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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three self-contained essays, each of which examines part of the
causal link among inward/outward foreign direct investment (FDI), intra-organizational proximity,
and in-house technology development performances.
The first essay explores why international joint ventures (IJVs)-an FDI-hosting arrangement
often employed by the global South to strengthen foreign investors' commitment to local
economic development-may lead to only partial success in nurturing local technological
capability. The experience of China's passenger vehicle sector demonstrates that, in the existence
of a substantial technological-capability gap between alliance partners, the IJV arrangement is
likely to create a "passive" learning mode where foreign firms determine what, when, and how
their local IJV partner firms should learn. Accordingly, learners using this IJV arrangement may
be able to strengthen their production capability, where interests of both IJV partner firms often
converge, but it leaves their project-execution and innovation capabilities largely undeveloped.
The second essay discusses how outward FDI can complement the IJV-based technological
capability-building process, through an analysis of the Shanghai Automotive Industry
Corporation (SAIC) case. When a firm is upgrading its technological capability, outward FDI can
allow learners to have access to human-embedded skills and knowledge and other intellectual
assets that are hardly accessible through the inward globalization strategy. Access to a wide range
of external resources is a critical ingredient for improving technological capability, and it can also
promote self-learning capability by encouraging subsequent learning-by-doing practices.
Accordingly, outward FDI can augment "active" nature in the "passive" learning mode created by
the inward globalization strategy.
The last essay examines why intra-organizational proximity matters for the technological catch-
up process, through a comparison of the Chinese Big Three automotive groups. As a firm's asset-
seeking inward/outward globalization strategy and domestic mergers are accompanied by
substantial growth in their organizations and assets, intra-firm governance affects the
internalization outcome of the acquired assets. The comparative analysis demonstrates that SAIC
surpasses the First Automotive Works and the Dongfeng Motor Group in terms of in-house
technology development partly because the former has managed its corporate growth within a
tight geographical and relational space, compared to the latter. Intra-organizational proximity
contributed to SAIC's technological capability-building process by encouraging the sharing and
integration of acquired resources across sub-operational units, thus creating group-wide synergy
for the effective internalization of the resources.
Dissertation Supervisor: Alice H. Amsden (MIT)
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Overview
Foreign Direct Investment, Intra-organizational Proximity,
and Technological Capability
Developing countries have long been interested in nurturing local technological capabilities in
order to move up the global value chain. They have been active in hosting foreign direct
investment (FDI), which is often called knowledge-embedded capital, seeing it as one of the most
effective and feasible vehicles for technology transfer. However, a higher presence of FDI does
not always ensure better local technological capability, and the FDI-based inward globalization
strategy often fails to serve as an effective means of technological catch-up. Empirical studies
suggest that FDI's long-term contribution to host economies, particularly from a local
technology-development perspective, is uncertain in both its sign and magnitude.
In this study, I explore the following two questions. One is why the FDI-based
technological catch-up strategy in the developing world often ends up in only partial success; the
other is how latecomers can overcome the limitations involved in the FDI-based catch-up model
to improve their technological capability. These questions may primarily interest scholars in the
fields of development studies, business strategy, or industry research, but the topics of technology
transfer and technological capability-building in the developing world may bequeath important
implications to much broader academic fields. For example, scholars of environmental studies
and science may also see the topic's relevance to their concerns, as global environmental damage
may not be able to be mitigated substantially unless the majority of developing countries adopt
clean and energy-efficient technologies, which demands active technology-transfer activities
from the developed world and intensive self-initiated capability-building practices in the
developing world.
To explore the main research questions specified above, I focus on the two-decade
experience of China's modem passenger-vehicle sector development. A primary fact that draws
my attention in the case selection is that the inward globalization model for China's passenger-
vehicle sector, based on the international joint venture (IJV) requirement with a strict control of
non-Chinese equity-share in each IV, has not yet met its ultimate goal of nurturing Chinese
automakers' technological capabilities according to global standards. This goal has not been met,
although huge domestic market potentials have given China the critical advantage, which is
rarely found in other developing countries, of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and
influencing foreign investors to commit to local technology development. Through detailed
studies of major firms in China's passenger-vehicle sector, I intend to demonstrate that (i) the
partial success of China's "exchange-market-for-technology" strategy is due to the limitation
inherent in the strategy itself rather than to the inappropriate implementation of the strategy; and
(ii) for a more comprehensive technological catch-up, thus, the sector would need to incorporate
some alternative approaches that can complement what is missing in the FDI-based learning
model.
In the first chapter, I focus on the cases of Shanghai-Volkswagen and Shanghai-General
Motors, which are often considered two of the most "successful" Sino-foreign auto-assembly
joint ventures (JVs). These case studies demonstrate that even the two leading IJVs have limited
their contributions to local production-capability building without nurturing local project-
execution and innovation capabilities. The primary reason was the "passiveness" inherent in the
IJV-based learning model, where multinational corporations control the contents, timing, and
method of learning for local JV partner firms and which discourages learners from being
proactive in building project-execution and innovation capabilities on the basis of their improved
production capability. Given the substantial gap in technological capability between IJV partners,
local firms have only limited opportunities to overcome the passiveness.
In the second chapter, then, I ask what learners can do to surmount the challenge raised
by the inward globalization model in the midst of building technological capability. To draw
implications, I analyze the case of the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), which
has been leading China's passenger-vehicle sector in terms of market share and in-house
technology development and, at the same time, has held a larger stock of overseas investment
than any other Chinese automaker. The SAIC story tells us that outward FDI, if used in an
appropriate way, can complement the IJV-based learning model substantially in terms of the
following aspects. First, acquired foreign assets have formed base technologies, which provide
SAIC a starting point for initiating a series of new vehicle development projects and to which
SAIC gradually added innovations through self-application practices. Second, outward FDI has
allowed SAIC to establish broad access to external knowledge and skills embedded in humans,
and this broad access has helped SAIC internalize the capability underlying external technologies
together with the technologies themselves. Finally, SAIC's improved technological capability,
thanks mainly to outward FDI and subsequent learning-by-doing practices, has strengthened its
IJV partner firms' commitment to China-based technology development projects. The key
implication from the SAIC case is that latecomers can turn into "active" learners from "passive"
ones with their outward globalization scheme.
In the last chapter, I highlight intra-organizational proximity as another key factor that
can affect technological capability-building outcomes. My central argument in this chapter is that
how to utilize acquired external resources to maximize firm-wide synergy is as important as how
to establish access to target external assets, and intra-organizational proximity is one critical
factor, particularly for M-form organizations to facilitate such synergy-creating process through
internal knowledge integration and sharing. To demonstrate this point, I compare SAIC with the
First Automotive Works (FAW) and the Dongfeng Motor Group (DFM), SAIC's two principal
domestic rivals. All of the three firms in the past were single-factory firms, but now they have
become large multi-divisional automotive groups as a result of their growth and knowledge-
acquisition strategies, involving new IJV establishment and domestic/cross-border mergers and
acquisitions. My comparative study of the three firms shows that (i) SAIC's in-house vehicle
development capability, considerably ahead of FAW's and DFM's, is partly due to its effective
intra-group governance system, optimized to mobilize internal resources for group-wide
technological learning; and (ii) SAIC's intra-organizational proximity has been a critical asset in
creating the governance system.
As usual in most qualitative studies, my study may also be susceptible to critiques
regarding the reliability of the interview-based primary data that its central argument depends on
or about the generalizability of its central argument based mainly on the case of China's
automotive industry. My research, however, may be shielded from such critiques, in the following
sense. First, I made substantial efforts to minimize individual biases that may be involved in the
interview process and to determine the credibility of the information collected through interviews.
Most of my firm interviews were conducted with mid-high level managers and senior engineers,
who had extensive knowledge about corporate strategies, history, and in-house technology
development. To avoid personal biases, I asked the same questions of multiple interviewees, and
adopted only the answers supported by more than one interviewee, in most cases. In addition,
whenever possible, I cross-checked the interview-based primary data with the information from
various secondary sources, such as statistics yearbooks, automotive magazines, newspapers, etc.
In general, I used only the primary data that were confirmed by other reliable sources, throughout
this study.
The second kind of critique, on generalizability, would be largely irrelevant, as I do not
intend to generalize the case of China's automotive sector to other industries or countries. Instead,
the main goal of my research is to offer one possible approach to explain why the FDI-based
learning model adopted by developing countries is often less successful than expected and how
some latecomers have successfully overcome the limitations of the model. In each chapter's
concluding section, however, I try to provide key lessons or implications drawn from my case
studies, which may convey general insights into the FDI-based catch-up in the developing world,
Third World Multinationals, or proximity within an M-form organization. In this respect, the
primary value of this study is that it enriches the currently sparse literature on the topic of the
new technological catch-up model, which involves outward as well as inward globalization (thus,
gives rise to Third World Multinationals) and has been adopted actively by large emerging
economies like China and India.
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Chapter I
Learning through the International Joint Venture:
Lessons from the Experience of China's Automotive Sector
"In carrying out in-house technology development projects, we have not benefited much from our
collaboration with foreign automakers. We have done almost allfor ourselves."
- A senior engineer, Dongfeng Group
"We did everything we promised to do."
- Philip Murtaugh, former CEO of GM China2
1. Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is distinguished from other types of global financial transactions
in that knowledge is embedded in it (Hymer, 1960). Multinational corporations (MNCs), the main
agent of FDI, bring their knowledge and know-how, as well as tangible capital, to host economies
in the process of managing their overseas operations and assets. The international joint venture
(IJV) is one particular form of FDI arrangement, where an MNC jointly controls overseas
operations in partnership with other MNCs or local firms. MNCs prefer IJV partnerships with
local firms to other FDI arrangements, particularly when they enter emerging markets where
substantial risk and uncertainty exist. FDI hosts may also favor the IJV arrangement because,
with the IJV arrangement, FDI hosts can influence MNCs to strengthen commitment to local
economic development-if local participation in the arrangement is assumed-while building
linkages to global production or distribution networks. More importantly, IJVs may allow local
firms to access knowledge embedded in the hosted investment better than other alternative FDI
Excerpted from Interview #21.
2 Quoted in Gallagher (2006), p. 63.
arrangements do because the former by nature presuppose certain degrees of cooperation and
collaboration between the equity holders.
The IJV arrangement has been at the center of China's "exchange-market-for-technology"
strategy for its passenger vehicle sector development (SDPC, 1994). Since 1983, the Chinese
central government has granted foreign automakers access to its domestic market, as long as they
operate China-based joint ventures (JVs) in collaboration with Chinese firms. A JV's non-Chinese
parties combined cannot claim more than a 50% stake for each of their Sino-foreign JVs, and
each JV project is reviewed every two to three decades, depending on its initial contract. In the
early period of foreign entry into the Chinese market, foreign passenger vehicle imports were
subject to strict import quota or tariffs, although these protectionist measures were either repealed
or loosened substantially after China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Harwit,
2001). This controlled inward globalization approach ultimately aims to build a sound local
automotive sector and to incubate technologically competitive local automakers within a short
period of time (Chu, 2008). China's government expected that the IJV arrangement, in
combination with its leverage power from China's huge market potentials, would effectively
induce MNCs to be good teachers for their local JV partners.
However, skepticism is growing concerning the JV-based catch-up model. Without doubt,
the Sino-foreign JV arrangement worked well for import substitution (IS); as of 2009, China had
developed the world's second largest passenger car market, and over 95% of the market's demand
was fulfilled by domestic-produced volume. Even a quarter century since the adoption of the IJV
model, however, was not long enough to incubate a technologically competitive local auto
producer: as of 2009, foreign-licensed models still captured over two-thirds of China's domestic
passenger car market.3 The link between the IJV model and technological catch-up seems even
weaker, given that the domestic market share, captured by Chinese independent brand models,
was in large part due to the rise of minor local independent automakers, such as Chery and Geely,
which have neither operated auto assembly IJVs nor been main beneficiaries of China's
automotive industry policy (Lu and Feng, 2005). In this sense, it seems difficult to say that the
IJV model has met the expected technological catch-up schedule.
My research question in this study is why IJV-based local technological capability
building in China's automotive sector has been so slow and yielded little, despite some favorable
conditions, such as the Chinese government's active support for the catch-up model's success and
China's seemingly strong bargaining power against foreign actors (thanks to its huge domestic
market). Is the poor outcome because of the inherent nature of the IJV-based catch-up model
itself or is it due to an inappropriate implementation of the model or some other reasons? My
main hypothesis is that the IJV arrangement in itself provides local firms with only "passive" and
"incomplete" learning opportunities because foreign firms, which have superior technological
capabilities, can effectively control various aspects of the main access channel to their strategic
assets (knowledge and skills, in particular) and they take the actual initiative in governing their
JVs' key technical affairs. In this respect, I follow in the footsteps of Hymer (1960).
2. Theoretical Framework and Method
My conceptual lens for this study is built on two propositions. One is that the core competency of
a high market-performer derives from its competitive capabilities for production, project
3 In 2009, 5.7 million (roughly 69%) out of 8.3 million units of passenger vehicles sold in China-excluding two
million units of minibuses, often classified as commercial vehicles-were foreign-branded sedans and recreation
vehicles produced by Sino-foreign assembly JVs (Fourin, 2010).
execution, and innovation (Amsden and Hikono, 1994); the other is that the outcome of
technological capability-building process of a firm lacking its own technological assets depends
on the firm's ability to take advantage of its production capability to nurture project-execution
and innovation capabilities (Lall, 1992).
As previously mentioned, I hypothesize that in the existence of substantial technological
gap between partner firms, the contribution of the IJV arrangement to such technological
capability-building process is, by and large, confined to the local firm (i.e., the learner)'s
improved production capability. In my theoretical framework, the rationale for the hypothesis
includes: (i) what the foreign firm transfers to the local firm through the IJV arrangement is
mostly the outcome of technological capability, rather than technological capability itself; (ii) the
IJV arrangement tends to encourage the local firm to master the transferred knowledge and skills
(thus, to improve production capability) while discouraging the firm from searching for their
alternative or new uses; (iii) the IJV arrangement leaves little maneuvering space for the local
firm, and the local firm does not have actual power to change this condition; (iv) the IJV lacks
innovation capability, and the foreign firm takes a dominant part in the IJV-related investment
projects; and (v) thus the local firm can hardly find a way to take advantage of its improved
production capability to nurture project-execution and innovation capabilities, depending solely
on the IJV arrangement. Figure 1-1 illustrates my conceptual lens, explained above.
I test the main hypothesis with a detailed case study of Shanghai-Volkswagen (SVW)
and Shanghai-General Motors (SGM), the two IJVs affiliated with the Shanghai Automotive
Industry Corporation (SAIC). The case study aims to demonstrate that (i) in the existence of a
substantial technological-capability gap between alliance partners, the IJV arrangement is likely
to create a "passive" learning mode where teachers, not learners, determine what, when, and how
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Figure 1-1: Conceptual Lens for This Study
to learn; and (ii) accordingly, the IJV's contribution may be substantial in building local
production capability, where IJV partner firms share common interests, but the contribution may
be marginal in nurturing local project-execution and innovation capabilities, due to the conflict of
interest between the IJV partner firms. If the SAIC case validates my hypothesis, then it would
support my view that regardless of its implementation, the IJV-based inward globalization model
is doomed to at best partial success in upgrading local technological capability, due to the passive
nature of the learning mode itself inherent in the model.
I chose SVW and SGM as case study subjects because they are among the best practices
of the Sino-foreign JV arrangement. Both IJVs not only have captured a large portion of the local
passenger car market4 on the basis of active technology transfer and localization activities, but
4 As of 2009, SVW and SGM were the top two passenger vehicle makers in China, in terms of annual sales. Both
also have developed better, though incomplete, in-house vehicle development capabilities 5 than
their other rival Sino-foreign JVs. For this reason, the case of SVW and SGM, as two exemplary
IJV practices in China's automotive sector, can help us distinguish what key issues may underlie
the IJV arrangement as a technological learning device.
For primary data collection, I conducted 25 in-depth interviews in winter 2007 and
summer 2008. Each interview lasted one to two hours, was based on semi-structured but open-
ended questionnaires. Interviewees included current and former employees (primarily, managers
and engineers) of China's five major automotive groups6 and their IJVs7 ; China's central and
local government officials; and other potential information holders, including journalists,
consultants, and researchers in the Chinese automotive field. In addition, I made two
manufacturing plant visits (SGM's Shanghai plant and Dongfeng-Honda's Guangzhou plant) for
plant-level data collection purposes. I complemented the primary data, collected through
interviews and plant visits, with various secondary sources, including the China Automotive
Industry Yearbook and the Fourin China Automotive Intelligence.
3. Literature Review
Three sets of existing studies provide critical insights into this research topic, as to inward FDI
and technological catch-up. I review here the development literature on technological capabilities,
IJVs sold 728,238 units and 708,356 units, respectively, during the whole year (Fourin, 2009).
5 As of 2009, GM is the only foreign automaker that operated a sizable independent local technical center, called the
Pan Asia Technical Automotive Center (PATAC), in partnership with a local firm. Also, SVW and SGM have
invested more in their in-house R&D than most other Sino-foreign JVs (for further details, see Table 2-3 in Chapter 2
of this dissertation volume).
6 The five automotive groups include SAIC, the First Automotive Works (FAW), the Dongfeng Motor Corporation
(DFM), the Guangzhou Automotive Group (GAG), and the Beijing Automotive Industry Corporation (BAIC).
7 The IJVs include SVW, SGM, PATAC, Dongfeng-Honda, FAW-VW, Guangzhou-Honda, Guangzhou-Toyota, and
Beijing- Hyundai.
the economic literature on FDI and local economic development, and the business literature on
the JV as a strategic alliance institution.
3.1. Knowledge, Learning, and Technological Capabilities
Knowledge is a critical production factor, but access to specific knowledge is challenging and
costly. Valuable knowledge in general exists in a tacit form, and this very characteristic of
knowledge raises difficulty in transacting it in the market place (Polanyi, 1966). Asymmetric
information between the consumers and suppliers of specific knowledge may also inhibit the
formation of an efficient market system for knowledge. Rent-seeking behavior is another obstacle
in having access to needed knowledge at the appropriate time (Amsden, 2001). Creating
knowledge, however, is not necessarily an easier alternative to buying it, given the cumulative
nature of knowledge (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). In general, making knowledge is more costly
and difficult than buying it, unless the producer already has a solid knowledge base and internal
innovation capability.
Technology, by nature, is knowledge; it is "the organization of knowledge for practical
purposes" (Mesthene, 1969: 492). Accordingly, technology shares basic characteristics with
knowledge; it is also hard to access and create. At a micro level, technology defines the nature of
a firm's product and production function. The technology currently available to a firm directly
affects the firm's immediate market performance. Each firm's competitive advantage depends
substantially on its ability to employ available technologies in a more efficient way and to create
improved technologies on the foundation of existing ones. Such an ability at the firm level can be
termed a firm's "technological capability." Technology is an outcome of technological
development activities, and their efficiency and effectiveness are determined by a firm's
technological capability.
A competitive firm in general has three kinds of technological capabilities: (i) production,
(ii) project execution, and (iii) innovation capabilities (Amsden and Hikino, 1994). Production
capability refers to a firm's ability to monitor, maintain, optimize, and improve existing
manufacturing operations in order to meet higher efficiency and quality standards. Project-
execution capability, which is also called investment capability (Westphal et al., 1985), includes a
wide range of skills and know-how, with which a firm can successfully establish a new operation
or expand the existing ones. Innovation capability is a firm's capacity to create new knowledge
(or improve existing knowledge) or to apply it to practical or commercial uses through ingenious
combinations of preexisting (whether internal or external) knowledge, skills, and other resources.
Although market leaders usually use their competence in innovation as sources of improving
other aspects of their technological capabilities (e.g., investment and production), latecomers
often reverse the sequence due to their insufficient innovation capability; that is, many latecomers
use production capability, developed from the acquired technology, as fundamental sources of
their improved investment and innovation capabilities (Dahlman et al., 1987).
As latecomers initiate their technological capability-building process on the basis of
external knowledge, their technological development depends substantially on their learning
ability (Amsden, 1989). A firm's learning performance is a function of the firm-level absorptive
capacity, which Cohen and Levinthal (1990: 128) define as "a firm's ability to recognize the
value of external knowledge, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends." On the one hand,
the absorptive capacity depends on the pre-existing internal knowledge base as knowledge is
cumulative and mutually complementary. A better understanding of the nature and value of
external knowledge can be established when a firm already has enough knowledge relevant to it.
On the other hand, intense internalization efforts nurture higher absorptive capacity (Kim, 1995).
The complete transfer of valuable knowledge is challenging due to its lack of explicitness;
external knowledge is thus effectively internalized through various efforts to explore and absorb
more of its tacit dimension, such as in-house R&D activities and learning-by-doing practices. A
simple adoption of external technology would not lead to a fruitful learning, unless it is
accompanied by intense assimilation and recreation practices. In this sense, learning is more than
mastering acquired knowledge and skills.
Building and improving technological capabilities is not an option but a "must" for a
firm's sustainable growth (Lall, 1992). Without strong technological foundations, the low-cost
advantage, which latecomers from the developing world often possess thanks to location-specific
factor prices, may be fragile, as it is sensitive to various external conditions that the latecomers
themselves cannot control. More stable sources of a firm's growth can be created when the
location-specific advantage is transformed into a firm-specific one (Dunning, 1977).
Technological capability is at the heart of this transformation process, and the developing world
has had serious concerns about how to nurture local technological capabilities (Wesphal et al.,
1985; Dahlman et al., 1987; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Kim, 1997).
3.2. FDI and Its Impacts on Host Economies
Is FDI's net-impact on host economies positive or negative? A substantial body of literature has
explored this question, but conclusive answers are not yet established. From a host economy's
perspective, FDI is a double-edged sword as potential positive and negative dynamics coexist in
it (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). On the one hand, FDI may induce positive spillovers in host
economies. The local presence of foreign firms can help domestic firms improve their
productivity and market performance through official transfers of advanced technology and
know-how or through the unintended spillover mechanism. FDI-driven output growth can also
lead to an improvement in intermediate sectors' competitiveness in terms of scale and output
quality. On the other hand, FDI may have crowd-out impacts on host economies. MNCs' market
entrance may weaken indigenous development dynamics by encroaching on domestic firms'
market share. Shrunken market share can push local firms into operation at a sub-optimal scale,
which, in turn, is likely to weaken their market positions further and discourage new investments
by local players. As the net of the two opposing forces-the spillover and crowd-out effects-can
differ by location, sector, and time, FDI's impact on host economies is hard to generalize
(Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005).
The spillover effect can happen either in horizontal or vertical directions. Horizontal
spillovers occur between MNCs and their local competitors. Besides official technology transfer
arrangement, local firms may be able to improve their productivity or product quality by
imitating MNCs' production technologies or marketing skills through market research
(Blomstr6m and Kokko, 1998), whose process can be accelerated by labor mobility between
indigenous local players and foreign-invested firms (Blalock and Gertler, 2005). In some cases,
more intense market competition, triggered by MNCs' market entry, can encourage local firms to
be more productive and innovative (Blomstr6m and Kokko, 1998). This type of spillover,
however, may be quite limited in reality, because MNCs tend to minimize the possibility of
horizontal spillover by tightening controls over their intellectual properties (Javorcik, 2004) or by
monopolizing local talents through high wages (Lipsey, 2004).
Spillovers can also happen vertically. MNCs may be willing to provide local parts
suppliers with opportunities for technical assistance or professional training, if they are closely
related through forward/backward linkages. Also, high quality-standards for local procurement,
set by MNCs, can indirectly contribute to local firms' technological development (Lall, 1978;
Moran, 2001). Moreover, MNC-generated local demands can help local firms achieve higher
economies of scale (Moran, 2005). Vertical spillovers face fewer obstacles than horizontal
spillovers, because the former are often mutually beneficial to both MNCs and local firms: better
local parts lead to higher quality final goods. Thus, vertical spillovers are more frequently found
in reality than horizontal ones (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005).
A set of empirical studies test FDI's net-impact on host economies, but the test results
somewhat diverge (Table 1-1). While many studies found statistically significant positive links
between the presence of FDI and the productivity of host economies, others found negative
correlations between them or failed to find any significant relationships. Inconsistent outcomes in
the table may reflect some methodological issues. One example is measurement errors and the
uncertainty involved in data or in some key parameters (e.g., output and productivity measures)
Table 1-1: Selected Studies on South-received FDI's Productivity Spillovers
Authors Country Year Data Unit ofAnalysis Result
Blomstr6m and Persson (1983) Mexico 1970 Cross-sectional Industry +
Blomstr6m (1986) Mexico 1970, 1975 Cross-sectional Industry +
Haddad and Harrison (1993) Morocco 1985-89 Panel Firm/Industry ?
Aitken and Harrison (1999) Venezuela 1976-89 Panel Firm
Djankov and Hoekman (1999) Czech Rep. 1993-96 Panel Firm
Schoors and van der Tol (2002) Hungary 1997-98 Cross-sectional Firm +
Smarzynska (2002) Lithuania 1996-2000 Panel Firm +
Blalock (2002) Indonesia 1988-96 Panel Firm +
Yeon (2003) S. Korea 1991-2000 Panel Firm +
Javorcik (2004) Lithuania 1996-2000 Panel Firm +
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) Romania, 1998-2000 Panel Firm Romania (+)
Czech Rep. Czech (-)
Note: "?" indicates mixed outcomes or statistically insignificant results.
of the testing models (Lipsey and Sj~holm, 2005). Another example is ambiguity in the direction
of causality. When a statistically significant, positive relationship exists between FDI stock and
sector-specific local productivity, it is often hard to tell whether more foreign firms enter the
sector where local productivity is already high enough, or the local productivity is high due to the
strong presence of foreign firms (Rodrik, 1999).
The different results, however, may simply suggest that FDI's net-impact cannot be
generalized as it is a function of certain country-specific or industry/firm-unique conditions. In
general, FDI inflows create larger positive externalities when host economies share similar socio-
economic conditions with MNCs' home base (Lipsey and Sj~holm, 2005). If local firms and
MNCs have too large a gap in terms of productivity or technology, local competitors are likely to
be crowded out of the market even before taking advantage of FDI-generated spillovers, and
MNCs may be discouraged from generating positive spillovers as it is too costly. This view partly
explains why a large fraction of FDI falls into the North-North FDI category.8
3.3. The Joint Venture for Strategic Alliance
The JV is an institutional means by which multiple business entities form a strategic alliance to
create synergy (Kale et al., 2000). A strategic alliance can take either a non-equity coalition form
or an equity-sharing collaboration form. In general, the latter type of alliance creates sturdier
inter-organizational ties as the sharing of financial interests reduces the possibility of
opportunistic behaviors and raises the level of each party's commitment to the partnership
(Scherer, 1980). For this reason, the JV, a typical form of equity-sharing alliance, is often
8 According to the author's calculation based on World Bank (2006) and the World Development Indicator Database,
over three quarters of the total cross-border direct investment flows were among advanced economies, as of 2002.
See Chapter 2 for further details.
considered as one of the most effective institutional means to form a solid inter-firm partnership
(Mowery et al., 1996). Meantime, strategic alliances can also be categorized into symmetric,
asymmetric, and mixed alliances, depending on the degree of the shared interests among alliance
parties (Barney, 2007). An alliance is symmetric when each firm has exactly the same incentive
to enter into the alliance, while it is asymmetric when each firm has a different motivation; a
mixed alliance is in between the two cases. The JV can fall into any of these three categories.
The primary purpose of the JV-based alliance is often more than financial interests.
Many firms use the JV arrangement for mutual learning purposes, in addition to incentives for
risk and uncertainty management, high scale economies, and low-cost market entry (Inkpen and
Beamish, 1997). The JV allows its stakeholders to exchange their mutually complementary assets
and to internalize external knowledge and skills (Hamel et al., 1989; Mody, 1993). The JV-
mediated technology transfer is often more effective than other transfer arrangements based on
market transactions because it can be more inclusive of tacit dimensions of knowledge, with
intense intra-JV collaboration and interactions (Mohr and Spekman, 1994).
The JV-mediated knowledge sharing does not always contain a successful learning
promise, however. The outcome instead depends on various factors including the gap or the
degree of complementarity in core competency between alliance partners. When each JV partner
owns a comparably strong core competency, JV partners are more willing to share their internal
and exclusive resources with each other (Mowery et al., 1996). A strategic alliance that lacks a
balance in core competency is fragile, as motivation to compete may overshadow incentive to
cooperate within the partnership (Park and Ungson, 200 1). If the purpose of the alliance is mutual
learning, inter-dependency and reciprocity are particularly important for its fulfillment (Lane and
Lubatkin, 1998). Also, the outcome depends on the degree of similarity in culture, organization,
and knowledge base between JV partner firms (Barkema et al., 1996; Inkpen, 2000). The JV is
likely to generate more positive outcomes when its stakeholders are very similar in terms of these
characteristics.
3.4. Implications for This Study
The following implications can be drawn from the review of the three sets of literature outlined
above.
First, a latecomer should nurture, as emphasized in the development-study literature, at
least three kinds of technological capabilities (production, project-execution, and innovation
capabilities) to become a global player, and needs to utilize its production capability as sources
for upgrading project-execution and innovation capabilities. In particular, the dynamic and
interactive mechanism, through which production capability leads the project-execution and
innovation capability-building process (or the other way around), is critical in cultivating and
upgrading overall technological capability.
Second, a substantial body of the FDI literature presents empirical evidence of the
positive correlation between the strong presence of FDI and the high market-performance of
firms and industries in FDI-hosting economies, but the direction of causality behind the
relationship is uncertain. Even when the efficiency of a host economy is assumed to be a function
of FDI flows or stock, it is still not clear whether the FDI-driven efficiency increase in the host
economy is from the spillover effect (i.e., improvement in local firms' efficiency due to the
presence of FDI) or from the crowd-out effect (i.e., replacement of local firms by foreign-
invested firms). Accordingly, the FDI-based learning model involves great uncertainty as to its
success, because the sign (i.e., whether FDI's net-contribution is positive or negative) and extent
(i.e., where FDI can contribute and where else it cannot) of FDI's net-contribution to the host's
technological capability-building process has not yet been examined thoroughly or depends on
local conditions.
Finally, the management literature demonstrates that the JV arrangement is most likely to
work well for mutual learning purposes, when each JV partner has comparably valuable and
complementary technological assets and capability. It is ambiguous, however, whether the JV can
still serve the same purpose if such a condition is not met. Accordingly, it is highly uncertain how
much a firm lacking knowledge-based core competencies can benefit from a JV partnership with
other technological leaders in terms of its technological capability-building process.
4. Case Study: Sino-foreign Automotive Assembly JVs
Using the case study of SVW and SGM, this section discusses the strength and weakness of the
IJV arrangement as an institutional vehicle to build local technological capabilities. The
following analysis focuses on why even a successful local IJV operator has experienced some
bottlenecks in upgrading its technological capabilities beyond a certain degree.
4.1. China's Passenger Car Sector in Brief
China has adopted an eclectic approach for its automotive sector development, which is
somewhere between Korea's independent model and Latin America's FDI-based model. The
Chinese government has granted foreign automakers access to its domestic market but only
through one particular form of FDI arrangement-IJVs in partnership with Chinese automakers,
where the upper threshold of the total foreign equity share in each IJV is strictly controlled at
50%. This IJV arrangement, strategically chosen for the main purpose of gaining access to
advanced skills and knowledge (SDPC, 1994), was expected to fulfill China's ultimate aim at
incubating technologically competitive local automakers (NDRC, 2004).
This controlled inward globalization model was effective in the stage of import
substitution (IS). Since the arrival of the American Motors Corporation-the first foreign
automaker that established a Sino-foreign automotive JV-in 1983, China took only a quarter of
a century to create the world's second largest domestic passenger-car market and to build the
world's third largest output capacity. Since 1997, almost the entire local passenger-vehicle
demand has been fulfilled by domestic-produced volume, and local passenger-car makers have
carried out a substantially high portion of their value-added activity within China. The increasing
export volume of domestic-produced passenger cars demonstrates that China's passenger car
sector has also developed the capability to meet globally competitive productivity and quality
standards.9 As illustrated by these facts, the Chinese automotive sector achieved an impressive
IS outcome within a short period of time.
It is questionable, however, whether the FDI-based model has provided Chinese
automakers with an effective vehicle for technological catch-up beyond the IS stage. In its 2004
automotive industry policy, China's central government acknowledged that its exchange-market-
for-technology strategy ultimately failed to meet its aims, given that Sino-foreign JVs functioned
as no more than local assembly bases for MNCs, and that the local firms operating the IJVs still
lacked in-house technology-development capability (Chen and Zhang, 2004; Lu and Feng, 2005;
Gallagher, 2006). The situation is not much different now; most Chinese automakers still depend
on foreign firms for technology, and foreign-licensed passenger vehicles capture roughly two-
9 In 2009, 122,874 units of passenger vehicles produced in China were exported to other countries. Among them,
55,206 units (45%) went to advanced economies such as North America, Western Europe, and Japan. Source:
Computed from Fourin (2010).
thirds of the domestic market (Fourin, 2010).
Then why is it the case that the same IJV-based catch-up model may be less effective in
the post-IS upgrading stage than in the earlier IS stage? A primary reason may be that the IJV
arrangement by nature is effective in nurturing local production capability, which is most crucial
in the IS stage, but less effective in promoting local capabilities for other dimensions of the
overall technological capability such as capabilities for project execution and innovation, which
are also essential in the post-IS upgrading stage. The following case study of SVW and SGM will
shed light on the validity of this hypothesis.
4.2. Sino-foreign JVs and Horizontal Knowledge Flows
As noted earlier, the term technological capability embraces at least three kinds of capabilities:
production, project execution, and innovation. Accordingly, the IJV arrangement's effectiveness
in building local technological capabilities needs to be linked with the arrangement's contribution
to these three segments of technological capabilities in China's passenger vehicle manufacturing
sector. In Section 4.2., I examine how SVW and SGM have helped SAIC nurture each of these
three segments.
4.2.1. Nature of the Sino-foreign JV Arrangement
Each Sino-foreign JV is a semi-permanent project that is subject to renewal every two to three
decades, with the approval of the Chinese central government. In the renewal process, terms and
conditions for each JV are supposed to be renegotiated by the JV equity holders. Foreign parties
combined cannot claim more than half the total equity of each JV. Literally, each equity holder
has the right to participate in the management of JVs in proportion to its share in total equity.
Foreign automakers have accessed China's domestic market under the IJV arrangement, while
not being allowed to operate wholly-owned assembly subsidiaries. Before China's accession to
the WTO in late 2001, the domestic passenger-car market was highly protected against foreign
imports through various public measures like import quotas and tariffs.
Each Sino-foreign JV exists as a separate business entity; it belongs to neither of the JV
partner firms. Sino-foreign JVs have their own assets and resources, none of which are under the
direct control of each JV partner firm. Their internal assets, including technologies and
production equipment/facilities, should be utilized only for the IJVs' own good without being
taken advantage of by other business entities, including IJV equity holders. Each Sino-foreign JV
also recruits its own people and operates internal training programs for its hires. Similar to other
tangible assets, human resources are the IJV's own asset; job rotations between each JV and its
stakeholder firms are strictly prohibited. That is, the JV employees are not allowed to work for
other business entities at the same time. The only direct connection between JVs and JV partner
firms exists at the top management level. Each Sino-foreign JV's top management board consists
of several delegates from each JV stakeholder. The number of board members reserved for each
JV stakeholder is determined according to its share in the total JV equity. Except for top
management, official resource-sharing channels do not exist between Sino-foreign automotive
JVs and their equity holders.
Under this arrangement, technology-related knowledge flows are quasi-delinked between
each IJV and its Chinese equity holder (Figure 1-2). Foreign JV partners transfer their product-
specific technologies to their JVs for local production of the chosen vehicle models. In many
cases, foreign equity holders in the Sino-foreign JV are chosen from their headquarters' (HQ)
development or engineering department in order to handle such technology transfer processes
smoothly and to manage technical affairs within the JV skillfully. In contrast, the Chinese side
typically sends its management or marketing people to the JV. To achieve technology transfer,
frequent interactions are necessary between the JV and its foreign JV partner. The MNC HQ
often sends its own engineers to the JV to assist the JV-hired engineers and shop-floor workers
technically so that the transferred technology can be adopted for local production. Human
resource exchanges in the opposite direction are not rare, either: JV engineers are often sent to the
MNC HQ for training purposes. Accordingly, each Sino-foreign JV can secure an official
learning channel in improving its production capability.
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Figure 1-2: Comparison of an Ideal IJV Model and a Typical Sino-foreign JV Practice
This knowledge-transfer process, however, does not leave much room for the Chinese JV
partner firm. It has little to offer its JV from a technical standpoint, and it is not allowed to take
advantage of the JV's improved technological capabilities, thanks to the technology transfer.
Perhaps this practice deviates somewhat from the ideal IJV model that the Chinese government
imagined when it formulated the IJV-based catch-up strategy, as skills and know-how
accumulated within the IJVs have remained quasi-external to local firms.
4.2.2. IJVs and Production Capability
SVW and SGM conform to the above-described Sino-foreign JV arrangement. Both SVW and
SGM are independent business entities, which hire their own personnel and operate and manage
their own assets. SAIC has half the total equity share for each JV, and its delegates in each JV's
management board are mainly in charge of human resource management, local procurement
(except for key capital goods for production), product sales and marketing, and government
relations. Volkswagen (VW) and General Motors (GM), whose representatives are primarily
responsible for the IJVs' technical affairs, control the other half of SVW and SGM's equity. As of
2009, all of both IJVs' products were respectively VW- and GM-branded vehicles.
SVW, founded in 1985, began its operation with the assembly of imported, completely
knocked-down (CKD) kits for the Santanal", a mid-sized sedan based on VW's 1982 technology.
Its beginnings were humble. For the first five years of its operation, SVW used the remodeled
Shanghai Tractor and Automobile Corporation (STAC) manufacturing facilities, which were
SAIC's non-cash contribution to the JV, without having its own assembly plant. The initial STAC
factory with a labor-intensive assembly line had an extremely limited annual production capacity
of 5,000 vehicles. Over the next several years, VW renovated the plant to expand SVW's CKD
assembly capacity to the level of 75,000 units a year, but SVW's productivity in early periods of
its operation was as low as 100 vehicles a day (Posth, 2006).
The lack of skilled labor, as well as dated manufacturing facilities, was responsible for
the low productivity. When SVW was in its initial operation, most of its shop-floor workers were
rural junior high school graduates without much practical vehicle production experience (Long,
1996). VW sent 35 to 65 German engineers to Shanghai under three-year contracts in order to
10 The original Santana CKD kit consisted of 5,200 parts and components (Posth, 2006).
train local production workers (Posth, 2006). SVW offered new hires a three-year on-the-job
training program, consisting of both lectures and practical training on modem automobile-
production system and their missions in SVW's actual production lines (Long, 1996). Only those
who completed the three-year training program were placed on production lines (ibid.).
After its first modem plant began operations in April 1990, SVW's overall productivity
improved substantially. In contrast to the renovated STAC factory, SVW's Shanghai No. 1 plant
was built on modem technologies, not only for vehicle and engine assembly but also for other
core production processes including pressing, stamping, welding, and painting. SVW's annual
production volume increased over seven times, from 15,688 units in 1989 to 115,316 units in
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Figure 1-3: SVW's Production-Capacity Expansion, 1985-2009
Source: Created by author; Annual production data from Fourin (1998-2010); other information from SVW
homepage h://www.csvw.com) and firm interviews.
1994, when the Santana assembly line was completely transferred to the new plant with an annual
production capacity of 100,000 vehicles and 180,000 engines (Figure 1-3). This growth was
accompanied by SVW's active efforts at localization. By the end of 1994, SVW achieved a local-
content ratio of 86% for the Santana model (for further details, see Section 4.3. below). With the
higher local-content ratio, SVW's output capacity was less constrained by the internal foreign
exchange reserves that could be mobilized to import CKD kits from Germany.
Rapid output growth was driven not only by increased capital efficiency (the introduction
of modem manufacturing equipment and facilities) but also by improved labor productivity at the
plant level (as a result of VW-initiated on-the-job training). In order to demonstrate an
improvement in SVW's production capability, I use the trend of annual output volume per worker
between 1990 and 1994 as a substitute for the plant-level learning curve of the same period,
which I cannot draw due to a lack of data. Analysts may claim that the accumulation of labor's
production skills and know-how was the main driver of the increase in the per capita output
volume during the period because SVW produced only one vehicle model (Santana) and there
was no further production capacity expansion until the end of 1994 (Figure 1-4; see also Figure
1-3). In other words, capital- and technology-related variables can be controlled during the period.
SVW's annual output volume per worker increased dramatically from 6.1 units in 1990 through
12.8 units in 1992 to 17.0 units in 1994 (Figure 1-5). A large fraction of this increased efficiency
resulted from the improved labor productivity, driven by knowledge transfer (through on-the-job
training and technical assistance) and the mastery of the transferred know-how and skills through
actual production practices.
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Source: Computed from CATARC (1986-1997).
Despite the plant-level productivity increase, SAIC wanted more than what VW brought
to SVW. One thing that SAIC demanded from VW was more advanced technologies than were
currently being used, and their frequent updates. By 2000, SVW finished constructing the
foundation of its current production bases: four manufacturing plants in Shanghai and Nanjing,
with a total annual production capacity of over half a million vehicles (see Figure 1-3).
Nonetheless, SVW produced only one vehicle model until it added Santana 2000, a minor-
upgraded version of the original Santana, to its product lineup in 1995; SVW produced only these
two models until 1999, when its regional rival, SGM, began its initial vehicle production (see
Figure 1-4).
The original Santana was a four-door mid-size sedan (the second-generation Passat),
which was sold in advanced markets between 1981 and 1989 (Edmonds, Inc., 2010). From
SAIC's perspective, the dated Santana model needed to be replaced by newer vehicle models
adopting more advanced technologies (Gallagher, 2006). VW, however, did not share this strong
need because Santana was still selling well-in 1998, for example, SVW captured 46% of
China's domestic market with Santana's two sister models-primarily due to SVW's oligopolistic
market position.
Another issue obvious to SAIC was SVW's lacking in-house technology-development
capability. When the Chinese government and SAIC signed the IJV project with VW, they
expected that SVW would follow a sequential evolutionary path from a CKD kit assembler
through an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to an original design/brand producer
equipped with independent in-house vehicle development capacity. But even a decade after its
initial operation, SVW was no more than one of VW's multiple global auto-assembly bases
lacking R&D capability. From VW's perspective, SAIC's desire to bring more in-house technical
functions to SVW was not feasible in every sense. In the first place-even besides additional
capital investment in development and testing equipment-SVW would have to hire a sizable
number of German engineers for new vehicle development purposes, each of whom would
demand over 100 times higher wages than an average local SVW worker received in the late
1980s (Posth, 2006). Although the exact number for SVW is not available, the estimate by the
American Motors Corporation (AMC), the foreign equity holder of the Beijing-Jeep company,
sheds light on how much SVW's comparable local R&D efforts would cost: in the mid-1980s
AMC estimated that it would cost an additional US$200 million for local R&D and engineering
activities alone, if it initiated a new vehicle development project in China, besides an additional
capital cost of US$800 million for the modernization of manufacturing machinery and facilities
and testing equipment (Mann, 1997). Equipping SVW with vehicle-development capabilities was
not easily justifiable from a cost-effective perspective either, given that VW already had a
number of vehicle models that could be immediately introduced to China's market.
Such a conflict of interests pushed SAIC to consider a new JV in partnership with GM in
1998. From SAIC's standpoint, the primary purpose of the deal was to create larger maneuvering
space within the IJVs by inducing competition between VW and GM (Gallagher, 2006). As a
latecomer to China's market, GM was active in its JV partnership with SAIC, the local market
leader. GM promised to bring its up-to-date technologies to its JV and establish a sizable
technical center in China. As promised, GM introduced contemporary Buick lineups to China
through SGM, and established a sizable China-based technical center, the Pan Asia Technical
Automotive Center (PATAC), in a separate JV partnership with SAIC. GM's active market-entry
strategy effectively incentivized VW's strengthened local commitment. VW's response came
rapidly; shortly after GM's arrival in Shanghai, SVW extended its product lineup, and introduced
more advanced technologies, although the dated Santana model was still produced until 2008 (see
Figure 1-4).
At present, SGM has four manufacturing plants in three locations: two in Shanghai, and
one each in Yantai and Shenyang. The two Shanghai plants, which in combination have an annual
production capacity of 320,000 vehicles and 200,000 engines, are the central production base for
SGM (Figure 1-6). The Yantai and Shenyang plants were renovated from acquired production
facilities, due to SGM's urgent need to expand production capacity before the completion of its
second Shanghai plant. In contrast to SVW, SGM began its operations with modem
manufacturing facilities, skipping the CKD assembly stage." In accordance with the then-local-
content regulation of 40% for the initial. year of production, SGM's first Buick sedan sourced
around half its final output value locally; SGM's Sail model, launched in 2001, even achieved a
" In China, imported parts and components are not considered CKD kits, if they are for a vehicle model, whose
local-content ratio is over 40%.
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Figure 1-6: SGM's Major Production Capacity Expansion, 1998-2009
Source: Created by author; Annual production volume data from Fourin (1998-2010); other information from
SGM homepage and finrm interviews.
70% local-content ratio in the year of its market debut. SGM owed this outcome substantially to
SVW's early localization efforts; the latecomer, with the mediation of SAIC, could share the first-
mover's primary local supply partners (Tao, 2005).
As a second mover, SGM also benefited from the solid pool of semi-skilled labor in
Shanghai. By the late 1990s, Shanghai already became the center of China's passenger vehicle
manufacturing sector, thanks to SVW's enormous market success. The SVW-provided training
program and first-hand manufacturing experience enriched Shanghai's local pool of semi-skilled
labor with good knowledge of and experience in modem automotive manufacturing. When SGM
began operations, a significant number of its production workers were ex-SVW employees,
which in fact caused a substantial conflict between VW and SGM's two stakeholders-SAIC and
GM (Tao, 2005). Of course, SGM had its own job training and technical assistance programs for
its hires, but it clearly began the market race from a high starting point, on the foundation of pre-
existing local infrastructure developed by the first mover.
Although sufficient information to draw SGM's plant level learning curve is not
available, a rough guess of SGM's improved production capability can be made with the
available output and employment data. As illustrated in Figure 1-6, SGM had only one
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Source: Created by author; Data from Fourin (2010) and CATARC (2000-2008).
manufacturing plant (Jinqiao North) in Shanghai until its Jinqiao South plant began operations in
May 2005. Given that SGM's Jinqiao North plant had a production lineup of only one to three
vehicle models between 1999 and 2004 (Figure 1-7), I attribute part of the changes in annual
output volume per worker during the same period to changes in labor productivity, caused by
internal training program and subsequent learning-by-doing practices. Except for the first year of
the period, when SGM's employment increased by roughly 50% from 2,075 in 1999 to 3,011 in
2000, annual output volume per worker in SGM's Jinqiao North plant continuously increased by
substantial margins, from 11.4 in 1999 through 31.2 in 2002 to 36.0 in 2004 (Figure 1-8). This
fact in part shows that SGM engineers and production workers have accumulated skills and
know-how necessary to utilize existing manufacturing facilities and equipment efficiently, and to
optimize existing production technology.
In sum, the SVW and SGM case demonstrates that the two IJVs have developed in-house
production capability on the basis of technologies and relevant technical support provided by VW
and GM. The primary incentive for the technology transfer was to raise the plant-level
productivity and product quality by helping the IJV workers take advantage of existing
manufacturing facilities and equipment. With the foreign partner firms' technology transfer, both
SVW and SGM currently produce export-quality products at competitive cost12 , and this gives
rise to a critical improvement in local production capability.
4.2.3. IJVs and Project-execution Capability
Production capability, though crucial, is not sufficient to prepare local firms to be solid
contenders in the global automotive industry. Local firms still need some other in-house
capabilities. One of them is project-execution capability.
SAIC has accumulated certain degrees of project-execution capability from its JV
partnerships with VW and GM. Until 2009, there were five major expansions in SVW and SGM's
production capacity (excluding the case of acquisition-based capacity increases) and SAIC
actively participated in each project (Table 1-2; see also Figures 1-3 and 1-6). The division of
labor between SAIC and its foreign JV partners was clear in each expansion project. On the one
hand, foreign JV partner firms were responsible for the overall assembly design and machinery
procurement for each manufacturing plant. VW and GM provided their JVs with the assembly-
line drawings and related technical assistance, and were in primary charge of procuring
manufacturing equipment for the new plants. On the other hand, SAIC took charge of the
construction management and engineering. The pre-investment feasibility assessment and the
12 In 2006, SGM exported 3,350 units (SAIC, 2006), for example, and part of the SVW-produced volume has been
exported to the Asia, Australia, and North America market since 2004 (Interview #4).
actual plant construction work for each project were carried out by the Shanghai Institute of
Mechanical and Electrical Engineering (SIMEE), one of SAIC Group's wholly owned
subsidiaries. 13
Table 1-2: Expansion of SVW and SGM's Major Manufacturing Plants
SVW Plants (Shanghai) SGMPlants (Shanghai)
No. ] No. 2 No. 3 Jingiao North Jingiao South
Project scale (annual Vehicles: 100 Vehicles: 200 Vehicles: 150 Vehicles: 150 Vehicles: 170
production capacity in Engines: 180 Engines: 270 Engines: 100
thousand units) Transmissions: 200
Project begun February 1985 October 1991 December 1997 January 1997 September 2003
Project completed April 1990 December 1994 April 2000 April 1999 May 2005
Assembly line design VW VW VW GM GM
Procurement of VW VW VW GM GM
production equipment
Pre-investment SIMEE SIMEE SIMEE SIMEE SIMEE
feasibility study
Construction & SIMEE SIMEE SIMEE SIMEE SIMEE
production preparation
Source: Firm interviews and SVW and SGM's official websites.
This pattern of intra-JV division of labor seems natural in light of each party's compara-
tive advantage. As SVW and SGM produce VW and GM's products, respectively, the former's
manufacturing facilities necessarily need to reflect the latter's production technologies. The
knowledge gap between the foreign and Chinese JV partners regarding the technologies restricted
SAIC's involvement in some core tasks in each investment project such as designing assembly
lines and procuring appropriate capital-goods providers. However, SAIC played a leading role in
the actual construction phase. With half a century of manufacturing experience", SAIC was
capable of managing and mobilizing internal and other local resources effectively so as to
13 Interview #4.
14 The precursor of the current SAIC Group was founded in 1958.
complete the projects on time and within budget.
From the plant-expansion projects, SAIC could improve part of its project-execution
capability to a certain degree. SAIC had accumulated project-execution skills internally by
involving SIMEE in SVW and SGM's major investment projects. An improvement in SAIC's
project-execution capability is partly evidenced by the time SIMEE spent in completing each
expansion project: obviously, the more SIMEE worked for SAIC's JVs, the sooner it completed
its mission. When SIMEE undertook the construction and manufacturing preparation work for
SVW's No. 1 plant, it took over five years to build the manufacturing facility to an annual
production capacity of 100,000 vehicles and 180,000 engines (See Table 1-2). However, it spent
only three years and two months completing its construction work for a bigger manufacturing
plant with an annual production capacity of 200,000 vehicles and 270,000 engines (SVW No. 2
plant). The most recent SVW plant began operations in two years and five months from the onset
of the project. Similarly, SGM's two main plants were completed in two years and three months
(Jinqiao North) and in one year and nine months (Jinqiao South), respectively.
Of course, the project-execution capability that SAIC was able to improve from its IJV
experience was partial at best given that SAIC did not have a chance to accumulate its skills and
experience for basic and detailed project engineering tasks. SAIC's role has been marginal in
such segments of the JV-related investment projects because they should reflect the JV-adopted
foreign technologies. The situation is not likely to change, unless SAIC-affiliated JVs produce
SAIC-developed passenger vehicles instead of VW and GM's vehicle lineups, a scenario that is
highly unlikely.
4.2.4. IJVs and Innovation Capability
Like other Sino-foreign JVs, the two SAIC-affiliated IJVs have adopted VW and GM's
technology under the official license contracts. Foreign automakers have ruled out JV-initiated
new vehicle development, primarily due to its low financial feasibility. From an objective
standpoint, the current OEM production model may be ideal for Sino-foreign assembly JVs, as it
is cost-effective and time-saving. Accordingly, foreign automakers' other investment strategies
have been formulated given this OEM production model. At present, basic R&D functions,
necessary to develop new vehicles internally, are quasi-nil in most Sino-foreign JVs. Foreign
automakers' non-manufacturing investment in their JVs has been limited to engineering support
for the local adaptation of the imported technologies, such as slight modifications of vehicles'
interiors to suit local tastes.15 SVW is no exception to this trend.
SGM's case, however, somewhat deviates from the above explanation. Until now GM
has invested in China-based engineering capability more actively than any other foreign
automakers. PATAC is the showcase of GM's efforts at more comprehensive knowledge transfer.
Since its founding in 1997, PATAC has been involved primarily in local adaptation of GM's
passenger vehicle models (e.g., interior/exterior modifications) and vehicle safety testing.
Literally, PATAC and SGM are two separate business entities, but they have developed strong
business ties. Initially, around three-quarters of PATAC's business was done for SGM, and the
share further increased to over 90% after SGM's development center was consolidated with
PATAC's in 2003.16 Recently, GM has expanded PATAC's scale and functional coverage
substantially. The initial US$50 million JV now owns total capital assets worth US$300 million,
15 Interviews #1, 3, 5, 6, 12, 16, 21, 23, 24, and 25.
16 Interviews #2 and 3.
and its employment level increased four-fold from 400 in 2002 to 1,600 in 2009 (Li, 2009). With
its rapid external growth, PATAC has redefined its primary missions: as of 2009 PATAC
engineers were also carrying out part of the concept car and platform development projects for
SGM's future passenger vehicle lineups. In 2008, GM officially announced that it would equip
PATAC with independent in-house vehicle development capabilities by 2010 (ibid.)17 , although
this plan is being met with skepticism because the U.S. government has prohibited the public loan
made to rescue GM from bankruptcy from being spent on the firm's global business expansion
(Bradsher, 2009a).
In the case of SGM, there is evidence that its foreign equity holder will substantially
expand China-based vehicle development and engineering activities beyond modest technology
adaptation works. SAIC's experience with SGM and PATAC might have been an asset, to a
certain extent, when it launched its first self-branded passenger vehicle in 2005. But this point
should not be exaggerated given that PATAC-SGM's engineering arm-still has only limited
technological capacity by global standards, with emphasis on minor vehicle modifications and
safety testing. Also, SGM's case is an exception rather than a typical example. Other foreign
firms have made far less investment in local technology development activities than GM.'8 There
is little evidence that the Sino-foreign JV practice has significantly upgraded local JV partner
firms' innovation capabilities. Foreign firms in the first place have not carried out critical basic
R&D activities or new product development projects in China.
One factor we should not overlook in the SAIC-GM alliance case is the sequence of the
events that occurred between PATAC's functional expansion and SAIC's improved in-house
17 Also confirmed with Interview #2.
18 See Table 2-3 in Chapter 2.
vehicle development capability. When GM decided to strengthen its joint R&D activities with
SAIC through PATAC in 2008, SAIC already possessed substantial in-house vehicle development
capability based on technologies and human resources acquired from Rover, as evidenced by the
market launch of Roewe 750-the first of SAIC's own brand models-in 2007.19 In other words,
in terms of the direction of causality, it is more likely that GM came closer to SAIC because
SAIC had better innovation capability, rather than that SAIC developed better innovation
capability because GM came closer to SAIC. In addition, GM's special circumstance may have
also affected its China strategy. GM's HQ in Detroit may be interested in transferring an
increasing portion of its R&D function to PATAC because GM's recent financial trouble could
reduce GM HQ's ability to develop new vehicles targeting emerging markets in a timely manner.
With this strategy, GM aims to employ PATAC as its regional R&D hub, which would mitigate
GM HQ's R&D burden on the Asian market.20 Another signal showing that GM has begun to
look at SAIC as a critical strategic partner is GM's recent decision to establish a new 50-50
automotive assembly JV in India, in alliance with SAIC (Bradsher, 2009b).
In sum, even the best practice of the Sino-foreign JV arrangement does not weaken the
argument that foreign automakers' investment in local R&D is a function of the pre-existing local
innovation capability, rather than the other way around. Until now, the dominant Sino-foreign JV
business model-a quasi-OEM production system where the IJVs manufacture foreign-licensed
vehicle models in accordance with the drawings and specifications provided by leading global
automakers-has failed to make critical contributions to local innovation-capability building. The
IJ model by nature does not need local engineering capability beyond a minor local adaptation
19 Outward FDI's contribution to SAIC's in-house technology development will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
20 Interview #2.
of imported technologies, and Sino-foreign JVs, by and large, have remained assembly-
specialized operations, lacking the abilities and means to nurture local innovation capability.
4.2.5. Knowledge Flows from IJVs to Wholly SAIC-controlled Subsidiaries
As argued in the previous sections, Sino-foreign JVs have substantially improved their in-house
technological capabilities through technological transfer from foreign JV partner firms and
following-up learning-by-doing practices, although the improvement is less obvious in project-
execution and innovation capabilities than in production capability. Then, the next question is
how local JV partner firms can benefit themselves from the Sino-foreign JVs' improved
technological capabilities in the absence of official knowledge flow channels between Sino-
foreign JVs and local JV partner firms. As explained in Section 4.2.1., Sino-foreign JV's in-house
technological capabilities are their own assets, which cannot be utilized for local firms' self-
benefits without the consent of their foreign JV partner firms. The official channel through which
the IJVs' in-house technological capabilities can be transferred to local JV partner firms' wholly
owned subsidiaries does not exist under the current Sino-foreign JV arrangement.
SAIC released such constraints on horizontal knowledge flows primarily through the
acquisition of ex-JV employees. Since 2006, SAIC has operated a wholly owned vehicle
development division, called SAIC Motor. The flagship SAIC subsidiary, taking initiatives in the
group's self-brand vehicle development, is staffed by SAIC's best R&D and engineering
personnel, and has already carried out several independent vehicle development projects (e.g.,
Roewe 750) successfully.21 A substantial number of SAIC Motor's key engineers have working
experience with SVW, SGM, and PATAC. In many cases, they were scouted by SAIC with more
21 Interview #5.
attractive financial packages than they received at the SAIC-affiliated IJVs.
A SAIC Motor engineer whom I interviewed is an example of such practices. The ex-
PATAC hire voluntarily left his former company to work for SAIC Motor. He was very satisfied
with his current job because not only is he paid more by his current employer but he is also
involved in more creative and productive activities. 2 This hiring practice is not limited to skilled
engineers. A SAIC manager confirmed that a considerable number of ex-SVW and SGM shop
floor production workers were working for SAIC Motor, as well. With such hiring practices,
SAIC has spread its JV-based learning internally to its wholly controlled subsidiaries.
In addition, SAIC has internally accumulated improvements in project-execution
capability, through a series of production-capacity expansion projects for its IJVs. SIMEE's
improved project-execution capability was a precious asset when the SAIC Group independently
undertook the assembly line and engine manufacturing plant construction project for SAIC Motor,
with the substantial assistance of Ricardo 2010-a then-British automotive consultancy, which
later became SAIC's subsidiary.
I note, however, that inter-firm variations exist in terms of the degree of benefit from
IJV-based learning. For example, the First Automotive Works (FAW) and the Dongfeng Motor
Corporation (DFM), which are strong rivals of SAIC in the local market, have been less
successful than SAIC in using IJV-trained human resources, in part due to their rigid wage
system. China's socialist traditions still remain relatively entrenched in these two centrally
controlled state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 2 5 . Their compensation system, based on jobs and
22 Interviews #5 and 20.
21 Interview #19.
24 Interview #23.
25 Both FAW and DFM are under the direct control of China's central government.
seniority, allows far lower thresholds for wage differentials than SAIC's does. 26 Their rigid wage
system has substantially limited both FAW and DFM's ability to attract local talent, while SAIC,
a locally controlled SOE 27 located in Shanghai, which has a more open and capitalist atmosphere
than most other Chinese cities, seems to be relatively free from the socialist legacy.
4.3. Sino-foreign JVs and Vertical Knowledge Flows
Automobile manufacturing is a composite art that deals with over 20,000 parts (Womack et al.,
1991). Accordingly, local assembly and supply capabilities are inter-dependent; quality vehicles
are built on quality parts and components. Recently, their inter-dependency has been higher than
in the past. Parts suppliers' technological capability is viewed as an increasingly crucial
constituent of vehicle assemblers' technological competency, as their R&D and engineering
collaboration has been extended to very early stages of new vehicle development (Fujimoto, 2007;
Jurgens, 2001). Taking up this point, in this section, I examine how Sino-foreign assembly JVs
have contributed to the technological development of China's local supply sector.
4.3.1. The Early Construction Stage of the Local Automotive Supply Base
When early Sino-foreign assembly JVs entered into actual vehicle production, extremely weak
local-supply capability was a serious obstacle (Posth, 2006). Most local parts suppliers lacked the
production capabilities to meet MNC-set quality standards; thus, early assembly IJVs in China
began their local production through the assembly of imported CKD kits. The Chinese central
government granted the IJVs their initial operations based on the CKD kit assembly, but required
26 Interview #23.
27 The SAIC Group is an SOE under the direct control of the Shanghai municipal government.
them to maintain certain time schedules for localization. Public measures like import tariffs,
local-content regulation, and foreign exchange control were used to incentivize the IJVs'
localization activities. Also, failure to abide by such guidelines from Beijing meant the
withdrawal of various preferential policies (e.g., subsidized credits) for the IJVs. A primary
reason for China's strong localization drive is that imported CKD kits exhausted the then-limited
national foreign exchange reserves and the simple assembly of the foreign-made kits was far
from desirable in building the local automotive sector (SDPC, 1994).
With local currency's limited convertibility to hard currency, foreign JV partners also
saw an imminent need to boost local sourcing (Harwit, 1995; Mann, 1997; Posth, 2006).
Although they could earn large profits by selling CKD kits to their JVs, this CKD business model
was not sustainable due to the limited foreign exchange reserves. Under the then-Chinese
foreign-exchange regime, Sino-foreign JVs could raise hard currency necessary to import CKD
kits only by exporting their final products. Export, however, was not immediately possible, as
domestically-assembled vehicles were too expensive given the quality by global standards, due to
the small production scale, low labor productivity, and lack of production skills. Accordingly, all
of the IJV-produced vehicles were supposed to be sold locally. Sino-foreign JVs needed to raise
their output volume to drive cost down and accumulate local production skills, but their
production scale was constrained by the amount of foreign exchange reserves that could be used
to import CKD kits. This is the dilemma in the CKD business model: the local ability to export
depends on the local ability to import CKD kits, but, conversely, this local ability is constrained
by the amount of foreign exchange reserves determined by the ability to export. Expanding local
sourcing was considered as the most realistic solution to this dilemma.
However, substantial inter-firm variations existed in localization outcomes, partly due to
dissimilar local capacity to deal with the coordination problem, which was obvious in the early
stages of China's automotive sector development (Harwit, 1995; Thun, 2006). When SVW-the
most successful localizer among early Sino-foreign JVs (Figure 1-9)-initiated its localization
efforts, VW's technical staff could not find a single local parts supplier near Shanghai that met
the global company's minimum quality standards (Posth, 2006). VW was willing to help local
parts suppliers improve their product quality, but it was evident that VW's technical assistance
would be in vain unless the supply firms upgraded their dated production equipment and facilities.
VW thus requested that they make additional investment in manufacturing facilities, as a
prerequisite to accessing its technical assistance. Local supply firms were, however, reluctant to
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Figure 1-9: Localization Paths of Three Early Sino-foreign JVs, 1985-1997
Note: In 1997, Peugeot liquidated its stake in Guangzhou-Peugeot, and Honda took over the stake to establish a
new joint venture with Guangzhou Automotive Group (Guangzhou-Honda).
Source: Data from Harwit (1995) and Huang and Thun (2002).
take the financial risk attached to their capital investment unless they were guaranteed solid
supply contracts with SVW (Huang and Thun, 2002). Unfortunately, such contracts were not
immediately possible given SVW's limited operation scale and local supply firms' weak
capability during its early operation periods. 28
The Shanghai municipal government played a critical role in breaking through the
standstill. It established the Localization Office under the direct supervision of the Mayor's
Office in order to monitor and support the localization drive of the Shanghai automotive industry.
Funds for localization activities, controlled by the Localization Office, were raised through a
localization tax, which was set at around 16% of a Santana's retail price (Huang and Thun, 2002).
Local-supply firms could substantially reduce investment-involved financial risks through their
access to loans subsidized by the localization fund. As coordination failure became less obvious,
VW became more engaged in SVW's localization project (Long, 1996; Posth, 2006). When local-
supply firms upgraded their production facilities, SVW hired retired engineers from the German
Senior Expert Service as short-term consultants. Those engineers were in primary charge of
training SVW assembly workers and engineers, and providing local-parts suppliers with technical
supports on the operation of new production equipment and facilities (Posth, 2006). As a result,
the number of SVW's local-parts suppliers that could meet VW's quality standards (under most
circumstances) increased from 31 in 1990 to 230 in 1997 (Thun, 2006).
The Sino-foreign JV arrangement, as exemplified by the SVW case, generated industry-
wide vertical knowledge spillovers, when it was implemented in combination with an effective
public support and incentive system. SVW was the main window through which local-parts
suppliers could access VW' advanced production technology and know-how. In particular, VW's
28 In late 1985, SVW assembled about 30 cars per day (Huang and Thun, 2002).
technical assistance, which aimed at a more complete transfer of production knowledge and skills,
helped local parts suppliers utilize their modern production equipment in order to raise their
product quality. Supply contracts with SVW let them further accumulate learning through their
self-application practices (Huang and Thun, 2002).
Most other early assembly IJVs in China were not as active in localization as SVW was.
For example, over 70% of Beijing-Jeep's local content in 1997 was actually sourced from the
outside of its main assembly base in Beijing (mostly from Shanghai) 29, suggesting that the IJV
simply took advantage of existing supply infrastructure rather than making efforts to build its
own. This is a striking contrast to the fact that 90% of SVW's local content was procured within
Shanghai (Huang and Thun, 2002). This fact, however, does not mean that the IJV arrangement
itself is not effective for the purpose of localization; instead, it is more a matter of
implementation. The SVW case shows that the best practice of the IJV arrangement can ensure a
successful localization outcome.
4.3.2. Localization in More Liberalized Environment
Public IS tactics, such as local-content regulation, import tariffs, and foreign-exchange control,
gave substantial incentives to the localization drive in China's automotive sector, as argued in the
previous section. Such protectionist measures, however, were mainly incapacitated with China's
accession to the WTO. In accordance with the conditions of its WTO membership, for example,
China repealed its local-content regulation in 2001, and reduced tariff rates for imported vehicle
and automotive parts by 2006 to roughly one-third of the year 2001 levels (Harwit, 2001).
Accordingly, foreign automakers gained more options for formulating their sourcing strategies.
29 Even in 2002, Beijing-Jeep sourced over half the total vehicle value of its Cherokee lineup from Shanghai (Thun,
2006).
The changed economic environment, however, has not significantly interrupted the
localization drive in China's auto sector. Foreign automakers have still taken a pro-localization
position in the post-WTO period. The primary reason seems to be the heated competition and
increasing cost-reduction pressure in the Chinese market. China's local demand for passenger
cars has grown at phenomenal rates for the last several years. The annual domestic sales of
passenger cars in China were barely over half a million units in 1997 (around 3.3% of the then-
US market size), but grew nearly 20 times, to over 10 million units by 2009, roughly the same
size as the US market for the same year (Figure 1-10).30 Such impressive market growth has
attracted more automakers to China, as evidenced by the number of China-based passenger car
makers, which increased from 11 in 1998 to 64 in 2009.31 Under the changed market condition
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Figure 1-10: Number of China-based Passenger Vehicle Producers and China's Passenger
Vehicle Market Size (in comparison with USA's), 1998-2009
Source: China data from Fourin (1998-2010); USA data from Ward's Automotive Group (2010).
30 As of 2009, the United States and China were the only countries that had annual domestic passenger car markets
of over 10 million units.
31 Since 2004, China's central government has controlled market entry to the domestic passenger vehicle sector by
requiring newcomers to have a total investment of RMB two billion and an R&D investment of RMB half a billion
as preconditions. Accordingly, the total number of domestic passenger vehicle producers has remained stable for the
last several years.
Table 1-3: Retail Prices of Selected Passenger-vehicle Models Sold in China, 2003 and 2007
Retail Price (thousands of R MB)
Class Producer Brand Model 2003 2007 % Change
Full-size SVW Volkswagen Passat 1.8 L* 280 233 -16.8
SGM Buick Regal 3.0 L 369 285 -22.8
SGM Buick Regal 2.5 L 263 196 -25.5
SGM Buick Regal 2.0 L 237 176 -25.7
Small/ FAW-VW Volkswagen Bora 1.8 L 204 173 -15.2
Medium SVW Volkswagen Santana 1.8 L 99 90 -9.1
DF-PSA Citrodn Elysee 140 106 -24.3
DF-Nissan Nissan Sunny 190 167 -12.1
Note: * Passat 1.8 L Turbo high-end (luxury) trim.
Source: 2003 data from Farhoomand and Tao (2005); 2007 data from Fourin (2007).
(from a supplier market to a consumer market), local automakers have given up their high-price
policy. Between 2004 and 2007, for example, Sino-foreign JVs, affiliated with the Chinese Big
Three automotive groups, reduced the retail prices for their flagship vehicle models between 12%
and 26% (Table 1-3).
Table 1-4 illustrates the fact that increased market competition is a primary factor that
has lifted the cost-reduction pressure. As shown in the table, SVW constantly reduced the retail
price of its best-selling model Santana from RMB114,000 in 1998 to RMB79,800 in 2007.
During this period, the reduced tariff rate itself was not chiefly responsible for the price-cut,
because SVW already achieved a domestic-content ratio of 93% for Santana by 1998 and thus
should not have been affected much by the changed tariff rates. Instead, the changed market
conditions, such as the transition away from the oligopolistic market-which is evidenced by
SVW's declining market share (from 46% in 1998 to 9% in 2007) despite its continued market-
leading status and weakened market protection against foreign imports (e.g., reduced tariff
rates)-should be seen as a main driver that caused automakers' changed pricing policy. In fact,
until leading global automakers rushed into the Chinese market in the late 1990s, neither local
auto assemblers nor parts suppliers had incentives to reduce their production costs, as the
oligopolistic market condition in China's passenger-car sector allowed them to enjoy excess
profits without doing so (Farhoomand and Tao, 2005). The new market environment, however,
does not ensure Sino-foreign JVs excess profits any more, and they must lower the cost to win
the competition-driven price war.
Table 1-4: Cost-reduction Pressure from Increased Market Competition, SVW's Santana
Indicators 1998 2003 2005 2007
Facts on SVW's Santana
Retail price (thousands of RMB) l14 994 9ott 80tt
Local-content ratio (%) 93t 99, 99 99Tt
SVW's market performance
Market share in China (%)§ 46 20 8 9
Market share relative to market leader's
(market leader's share = 100) 100 100 77 96
Domestic sales rank 1 1 2 3
Tariff rates by local-content ratio (%)
Integrated vehicle imports 110 52 34 25
Local-content ratio < 40% 50* 52 34 25
40% Local-content ratio < 60% 30* 21 14 10
60% < Local-content ratio < 80% 24* 21 14 10
Local-content ratio > 80% 20* 21 14 10
Note: (i) The tariff rates for 2003 and 2005 were computed by the author under the assumption that the 2001
tariff rates of 70% for integrated vehicles and 28% for parts and components declined linearly to the 2006
levels of 25% and 10%, respectively; (ii) Santana's local-content ratio for 2005 was surmised from those
for 2003 and 2007; (iii) t Data for 1997; (iv) ** The tariff rates required to China as conditionality of WTO
accession.
Source: t Huang and Thun (2002); t Shu (2009b); I Thun (2006); 11 Fourin (2007); Computed from Fourin (2010);
Farhoomand and Tao (2005);** Harwit (2001).
With the increased market competition, China's post-WTO actions have not interrupted
its localization drive. Despite the lowered market protection against imported parts and
components, China-based automakers are still incentivized to expand local sourcing for
production-cost reduction. According to a 2004 survey by the Korea Institute for Industrial
Economics and Trade, parts and components produced in China were 39% cheaper than those
produced in Japan in terms of retail price and 28% less in terms of production cost, although the
former did not reach the latter's product quality (Table 1-5). Similarly, parts and components
produced in China were substantially cheaper than those produced in Korea, which present a
benchmark price-quality substitution level for parts and components, although their price/cost
index margins were narrower than their quality index gaps. This fact suggests that Sino-foreign
IJVs can reduce production costs significantly by increasing domestic content, although they may
need to compromise product quality somewhat. According to a GM-China engineer, parts and
components sourced within China are not only reasonable in price but also good enough in
quality to ensure Chinese consumers SGM's quality-products; parts and components sourced
from outside of China are, in general, over-engineered by Chinese standards and would drive up
production cost without adding clear benefit.32
Table 1-5: Price and Quality Indices for Automotive Parts and Components Made in China, in
Comparison with Those Made in Japan and Korea, as of 2004
Price and Quality Indices Automotive Parts and Components
( X Parts and Components Made in Japan = 100) Made in China Made in Korea
Price indices*
Retail price 61 84
Production cost 72 84
Quality indices**
Defection rates 82 94
Durability 75 93
Precision and Accuracy 74 91
Note: * Higher numbers mean higher prices or costs; ** Higher numbers mean higher product quality.
Source: Adapted from Cho et al. (2007).
32 Interview #2.
In addition, even the post-WTO tariff rates are effective enough to support China's
import substitution drive in the automotive parts sector. The basic framework of China's post-
WTO tariff policy for the automotive sector is that (i) different rates apply to integrated vehicles
(25%) and parts and components (10%), and (ii) even vehicles assembled in China are considered
integrated-vehicle imports and thus are subject to the tariff rate of 25%, if their local content is 40%
or less. 33 Under the heated market competition, the tariff rate difference of 15% has in part
100 Oxa811 +0Jetta (A2)Citroen ZX Santana
Accent
Red Flag HQ3 orolla
Audi A6LVIOs
80- 20agitar d 00 Audi A4
* i nia Freema
MagotanCDpooMazda 6
IvicCeratoTouran
Bestum Bora Golf IV Passat
4D * CR-V 0
0 rown Tide (HatchExcelleSa l u
_1 60 0 44* 0 *+ qBiuebird
S Teens, + Peugeot 3O7Sunny Carnival Buick Regal
LaCrosse Gol
Spark
0 Reiz Aveo
Optima
Sylphy
Group
Epica
20- + DFM
0 FAW
* SAIC
I I i I I I I I
0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280
Time Length of Market Appearance (Months)
Figure 1-11: Local-Content Ratio by Firm and Vehicle Model, As of 2008
Source: Data from Wang (2009), Fourin (2007), and firm interviews.
3 In April 2006, the United States, the European Union, and Canada, seeing this policy as a serious obstacle to their
automotive parts export to China, brought this issue to the WTO for a dispute settlement. On February 11, 2009, the
WTO concluded that the policy went against the conditions for China's WTO accession, and on February 27, the
Chinese government accepted the WTO's ruling with a grace period of 7 months and 20 days for the policy's repeal
(WTO, 2009).
encouraged IJVs to expand their local sourcing, as evidenced by the fact that, as of 2008, most
top-selling passenger models produced by major Sino-foreign JVs showed fairly high local-
content ratios, with little inter-firm variation (Figure 1-11). As of 2008, each firm's steady-selling,
flagship models, such as Santana, Jetta, and Citrodn ZX comprised nearly 100% of the parts and
components produced within China, and most of the vehicle models, which showed a 40-month
or longer period of market presence, achieved local-content ratios of 60% or higher.
4.3.3. Upgrading Stages: The Inside of the Local-Content Ratio
I urge caution in translating high local-content ratios directly into local suppliers' improved
technological capabilities. In the first place, firm-level local-content figures are believed to be
biased upward because automotive parts and components, which are initially imported by a
domestic party and then traded to other local firms (likely, an assembler), are often counted as
local content for the latter.34 More critical than the bias issue, however, is the fact that a high
local-content ratio does not ensure China's local suppliers an increasing role in local production
networks. Note that China does not regulate foreign equity ownership in its automotive-parts
sector; thus, foreign automotive-parts suppliers are allowed to establish their wholly controlled
subsidiaries in China and to acquire controls over local assets without upper thresholds (Tsuji and
Wu, 2005). In the absence of equity-related regulations, leading global parts suppliers have
established Chinese branches under their full control, in proximity to their major customers. In
the post-WTO period, it was not rare, either, for foreign automakers, when they established new
IJV operations in China, to enter the Chinese market together with their primary home-base-
supply partners. As a result, local automotive production clusters, which emulate MNCs' home-
3 Interviews #16 and 23.
based production networks, have been formed around major Sino-foreign passenger vehicle
assembly JVs.35
In many cases, Chinese local parts producers participate in MNCs' localized automotive
production networks as low-tier supply partners.36 This outcome is in part related to the
paradigm shift in the modem automotive manufacturing business itself (from Fordism to
Toyotism), in addition to Chinese supply firms' insufficient technological capabilities. Before the
Japanese lean production system was introduced to Western automakers, a provided-drawing
system for detail-controlled parts was the industry's standard sourcing method (Clark and
Fujimoto, 1991). The provided-drawing method refers to the sourcing pattern where assemblers
design automotive parts and components and provide their drawings and specifications to parts
makers for their actual production. Even in the early 1990s, when global leading automakers
were increasingly incorporating the lean production system into their Fordist mass-production
model, the provided-drawing sourcing model was still prevalent in the West (Fujimoto, 1999). In
this sourcing model, parts suppliers do not necessarily need to equip their own in-house R&D
capabilities; their primary competitive advantage instead is in their production capability, which
enables the production of quality parts and components at competitively low costs, in accordance
with the assembler-provided designs for each part. In this model, the assembler-supplier
relationship is more price-driven, and often lasts a short period of time.
At present, however, the approved- (or consigned-) drawing method is more prevalent
(Fujimoto, 2007). In this sourcing method, supply firms design and develop parts and
components for themselves, in accordance with assemblers' integrated-vehicle designs. Once
35 This tendency is more obvious in the case of Asian automakers. Refer to Fujiwara (2006), Kishimoto (2006), and
Jung and Lee (2007) for Japanese and Korean automotive supply networks in China.
36 Interviews #2, 9, 16, 17, and 23.
assemblers approve the designs and specifications, suppliers manufacture parts and components
to deliver them to assemblers. As this method becomes the industry's standard sourcing model,
there has been a critical change in the assembler-supplier relationship: assemblers and their
primary parts suppliers work together from the very early stages of new vehicle development (i.e.,
design-in) and form more interdependent and longer alliances than before (Fujimoto, 1999).
Accordingly, their collaboration process has generated crucial knowledge-sharing networks for
technology development."
It is technologically challenging to be top-tier supply partners of global leading
automakers. In order to deliver quality black-box parts and components to assemblers, parts
producers need highly competitive R&D and engineering capabilities. In addition to competitive
manufacturing capability, they should be able to design key parts for themselves in accordance
with integrated vehicle designs, and to integrate part-specific technologies for more complicated
subassembly or module components. When parts suppliers are classified into component
manufacturer, subassembly manufacturer, and module-system manufacturer, only module-system
manufacturers and a small number of subassembly manufacturers are qualified as leading
automakers' primary suppliers (Veloso et al., 2000).
The technological barrier is even higher for newcomers. The knowledge-sharing
networks between assemblers and parts suppliers discriminate against outsiders, as the networks
are formed through long-term transactions on the basis of social, cultural, and geographical
proximity. Outsiders can join the networks, but only after proving that they have better
engineering and manufacturing capabilities than insiders do, as assemblers often set higher
37 For example, the number of patents that Toyota and Honda obtained jointly with their primary-parts suppliers
increased substantially from 900 and 290 in 2000 to 1,480 and 480 in 2004, respectively (Konno, 2006).
technological standards for newcomers than for those already having joint engineering experience
with them (Veloso and Kumar, 2002). Also, it is not rare for assemblers to ask newcomers for a
significant commitment to their development capabilities without guaranteeing any supply
contracts (ibid.). Thus, it is hard and costly for outsiders to replace pre-existing primary suppliers.
From the assemblers' perspectives, there is no strong incentive to change existing members of
their knowledge-sharing community, in the face of substantial transactions and adaptation costs,
unless newcomers can offer benefits that can more than offset these costs.
With a "China-rush" of leading global supply firms, the Chinese local automotive
production system has embraced more multinational actors. Sino-foreign assembly JVs are at the
center of the local automotive production system in most of the Chinese major automotive
clusters-notably, Shanghai, Changchun, Wuhan, Guangzhou, and Beijing (Figure 1-12). Foreign
automakers usually exercise their equity share in the IJVs through their wholly owned subsidiary
holding companies in China.38 Although China-based holding companies are the direct parties
that are involved in the management of the assembly JVs, they themselves do not have strong
influence in determining key JV matters. Instead, most foreign-side key decisions, including what
to produce in China and from whom to source key parts and components, are made in the MNCs'
HQ, and are conveyed directly to their Chinese operations. Some foreign automakers operate
separate JVs for power train components (mainly engines and transmissions) with their local
assembly JV partners, and they are managed the same way that the assembly JVs are.
38 For example, GM controls its equity in SGM through GM-China, and VW controls its equity in SVW and FAW-
VW through VW-China.
39 Interviews #2 and 12.
China MNC's Home Base
-- More Active Interactions
------ Less Active Interactions (mostly supply flows)
Figure 1-12: Knowledge Flows within Localized Production Networks
Note: Generalized from the cases of Sino-foreign JVs affiliated to SAIC, FAW, DFM, the Guangzhou Automotive
Group, and the Beijing Automotive Industry Group.
Source: Created by the author on the basis of firm interviews.
In this production system, key knowledge and information on vehicle development does
not flow within China. As Sino-foreign assembly JVs manufacture foreign-licensed vehicle
models, for which development and engineering processes were already completed in MNCs'
home bases, key vertical knowledge-sharing channels exist in the MNC home bases, not in China.
Even the Chinese subsidiaries of global leading supply firms simply manufacture their products
according to the designs provided by their HQs, lacking significant local R&D functionalities.
Interactions between assemblers and supply firms are also more intensive in the MNC home
bases than in China. In fact, key decisions and orders between assemblers and their primary
suppliers are often fine-tuned in their homes, and then conveyed to their Chinese subsidiaries.
The assembler-supplier interactions that exist in China mostly involve sourcing itself, not
collaboration for development and engineering. In sum, a dearth of assembly IJVs' local
technology development initiative has reduced the need for engineering and R&D supports from
local supply firms.
The parts and components delivered by local indigenous supply firms are clearly
distinguished from those provided by foreign-controlled supply firms. On the one hand, most
parts sourced from Chinese indigenous suppliers are detail-controlled ones, for which foreign
assembly JV partner firms or upper-tier foreign suppliers provide drawings and specifications."
This procurement pattern is sensible in light of local indigenous firms' relatively strong
production capability but weak in-house development and integration capabilities. On the other
hand, foreign-controlled supply firms are primarily in charge of the high value-added portion of
the local supply chain (Lee et al., 2004; Shu, 2009a). They have large market shares in
technological sophisticated parts and components, such as engine-management systems, central
control units, small motors and anti-lock braking systems, many of which fall into the black-box
parts category (CATARC, 2008). In an extreme case, like electronic-stability-control equipment,
all local demand is met by the products of foreign-controlled parts suppliers (Wang, 2009b).
There are some inter-firm variations in local sourcing patterns. Local production
networks, initiated by VW and GM-affiliated JVs, embrace more local-parts-supply firms than
others (Table 1-6). This circumstance is, in part, related to their sourcing strategies. In China,
Western automakers, in general, have had more price-driven (based on more open bidding
systems) sourcing policies than their Asian rivals have (Jung and Lee, 2007). When Chinese local
40 Interviews #5, 16, 21, and 23..
suppliers have capabilities to manufacture detail-controlled parts at competitive costs, Sino-
Western JVs have kept sourcing partnerships with them. For example, in 2004, 42% to 54% of
the total number of the three Sino-Western JVs' (SVW, SGM, and FAW-VW) local sourcing
partners were Chinese, and in 2007, 60% of SGM's local content was from Chinese suppliers.
In contrast, Sino-Japanese and Sino-Korean JVs showed far less dependence on Chinese
suppliers. As of 2007, for example, FAW-Toyota and Beijing-Hyundai sourced less than 30% of
their output values from Chinese suppliers, while over half of their output's local content was
from Chinese subsidiaries of Japanese and Korean supply firms, respectively. This sourcing
pattern may have been affected by the Asian automakers' geographical proximity to China or may
reflect strong supplier-assembler ties embedded in the home-based production system itself.
Table 1-6: Local Souring Partners by Nationality for Selected Sino-foreign Assembly JVs
Local Souring Partners from MNC's
Home Base Chinese Souring Partners
Sino-foreign % of Total No. of % of Total No. of
Assembly Joint % of Total Local Local Sourcing % of Total Local Local Sourcing
Ventures Sourcing Value Partners* Sourcing Value Partners*
Shanghai-VW n/a 13 n/a 54
Shanghai-GM n/a 17 60* 42
FAW-VW n/a 13 n/a 53
FAW- Toyota 75*** 79 25*** 15
DF-Nissan n/a 43 n/a 34
DF-Yueda-Kia 60+* 29 15* 26
Beijing-Hyundai 50+* 81 20+* 6
Guangzhou-Honda 60+* 55 10* 25
Note: * as of 2007; ** as of 2004; *** as of 2002.
Source: * Firm interviews; ** Marukawa (2006); *** Tsuji and Wu (2005).
The three Sino-western JVs' considerable dependence on local Chinese suppliers is a
consequence not only of the Western automakers' more open-sourcing system but also of SVW's
"' FAW-VW shares a significant number of SVW's Shanghai-based suppliers.
early localization efforts, as discussed previously. SGM and FAW-VW share a significant number
of SVW's Shanghai-based suppliers-through the mediation of SAIC (SGM's Chinese equity
holder) and VW China (FAW-VW's foreign equity holder), respectively4 2 -as evidenced by
FAW-VW's relatively far physical distance from primary suppliers, compared with SVW and
SGM's (Table 1-7).43 This fact reflects the strong presence of quality parts suppliers in Shanghai,
and suggests that the Shanghai-based supply firms have owed their improved production
capabilities to their business with VW and GM's JVs in China. Vertical knowledge flows in
Shanghai, however, are not exceptions to the pattern illustrated in Figure 1-12; key vertical
knowledge-sharing channels exist not in Shanghai but in Wolfsburg or in Detroit. Most of the
Shanghai-based local parts suppliers also lack in-house development and integration
capabilities.44
Table 1-7: Mean Distance between Assembler and Primary Suppliers, 2004
Main Production Base Number of Primary Mean Distance from
Assembly JVs in China Suppliers Primary Suppliers
SVW Shanghai 254 542 km
SGM Shanghai 145 258 km
FAW-VW Changchun, Jilin 240 1,736 km
Source: Marukawa (2006).
By and large, the IJV-initiated local production system has limited its influence on local
supply firms to their production-capability building process; little influence is found in local
efforts to upgrade project-execution and innovation capabilities. In fact, assembly LJVs in China
42 For example, around 20% of SVW's primary suppliers also had supply contracts with FAW-VW (Wang, 2009a).
43 A significantly large number of SVW and SGM's Shanghai-based sourcing partners are actually SAIC's
subsidiaries. As of 2008, around 40% of their passenger car output value was sourced from SAIC-affiliated parts
suppliers (Ping, 2009).
44 Interviews #2 and 5.
have endowed their local supply partner firms with their weak in-house innovation capability by
leaving little room for potential R&D or engineering collaboration. Under the current OEM
production model adopted by Sino-foreign assembly JVs, however, effectively local indigenous
supply firms may take advantage of their partnership with the assembly IJVs, and most of them
are likely to remain as the captive suppliers of detail-controlled parts.
4.4. Synthesis of the Section
Under the Sino-foreign JV arrangement, Chinese local automotive assembly firms have accessed
advanced technologies, transferred by leading global automakers, and local-parts suppliers have
also benefited substantially from the technology-transfer process. There is no question that the
constituents of the Chinese automotive industry have developed better technological capabilities
with the sector's LJV practices than in the past.
The SVW and SGM case suggests, however, that the IJV arrangement is not capable of
nurturing every aspect of local technological capability. The lJV model's contribution has been
most notable in incubating local production capability. MNCs have been active in transferring
product-specific technologies and relevant production know-how to their Chinese operations.
With their technology transfer, Sino-foreign assembly JVs are producing foreign automakers' up-
to-date vehicle lineups in their modem manufacturing production facilities. As part of this
technology-transfer process, foreign automakers have provided local engineers and shop-floor
workers ample opportunities for official job training and technical assistance in order to optimize
the operation of the introduced process technologies. In addition, the IJVs' growing efforts at
local sourcing, incentivized both by public regulations (e.g., local-content regulation, import
quota/tariffs, foreign-exchange control) and market factors (e.g., market growth and inter-firm
competition), have paved the way for the growth of local supply capacity. Interactions with
global automakers helped (and pushed) local suppliers to upgrade their manufacturing capability,
so that their products could qualify as components of the JV-produced vehicles.
The IJV model may also induce a significant, but partial, improvement in local firms'
project-execution capability. The more IJV-driven organic growth experiences SAIC accumulated,
the better project-execution capability it could develop, as evidenced by the fact that SVW and
SGM's more recent plant-expansion projects were completed within a shorter period of time than
earlier expansions. However, the core technical portion of the plant-expansion project was done
mainly by VW and GM without SAIC's significant participation. For example, VW and GM
provided the assembly design to SIMEE for its actual construction, and procured necessary
capital goods, mostly imports, under their primary control.4 5 This practice is a convention under
the Sino-foreign JV arrangement, specialized for the production of foreign-licensed vehicle
models: the whole production line design and the required production facilities and equipment for
the JVs should reflect foreign automakers' technologies, which the foreign automakers
themselves know best. Concerning this point, it would matter little whether or not SAIC
accumulated more experience in plant expansion. Regardless of SAIC's capability improvement,
asymmetric information about the JV-adopted technologies would keep reserving the core
technical portion of the investment project not for SAIC but for its foreign JV partner firms.
The final point that the SGM case makes clear is that even the best practice of the IJV
model is unlikely to ensure a critical degree of local innovation-capability building. GM is the
foreign automaker that has made the largest R&D investment in China, but its Chinese assembly
operation, SGM, does not possess significant in-house vehicle-development capability, either,
4 Interviews #2 and 19. Part of SVW's early plant construction episode is also documented in Posth (2006).
like any other Sino-foreign assembly JVs. GM's flagship China-based R&D operation, PATAC,
has also defined itself as SGM's localization-supportive engineering arm, specialized primarily in
minor technological adaptation tasks. SAIC, of course, has accessed GM's up-to-date
technologies in the form of vehicle drawings and relevant assembly-line designs. The Sino-
foreign JV arrangement, however, has not allowed SAIC either to modify such technologies
without GM's consent or to utilize them for SAIC's discretionary purposes. Innovation is
fundamentally a product of a continuous search process for alternative or complementary uses of
existing knowledge, in combination with other various kinds of internal and external assets. The
outcome of the search process is a function of the intensity of the firm's application processes as
much as it is that of the firm's preexisting innovation capability. Simply mastering the "outcomes"
of others' innovation does not lead to a better in-house innovation capability, without further
subsequent internalizing through application practices or R&D activities. The SGM case suggests
that even successful IJV practices in the developing world may not only fail to induce MNCs to
bring in their critical technological capability but also may discourage local firms' self-learning
process through intensive application practices.
5. Conclusions
When China's central government decided to pursue the Sino-foreign JV arrangement in the early
1980s, it had two main reasons. One was to substitute locally produced passenger vehicles for
foreign imports. The IJV arrangement was initially viewed as the most feasible option to meet
rapidly growing local demands for passenger vehicles without exhausting China's then-limited
foreign-exchange reserves. The other reason was to incubate technologically competitive local
firms within a short period of time. China's government expected that it would be able to achieve
this goal by requiring foreign automakers to meet certain degrees of local content and technology
standards.
In the case of SAIC-affiliated JVs, I argue that the IJV arrangement, although it might be
suitable for meeting the first goal, does not serve the second purpose, primarily due to different
technological development requirements for each development stage and the basic nature
underlying the IJV-based learning model. Compared with the IS stage, the post-IS upgrading
stage demands that local firms have a balanced combination of in-house capabilities for
production, project execution, and innovation. Accordingly, the same IJV arrangement may result
in different outcomes depending on development stage.
The basic nature of the IJV-based learning channel-incompleteness and passiveness-
was not a serious problem in the IS stage, but it was in the post-IS upgrading stages. The IJV-
learning model is incomplete, in that knowledge transferred to the IJV, set up to perform only
production functions, and is limited to product-specific production technology. In most cases,
MNCs have provided their IJVs with the explicit "outcomes" of their technological capabilities,
not the technological capabilities themselves. The IJV arrangement has discouraged local firms
from making efforts to internalize the transferred knowledge for their own goods, by putting strict
restrictions on the potential use of the transferred knowledge; its modification or application for
local firms' own benefit is prohibited. Accordingly, IJV-based learning has been driven mostly by
mastery of the transferred knowledge and skills, related primarily to the production dimension.
Further internalizing efforts beyond the mastery of the transferred innovation "outcomes" have
been missing. Also, there is no official channel through which even partially IJV-based learning
outcome can be spread to local firms.
The IJV-based learning mode is also passive, as the IJV arrangement allows local firms
little room for maneuvering in choosing objects and methods of their learning. Under the IJV
arrangement, local firms could learn only what they were supposed to learn in a given way at a
given time. The knowledge gap and the asymmetric information about the IJV-adopted
technologies between JV partner firms have granted MNCs a great influence over the key
technical aspects of the IJV management, such as technologies to be transferred, the timing and
method of transfer, and the procurement of key capital goods. Each shareholder's equity stake in
the IJ has failed to endorse a comparable influence on such technical aspects of the IJV-related
affairs.
Technological capabilities consist of a number of detailed sub-segments, including in-
house capacity for production management and engineering, project management, basic and
detailed project engineering, and basic and applied R&D. All these segments are complementary
and mutually reinforcing in building overall technological capabilities. Production-related
capabilities can serve as foundations for investment capabilities; skills and know-how,
accumulated as results of production and investment activities, can help a firm develop better
innovation capabilities. As the SVW and SGM case illustrates, the IJV arrangement has been
effective in building local capabilities for production and part of the project execution task (e.g.,
project management and construction), but has not been effective in developing other segments of
the overall technological capability (e.g., procurement, project engineering, and innovation).
Accordingly, local firms have developed partial segments of the overall technological capability,
and the disparity among the technological capability segments has been further deepened in the
absence of a mutually reinforcing cycle. Local firms have no effective means to maneuver the
IJV arrangement to modify its nature in favor of their needs in in-house capability building
process.
In this sense, it is not meaningful to discuss whether or not the IJV model is useful for
local technological capability building, from a collective perspective; instead, it is necessary to
understand which aspects of the capability building process in detail the IJV can contribute to and
which other aspects it may not be able to contribute to. The Sino-foreign JV case suggests that the
IJV arrangement itself may be at best a partial solution to nurturing the development of local
firms as solid contenders in the global market, due to the very basic nature of the arrangement-
involved learning mode. Perhaps the IJV-based learning model may work better when combined
with other learning channels that can complement its missing dimensions and ensure that local
firms have substantial maneuvering space for their proactive learning attempts.
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Chapter II
From a Passive Learner to an Active Learner:
SAIC's Outward FDI Strategy
"A housekeeper can never replace a master"
- Wang Xiaoqiu, former general manager of SAIC Motor'
1. Introduction
What roles can "outward" globalization play in the "inward" foreign direct investment (FDI)-
based technological capability-building process? In the first chapter, I showed that in the
existence of a substantial gap in technological capability between alliance partners, the
international joint venture (IJV)-based learning mode is likely to be "passive," as it is the party
with a superior technological capability-not the one trying to learn from IJVs-that has the
actual initiative in determining the key aspects of the IJV-based learning mode, such as what,
when, and how to learn. My main hypothesis in this study is that outward FDI can play a critical
role in turning the passive learning mode into an active one by helping learners establish access
to a wide variety of external strategic resources (e.g., knowledge and skills) and encouraging
subsequent self-driven, learning-by-doing practices. I will demonstrate this claim with a detailed
case study of the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC).
For three reasons, I believe that the SAIC case serves ideally for testing my hypothesis; (i)
SAIC has operated two most successful Sino-foreign passenger vehicle assembly joint ventures
Quoted in Bradsher (2006).
(JVs); (ii) SAIC at the same time is the first Chinese passenger vehicle producer that acquired
foreign automotive assets and operated manufacturing operations outside China; and (iii) SAIC's
independent vehicle development projects, which were delayed over two decades even with the
two most successful IJV operations, have made substantial progress since SAIC made its first
outward FDI in 2004. I explain each of these three points in more detail.
First, SAIC-affiliated Shanghai-Volkswagen (SVW) and Shanghai-General Motors
(SGM) are among the most "successful" Sino-foreign auto assembly JVs, where success is
measured as market share, local content ratios, and organizational sustainability2 (Harwit, 1995;
Gallagher, 2006; Thun, 2006). Both SVW and SGM not only have led China's passenger car
sector in terms of market share3 and localization4 but also have continuously upgraded
themselves from completely knocked-down (CKD) kit assemblers to more advanced auto
producers that retain partial but non-negligible in-house research and development (R&D) and
engineering capabilities (Table 2-1).5 Those who pay attention to the best practices of Sino-
foreign JVs such as SVW and SGM take a positive position toward China's JV-based catch-up
model (e.g., Zhang and Taylor, 2001; Zhao et al., 2005). According to them, the Sino-foreign JV
is effective enough to incubate local makers' technological capabilities: foreign automakers have
introduced more advanced technologies to China's market with increasing market competition
while increasingly losing their control over spillovers of those technologies. The Chinese central
2 For example, among the four earliest Sino-foreign JVs, Guangzhou-Peugeot and Panda Motor were bankrupt and
liquidated by the late 1990s, while Beijing-Jeep and SVW are still operating.
3 As of 2009, SGM and SVW held the largest passenger vehicle market shares of all other IJVs and indigenous
automakers in China.
4 The Shanghai region has the nation's strongest supply bases thanks to the success of the SVW localization project,
and both SVW and SGM have sourced more product content within their corporate home base (Shanghai) than have
any other China-based passenger vehicle makers (Huang and Thun, 2002; Thun, 2006).
5 In particular, GM has invested in China-based R&D and engineering activities more than any other foreign
automakers. SGM's Shanghai-based supportive engineering arm the Pan Asia Technical Automotive Center-which
is self-capable of local adoption projects, vehicle safety testing, and concept car development-is a good example.
government, however, seems to have a pessimistic view of its "exchange-market-for-technology"
catch-up regime, as its full realization is uncertain or may take too long (NDRC, 2004). In fact,
although over two decades have passed since Beijing-Jeep, the first Sino-foreign auto assembly
JV, was established in 1983, most Chinese automakers still depend on foreign firms for
technology, and over two-thirds of local demand is fulfilled by foreign-licensed passenger
vehicles.
Table 2-1: Development Stages of Big Three-affiliated Sino-Foreign JVs, 2007
Chinese First Auto Works SAIC Dongfeng Motor
Foreign KD IS RD KD IS RD KD IS RD
GM (USA)
VW (Germany)
PSA (France)
Toyota (Japan)
Honda (Japan)
Nissan (Japan)
Mazda (Japan)
Kia (Korea)
Notes: ()in first column indicates the location of each automaker's headquarters.
KD = an early form of JVs that is specialized in knocked-down kit assembly;
IS = an intermediate form of JVs that is specialized in local license-production of foreign brand car models
but purchases locally more than 60% of the total value of its final product.
RD = an advanced form of JVs that performs key R&D activities locally in cooperation with local firms, in
addition to manufacturing functions.
Source: Created by the author on the basis of (i) CATARC (2008) for each JV's annual total and per-employee
R&D expenditure data; (ii) Fourin (2007) and Wang (2009) for the local content ratio data of each JV's
major vehicle models; and (iii) firm interviews for the information on each JV's in-house technology
development projects.
Second, SAIC, the operator of the two most "successful" IJVs, made greater outward
FDI earlier than any other Chinese automaker.6 This fact suggests a certain complementarity
between inward and outward globalization strategies in the path of upgrading SAIC's competitive
6 As of 2007, SAIC held the 1 1* largest foreign assets valued at US$2.3 billion among China's non-financial
enterprises (Fudan and VCC, 2009). SAIC was the only automaker on the top 20 list.
advantage. An asset-seeking motivation, such as exploring alternative sources for advanced
technology, may underlie increasing attempts at outward globalization in China's passenger
vehicle sector, in that most of the outward FDI attempts fall into the category of an intra-industry,
horizontal merger and acquisition (M&A). Between 2004 and 2005, SAIC acquired the Rover
portion of manufacturing assets and intellectual properties from MG Rover and the majority stake
of Ssangyong Motor (SYM). Subsequently, the Nanjing Automotive Group (NAG), affiliated
with the SAIC Group in 2008, took over the MG division from the MG Rover Group. More
recently, Sichuan Tengzhong took over the Hummer division from General Motors (GM) in late
2009, and Geely acquired Ford's Volvo division in early 2010.
Finally, SAIC's independent vehicle-development projects, abandoned for over two
decades despite SAIC's successful IJV operations, have made solid progress since SAIC made its
first outward FDI in 2004. It was as early as 1959 when SAIC first produced a self-developed
sedan SH760. This model, however, was in fact a reverse-engineered imitation of the 1956
Mercedes 220S (Posth, 2006), and thus does not necessarily represent SAIC's in-house capability
for independent vehicle development. Without any significant technological improvements, SAIC
produced SH760 (and it only) until 1991. Over a decade later, SAIC did not have a self-branded
lineup, although the firm became a dominant domestic market leader with the VW and GM-
branded vehicles lineups license-produced under the IJV arrangement. SAIC's own brand lineup
was revived in November 2006, when Roewe 750 made its debut in the Chinese market.
It is clear that SAIC's outward globalization strategy contributed substantially to its
Roewe 750 project, though the project might also have benefited from SAIC's IJV experience, as
the standard-class sedan was built on the minor-upgraded Rover 75 platform, acquired from
Rover between late 2004 and early 2005. In the five years since the first market appearance of
Roewe 750, SAIC has introduced 10 more self-branded passenger vehicle models, most of which
were produced on SAIC's new in-house developed vehicle platforms with reference to the
acquired Rover platform. SAIC's achievement in independent vehicle-development surpasses-in
terms of development speed, in-house engineering contributions, and the number of self-branded
vehicle models developed in-house-that of other domestic rival firms, including the First
Automotive Works (FAW) and the Donfeng Motor Group (DFM). Given that until late 2009
SAIC was the only Chinese automaker having foreign-acquired manufacturing assets or foreign
operations, there seems to be a reason to suspect a potential causal link between SAIC's outward
FDI and its active in-house technology development activities.
Although the aforementioned three points together suggest certain key role played by
outward FDI in SAIC's in-house technological capability-building process, many studies limit
their discussion solely to the "inward" FDI variable, focusing on what factors caused
performance variations among Sino-foreign JVs (e.g., Harwit, 1995; Zhang and Taylor, 2001;
Zhao et al., 2005; Gallagher, 2006). Their analytical frameworks are thus incomplete: they
neglect the possibility that outward FDI, as well as inward FDI, can contribute to late market
entrants' technological catch-up. In addition, even the studies that give some attention to China's
outward globalization often treat the impact of outward FDI as no more than that of "one-shot"
technology adoption, and rule out the possibility that outward FDI's potential contribution to
technological catch-up may last beyond a short run (e.g., Nolan, 2004; Rugman, 2009). In reality,
however, their assumption may not be the case. This study is motivated by the need to fill the
gaps between the literature and reality.
2. Theoretical Framework and Method
As explained in the previous section, I hypothesize that outward FDI can add an "active" nature
to the "passive" learning mode inherent in the inward globalization model. Here, I distinguish
active learning from passive learning in terms of two aspects.7 One aspect is who actually
determines the basic nature of the learning mode. I consider a learning mode active when learners
themselves can determine what, when, how to learn, while I see it as passive when teachers do so.
The other aspect is what the main subject of learning is. I consider a learning strategy passive
when learners seek after and absorb the outcome of others' technological capability, while I call it
active when what learners aim to internalize is others' technological capability itself My
theoretical framework on the potential synergy between inward and outward FDI in improving
local technological capability consists of the following three propositions (Figure 2-1).
First, as argued in Chapter 1, the contribution of inward FDI to the local technological
capability-building process is at best partial. While competitive firms should develop three kinds
of in-house technological capability-production, project-execution, and innovation capabilities
(Amsden and Hikino, 1994)-the inward globalization learning model may be effective in
nurturing production capability, but not project-execution and innovation capabilities, particularly
when there exists a substantial technological gap between FDI source firms and FDI recipients.
Learning-by-doing practices in the model are, by and large, limited to the dimensions of
7 Some may attempt to define active and passive learning in more practical terms. For example, Viotti (2001) defines
the "passive" learning strategy as a technological catch-up scheme aiming primarily at mastery of production
capability and employing the FDI or technology-licensing arrangement, and describes the "active" learning strategy
as one focusing on absorption of project-execution capability as well as production capability through self-initiated
investment projects or imitation activities.
However, such a definition may not be appropriate under certain circumstances. This is because even the
passive learning strategy based on inward FDI, for example, can improve not only production capability but also
project-execution capability-though partially-and thus the boundary between the active and passive learning
strategies can hardly be drawn in such a definitive manner.
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production capability and partial project-execution skills, where FDI source firms convey
advanced knowledge and know-how to local firms through official transfer or unintended
spillover mechanisms.
Second, learning firms in the bidirectional globalization model initiate outward FDI for
the primary purpose of improving their project-execution and innovation capabilities, which can
rarely be nurtured by hosting inward FDI or subsequent self-learning practices. Appropriate
outward FDI allows learners to access a broad range of external resources, some of which are
hardly accessible through market transactions or strategic alliances, and subsequent learning-by-
doing practices help learners to internalize the external resources in a more complete manner.
Finally, the bidirectional globalization model generates a feedback loop, which does not
exist in the inward globalization model. That is, when learners succeed in improving their in-
house technological capability through the combination of inward/outward FDI and subsequent
self-learning practices, the improved technological capability increases the contribution of inward
FDI to the local technological capability-building process by redefining MNCs' local operations
to emphasize project-execution and innovation capabilities.
I use the SAIC Group and its foreign-acquired assets and operations as a case study to
test the validity of my hypothesis and theoretical framework. As explained in Section 1, I choose
SAIC as a case study subject because (i) SAIC is a more "successful" IJV operator than any other
Chinese automaker; (ii) SAIC, at the same time, has managed overseas assets and operations on a
larger scale than other local rivals have; (iii) SAIC's in-house technology development, which
was stalled for over a decade when SAIC adopted the inward globalization learning model, has
made substantial progress since the firm modified its technological catch-up strategy into the
bidirectional globalization model in 2004; and (iv) in light of the facts listed in (i), (ii), and (iii),
the SAIC case is likely to provide some key implications for the complementarity between
inward and outward FDI as well as the causality between outward FDI and improved
technological capability.
This study depends for data on both primary and secondary sources. I collect key data,
largely unpublished, for hypothesis testing (e.g., each firm's technological upgrading strategies,
stories behind key corporate events, and intra-/inter-organizational interactions) mainly from a set
of one to two hour in-depth interviews with current and former employees (mostly, managers and
engineers) of selected firms of my interest and several outsiders who know the firms well through
formal and informal channels. The interviews use semi-structured but open-ended questionnaires.
As of September 2009, a total of 25 in-depth interviews and two manufacturing plant visits (SGM
and DF-Honda) were made. In addition, whenever possible, this study uses various published
firm-, industry-, and regional-level statistics, including those from the China Automotive Industry
Yearbook, the Fourin China Automotive Intelligence, and the China Data Online. Also, this study
incorporates miscellaneous information from other reliable sources including academic journals,
books, newspapers, and automotive magazines.
3. Outward FDI: Theory, Facts, and Policy
Before I discuss the SAIC case in detail, this section briefly reviews existing theories of outward
FDI and the MNCs based in developing economies, and provides a glimpse of key FDI-related
facts in China.
3.1. Outward FDI and Its Incentives
What motivates FDI?
Early economic theories explain cross-border capital movements as being an outcome of
different interest rates across nations. This conceptual lens, though suitable for explaining
portfolio investment patterns, fails to provide convincing insights for direct investment, which
shows movement patterns dissimilar from portfolio investment. Hymer (1960), often considered
the pioneer of modern FDI theories, distinguishes direct investment from portfolio investment,
and focuses on incentives for firms' FDI, other than the interest rate. He argues that firms have
incentives to hold ownership and control over their foreign operations in order to reduce market
competition and thus maximize returns to their competitive advantage. In other words, direct
investment is an institutional means that helps firms to create oligopolistic market conditions
outside their home bases and to offset the "liabilities of foreignness" (Zaheer, 1995).
Extending Hymer's idea, Vernon (1966) sees the international expansion of corporate
production bases as a firm's inevitable choice, as a function of the product life cycle and location-
specific advantages. When a product is in its early life cycle, key production activities are likely
to stay in home bases as its producer has strong leverage over the market for the time being
(thanks mainly to its proprietary technologies) and thus cost reduction is not a key concern. But
in its later stage, when the product is mature and standardized, and thus more competitors appear
in the market, its producer has strong incentives to relocate its production base in order to reduce
costs. The core of this explanation, i.e., that firms seek different location-specific advantages
according to their product cycle, seems still valid, although the theory was originally built on
Vernon's observation of only a fraction of FDI's multi-faceted nature (mainly, the efficiency-
seeking aspect of North-South FDI).
Buckley and Casson (1976), Rugman (1981), and others approach the FDI question from
an internalization perspective. A mainstream view of a firm's growth is that it depends on a firm's
organizational capability to create competitive advantages that cannot be easily emulated by
others (Penrose, 1959). Core competencies, which are essential in developing such competitive
advantages, are a combination of tangible (e.g., capital, labor, etc.) and intangible (e.g.,
technologies, skills, etc.) internal resources (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Barney, 1991; Conner,
1991). A firm's incentive to engage in overseas investment is strengthening their core
competencies by internalizing various country-specific or firm-specific advantages that reside
outside their home base. Firms often prefer the direct investment arrangement to other
alternatives such as licensing contracts, because the former can allow firms to control their core
competencies (and key internal resources for them) more effectively than the latter.
Dunning's eclectic framework well synthesizes key views of FDL. His ownership-
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location-internalization (OLI) paradigm maintains that firms were motivated to go multinational
in order to internalize ownership-specific and location-specific advantages that existed in foreign
countries (Dunning, 1977). He claims that most FDI practices fall into the following four
categories according to their primary incentives: resource-seeking FDI, market-seeking FDI,
efficiency-seeking FDI, and asset-seeking FDI (Dunning, 1998). This framework seems to secure
enough universal validity to provide critical insights into outward FDI from the developing world,
a topic that still needs further examination.
3.2. FDI from the Developing World and the Third World MNCs
Most existing theories of FDI have been built on North-originated FDI cases (investment
originated from advanced economies); in contrast, South-originated FDI (investment from the
developed world) has not been discussed widely (Ramamurti, 2009). This is mainly because for a
long time the developing economies made only a minor contribution to the world's economy as
FDI sources. In the period 1989-1991, for example, the developing world accounted for only 2.7%
of the global FDI outflow volume (Table 2-2). The South-originated FDI flows, though at present
in a constantly increasing tendency, still account for less than 10% of the world's total annual FDI
outflows. In particular, South-North FDI (up-market FDI from less advanced economies to more
advanced ones) flows, on which this essay focuses, have attracted even less attention due to their
Table 2-2: Comparison of Source of FDI Flows between 1989-1991 and 2005-2007
Developed Economies Developing Economies
Period Millions of US$ % of World Total Millions of US$ % of World Total
1989-1991 217,637 97.3 6,142 2.7
2005-2007 1,332,782 90.4 141,171 9.6
Source: Adapted from UNCTAD (2009), p. 221.
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Table 2-3: Estimated Annual FDI Flows between High-income and Middle/Low-income
Economies, 2002
Unit: billions of US$
Destination High-income Economies Middle/Low-income
Origin (North) Economies (South)
North 558* 82
South 27* 53 **
Note: The North/South classification in this table follows the World Bank's definition. The North includes
developed countries and a set of high-income developing economies; the South includes the rest of the
world. For the detailed list of countries for each, refer to the World Bank's official website at
http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/beyond/global/glossary.html#39.
Source: * Author's calculation from the World Development Indicator Database; ** World Bank (2006), p.11 1.
negligible size. Even FDI scholars long considered South-North investment flows quite rare and
exceptional cases. As of 2002, South-North FDI flows accounted for less than 4% of the world's
total or roughly half the annual South-South FDI volume (Table 2-3).
Despite most analysts' insufficient attention to South-North FDI, pioneering firm-level
works on the subject date back to three decades ago. In his 1983 work on "Third World MNCs"
(TWMNCs), i.e., MNCs headquartered in the developing world, Wells argued that the primary
sources of TWMNCs' competitive advantages were a set of unique technologies that they
possessed as a result of their efforts of adapting preexisting ones. TWMNCs operated on the basis
of a combination of production factors and intermediate goods, which was somewhat different
from the combination used by market leaders, because they were often forced to use more local
inputs (instead of foreign imports) and labor (instead of capital), in the presence of the import
substitution (IS) regulation. As such localized small-scale production technologies had merits in
other developing countries that had the IS policy and similar local factor/market conditions and
IS policy regimes, TWMNCs could expand their business to a certain degree beyond their home
bases. Similarly, Lall (1983) attempted to find TWMNCs' competitive advantages in their know-
how adopted and modified for closed markets. These early ideas lost their foundations with the
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demise of the IS regime, and may be too outdated to reflect more recent situations (Wells, 2009).
However, their essence may still be relevant in part. Many scholars (e.g., Hobday, 1995; Kim,
1997; Nelson and Pack, 1999; Amsden, 2001) agree that some of the most successful enterprises
in developing countries, which often have multinational production and sales bases, have
developed their core competencies mainly from their competitive ability to learn and recreate
existing knowledge that was formed under specific sets of policy incentives and certain degrees
of market protection.
More recent studies present some updated characteristics of "emerging-market MNCs"
(EMNCs), a contemporary expression replacing its dated equivalent TWMNCs. One of the most
interesting aspects of EMNCs is their intra-regional characteristic. With few exceptions, the
largest MNCs from developing countries produce and sell large proportions of their output in
their home regions (Rugman, 2005). Given this fact, it may be too early to call EMNCs MNCs of
a true kind, as they are not yet truly multinational (Rugman, 2009). Another interesting fact
concerns the increasing asset-seeking portion of outward FDI, initiated by EMNCs. In particular,
firms from China and India have shown active moves as buyers in recent cross-border M&A
deals (Aguiar et al., 2009). Perhaps this can be seen as an outcome of increasingly converging
interests between global market leaders and market followers. Given the recent tough economic
situation, more market leaders are likely to be convinced of the need to restructure their
organizations with more focus on core businesses, and firms from the developing world may have
a good opportunity to internalize certain strategic assets of their interest, which the former are
willing to abandon as a result of their restructuring efforts.
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3.3. Overview of China's FDI
Since adopting its Open Door Policy in 1979, China has employed FDI as a catalyst for its
capitalist reform (Roland, 2000). Preferential treatment for foreign investors over local capitalists
as well as China's huge market potential have made China one of FDI's most popular destinations
(Huang, 2003). As of 2008, Mainland China captured 17.5% of FDI flows toward the developing
world, which was equivalent to 6.4% of the world's total FDI inflow volume (UNCTAD, 2009).
The last two decades, in particular, have witnessed an increasing rush of foreign investors into
China: during this period, the amount of FDI that was newly hosted by Mainland China8
increased more than 30 times over, from US$3.5 billion in 1990 to US$108 billion in 2008
(UNCTAD, 2010). A large fraction of FDI, received by China, took the form of green-field
transactions, while the other FDI pattern-acquisition of local firms or assets by foreign
investors-was marginal (UNCTAD, 2010). This pattern of hosting foreign capital, green-field
investment over acquisitions, is a striking contrast to the way Chinese firms invest overseas.
In contrast to FDI received by China, overseas investment made by Chinese firms has not
been of primary interest for a long time, mainly due to its relatively modest size. It was not until
2005 that China's annual outward FDI volume reached US$10 billion (the 1992 level of China's
FDI inflow volume) for the first time in history. Since 2005, however, China's annual FDI
outflows have soared rapidly, reaching US$50 billion in 2008 (Figure 2-2). The magnitude and
speed of growth suggest that China's role as a capital exporter and China's outward FDI are
worthy of greater attention. The recent rapid growth of China's outward FDI has been led by that
of cross-border M&A deals rather than that of green-field investment. In 2008, for example, over
60% of China's outward FDI took the form of cross-border M&A.
8 Mainland China does not include Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.
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Figure 2-2: China's Outward FDI Flows (China as Origin), 1990-2008
Source: UNCTAD online database (http://www.unctad.org/temnplates/Page.asp?intltemID=3 199&lang=1).
FDI made by Chinese firms is geographically concentrated in Asia. For the period of
2004-2008, Asia received on average 64% of China's annual outbound direct investment, and
Latin America followed with 21% (Figure 2-3). The geographical distribution of China's outward
FDI stock also illustrates an extremely Asia-biased pattern. One point to be highlighted here is
that the top three destinations, which account for three-quarters of China's 2004-2008 mean
annual outward FDI flows and its stock as of 2008, are small open economies that have generous
corporate-tax policies. Hong Kong (55% in flows and 63% in stock) was the single dominant
destination of China-originated direct investment, followed by the British Cayman Islands (15%
in flows and 11% in stock) and the British Virgin Islands (5% in flows and 6% in stock). Given
this fact, the official statistics on China's outward FDI used in this section may not capture a
precise picture of China-exported capital's actual geographical distribution, as the tax havens are
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Figure 2-3: Geographical Distribution of China's Outward FDI
Note: The British Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands are counted as Latin America.
Source: Computed from the P.R.C. Ministry of Commerce et al. (2008).
often intermediate locations for FDI, not final destinations. One extreme example of this concern
is "round-tripping" FDI, which refers to China's outbound FDI that is imported back to China. It
is widely believed that China's official inward FDI statistics have been overestimated at least by
20% due to "round-tripping" FDI flows (World Bank, 1996; Wong and Chan, 2003).
In the meantime, the sectoral target of China-originated overseas direct investment has
been shifting to the tertiary industry, away from the primary sector. During the early period of
China's overseas direct investment, resource-seeking FDI was substantial. According to China's
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), the natural-resource-
exploiting sector accounted for roughly 30% of China-originated FDI flows between 1979 and
1998 (Yang, 2005). The main incentives behind the resource-seeking FDI from China include
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Figure 2-4: Sectoral Distribution of China's Outward FDI
Source: Computed from the P.R.C. Ministry of Commerce et al. (2008).
soaring demand for raw materials and the poor quality of some key natural resources in China9
(Zhan, 1995; Cai, 1999).
Recently, however, the tertiary sector has been a major sectoral target of China's outward
FDI. For the period 2004-2008, three-quarters of China's annual outward FDI went to the service
sector, including leasing and business services, finance, and wholesale and retails, and only
slightly less than a quarter of it was targeted to the secondary sector (Figure 2-4). The sectoral
distribution of China's outward FDI stock is not much different from that of its annual flow. As of
2007, seven out of China's 18 leading non-financial MNCs (in terms of foreign assets) were in
basic sectors (oil refinery, power generation, and steel making), five were in the consumer-
9 For example, China has massive iron ore reserves, but most of them are poor in quality, in terms of iron content.
Therefore, China imports a substantial amount of iron ore from other countries such as Australia, in order to ensure a
certain quality of steel-products or reduce iron production cost (Tcha and Wright, 1999).
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product manufacturing sector, and the other five were in logistics, construction, and other sectors;
among the 18 Chinese MNCs, 16 (the exceptions were Lenovo and Haier) were state-owned
enterprises (Fudan and VCC, 2009). This fact raises the possibility that the Chinese government
is a main actor behind China's outward FDI.
3.4.China's Automotive Policy: From Inward to Outward Globalization
The Five Year Plans (FYPs) for the period 1986-1995 placed an emphasis on FDI-induced inward
globalization to modernize the domestic automotive manufacturing sector without being
constrained by foreign exchange reserves. The FYPs-China's economic master plans that
provide national economic development outlines and sector-specific growth strategies-
incorporated guidelines for the automotive sector development until the State Planning
Commission (SPC) announced its first detailed automotive industry policy in 1994. The
automotive sector was firstly designated as a national pillar industry 0 in the seventh FYP (1986-
1990), and its status as a national pillar industry was firmly established in the eighth FYP (1991-
1995) (Chu, 2008). In this period, import substitution (IS) in the passenger vehicle sector was the
primary policy goal of the automotive sector. The SPC picked six local auto assemblers as the
nation's strategic passenger vehicle makers-often described as three majors and three
minors"-and encouraged them to form IJVs with leading global automakers for IS
implementation purposes.
The IJV-based IS strategy was recapitulated in the 1994 automotive industry policy-
10 The SPC used the term pillar industry to indicate specific segments of the secondary sector that have large
multiplier effects on the national economy and thus rank high in the pecking order for national resource allocation.
The pillar industries, specified in the eighth FYP, include machinery, electronics, automotive, petro-chemical, and
construction sectors.
" In this period, the three majors were FAW, SAIC, and DFM; the three minors were the Beijing Automotive Works,
the Guangzhou Automotive Group, and the Tianjin Automotive Industry Corporation.
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China's first comprehensive policy framework dedicated to the automotive sector. This sector-
specific industrial policy reflected the central government's concern that the automotive sector
was contributing to the national economy less than expected as a pillar industry.2 This policy
aimed at mobilizing nation-wide resources and capability to incubate two to three large global
players, which have competitive in-house vehicle-development and volume-production capability,
and six to seven sizable local automakers, which can serve the fast-growing domestic market with
partial vehicle-development capability, by the end of the 2 0 th century. The 1994 policy saw the
IJV-arranged exchange-market-for-technology strategy as the most feasible means to attain the
goal-i.e., incubating competitive China-based automakers. In particular, the six IJVs 3 that the
policy targeted were expected to play critical roles in reshaping and upgrading the existing (i)
industrial organization' 4 , (ii) operation scale", (iii) industrial location'6, and (iv) production
technologies. The ninth (1996-2000) FYP maintained the 1994 automotive policy in many
respects. One point to be noted is that the ninth plan made it clear that the passenger vehicle
segment was at the heart of the national automotive industry policy. Around two-thirds of the
total auto sector development budget was allocated to the sector's passenger vehicle portion.
In the tenth (2001-2005) FYP, the Chinese central government signaled a shift in its
future industrial policy direction: from injinlai (inward globalization) to zoucuqi (outward
globalization). By 2000, the major exporter country became the world's second largest foreign
12 In 1993, the automobile manufacturing sector accounted for only 1.43% of China's total industrial value-added.
Note: the industry excludes the construction sector, Source: computed from CATARC (1994) and NBSC (1994).
13 The six IJVs are SVW, FAW-VW, DF-Citrodn, Beijing-Jeep, Guangzhou-Peugeot, and Tianjin-Daihatsu.
14 The 1994 policy specified that the Chinese government would focus on creating an oligopolistic market situation,
where the three largest firms hold a joint market share of 70% or higher.
IS In 1993, there were 124 automakers in China, and their annual vehicle output volume was on average only 10,458
units. Source: computed from CATARC (1994).
16 In 1990, for example, China's major auto assembly plants were geographically dispersed throughout 27
provinces-only three provinces (Hainan, Xizang, and Ningxia) did not have auto assembly plants within their
administrative boundaries (CATARC, 1991).
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exchange reserve holder, and confronted increasing pressure for currency appreciation from the
global community. Outward FDI was viewed as an effective means by which China could relax
the pressure while showing off its expanded role in the world's economy. In 2002, the 16th
National Congress of the Communist Party of China included outward FDI in China's official
policy agenda. As follow-up actions, in 2004 the Ministry of Commerce published the Countries
and Industries for Overseas Investment Guidance Catalogue 7 , in which potential investment (or
M&A) target industries are listed by country; in 2005 the Chinese government substantially
simplified administrative procedures necessary to initiate outward FDI.
An updated automotive industry policy was announced by the National Development and
Reform Commission (NDRC)'" in 2004. This policy makes it clear that China aims to nurture
four to five large automotive groups that can be contenders for the list of the world's top 500
corporations. Accordingly, the policy priority shifts from import substitution to firm-level
competitive advantage, and emphasizes scale-up and technological capability. For scale-up, the
2004 policy encourages intra-industry M&As and vertical integrations, and allows large firms
with a market share of 15% or higher (i.e., the Big Three automotive groups) to initiate their own
development plans.
One noteworthy change in the 2004 policy is its emphasis on indigenous technology and
brand development, away from dependence on inward FDI and IJVs. In other words, the former
market-technology-exchange strategy has been officially abandoned. The primary reason for this
" Nk H 8 (Countries and Industries for Overseas Investment Guidance Catalogue). The
summary is available at http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/PI-c/626171.htm.
18 In 2003, the State Planning Commission was merged with the State Council Office for Restructuring the
Economic System and part of the State Economic and Trade Commission to form the NDRC. At present, the NDRC
is China's top economic development authority in charge of national economic master plans and other key socio-
economic policies.
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change is that independent automakers like Chery and Geely responded more actively to the
government's request for independent vehicle technology and brand development than primary
industrial policy target SOEs operating IJVs (Chu, 2008). The change in the automotive policy
direction reflects top policy makers' growing skepticism about the IJV-based sequential catch-up
model-i.e., from the CKD IJV through the joint R&D IJV to the local automaker with
independent technological capability. Many forms of preferential treatment for foreign investors
have been discontinued so that high-performing indigenous local firms are not discriminated
against, and substantial local R&D investments are required as a condition for new IJV
investments or existing IN expansions.
In addition, the 2004 policy emphasizes outward FDI as one way to access advanced
foreign technology. This means that outward FDI, which in the past the Chinese government
considered a macroeconomic policy measure to mitigate trade frictions (or global pressure for
local currency appreciation), is now regarded as part of industrial policy. The 11 t FYP reaffirms
the major policy directions formulated in the 2004 policy and encourages local automakers'
investment in other countries as a way to implement its new "leapfrogging development" model,
which replaces its former FDI-based "sequential catch-up" model.
3.5. Implications for This Study
Although MNCs from the emerging market economies are rapidly expanding their roles in the
global economy, scholars have paid little attention to the developing world as a source of FDI.
Dunning's OLI approach, discussed in Section 3.1., seems to be universally valid in its theoretical
framework, but the approach's further generalization-beyond the cases of MNCs from advanced
economies-needs support from more studies on the TWMNC cases. As argued in Section 3.2., a
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subset of South-North FDI that is initiated for asset-seeking purposes may need more attention, as
the literature on the subject, in particular, is sparse, but such FDI appears to be forming a new
mainstream FDI trend.
One of the key characteristics of China's outward FDI, introduced in Section 3.3., is
Chinese firms' clear preference for M&As over green-field investment as their primary outward-
FDI mechanic. This fact may suggest that Chinese firms' overseas investment is motivated by
their desire to internalize others' firm-specific assets (e.g., production skills, managerial and
marketing know-how, R&D capability, distribution and sales network) rather than by their intent
to benefit from location-specific advantage (e.g., factor-input/market conditions in a particular
location).
Section 3.4. shows that this point is the case for China's most recent automotive industry
policy. In contrast to the 1994 policy, where inward FDI and the IJV arrangement were
emphasized for import substitution and technological catch-up purposes, the 2004 policy asks
domestic automakers to initiate more self-driven technology development efforts combined with
active outward globalization, in order to achieve the same goal. The 2004 policy is evidence of
the Chinese government's recognition of outward FDI as a strategic tool to spur local firms'
technological capability-building process. In addition, the revised direction of the automotive
policy may reflect the limitation of the IJV-based inward globalization strategy as a technological
catch-up model, which the Chinese government learned from the last two-decade IJV experiment
in the domestic automotive sector.
In sum, the literature reviewed in this section suggests that the following case study of
SAIC's outward FDI has value in the following two respects. First, the study of the SAIC case, as
it is, enriches the existing literature on the asset-seeking FDI originated from the developing
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world. Second, the SAIC case illuminates outward FDI's potential roles in technological
capability-building process (e.g., synergy with inward FDI), which have gone largely unexplored
or have often been misunderstood in the existing literature.
4. A Case Study: the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation
This section explores the puzzle of why SAIC, a "successful" in-house capability builder with
inward FDI (i.e., the Sino-foreign JV arrangement), went outside its home base seemingly for
asset-seeking purposes earlier than any other Chinese automaker. In particular, I focus on how the
outward globalization strategy has affected SAIC's technological learning outcome.
4.1. Acquisition of Rover and MG Assets
SAIC was the first Chinese passenger-car maker that secured sizable foreign operations. The
primary motivation for SAIC's outward FDI was both internal and external. On the one hand, the
SAIC Group itself recognized certain limitations involved in JV-based catch-up, and thus had an
incentive to consider alternative sources of learning. This point will be discussed further in
Section 4.3. On the other hand, the Chinese central government, which had reached the same
conclusion that its "exchange-market-for-technology" strategy for the local auto sector
development was not as fruitful as intended, has placed more emphasis on the zoucuqi strategy
since the mid-2000s (NDRC, 2004; Luo et al., 2010). Recently, the Chinese government has
signaled a paradigm change by withdrawing or reducing preferential incentive packages for
foreign investors, and by providing increased policy support for Chinese firms pursuing outward
globalization.
SAIC took the first step in its outward FDI strategy by acquiring vehicle and engine
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manufacturing assets from the British sedan maker Rover. The Rover company, founded in 1904,
was a division of the Rover Group. In 1994, through a series of different owners, BMW acquired
all the divisions of the Rover Group, including Rover, Land Rover, Riley, Mini, Triumph, and
Austin-Healey. In 2000, the Rover Group was split into three divisions: Mini, Land Rover, and
the rest (MG Rover). The latter two divisions were sold to Ford and the Phoenix Consortium,
respectively, while the Mini division remained part of the BMW Group. What is noteworthy is
that this deal did not include the property rights of the Rover brand. BMW retained its right to the
Rover brand name even after the deal. The Phoenix Consortium was allowed to use the Rover
badge only for Rover's pre-existing sedan line-up. This request was made by Ford as a
condition of the Land Rover deal because the firm wanted to keep Land Rover's brand value
from being compromised by MG Rover's market performance. According to the contract, Ford
was to have the priority for negotiation if BMW determined to sell its rights to the Rover brand.
In early 2005, the MG Rover Group went bankrupt and was on the market again. In July of the
same year, the Nanjing Automotive Group (NAG) of China acquired key assets of the MG
division including property rights to the MG brand. SAIC completed several acquisitions of
Rover-owned manufacturing and intellectual assets from the MG Rover Group between
November 2004 and May 2005. SAIC's acquisition of the Rover division, however, came without
ownership of the Rover brand name. Ford purchased exclusive rights to the Rover badge from
BMW in 2006 and sold them to the Tata Motors of India in 2008.
The acquired assets from MG Rover, although not a full package that included core labor
power and brand ownership, helped SAIC move forward in terms of technological upgrading.
SAIC's key acquisitions include a complete set of property rights to two models of Rover's sedan
19 The pre-existing Rover lineups included Rover 25/45/75 models.
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lineup (Rover 25/75) and the Rover Power train K-series engine.2 In particular, the platforms
and designs for Rover 75 became the matrix of SAIC's first own brand model Roewe 750.
Although the Roewe 750 project was based on the adoption of pre-existing technologies rather
than the creation of new ones, it helped SAIC better understand the process of passenger vehicle
21development and manufacturing, and better diagnose its weaknesses in the process.
This deal, however, might have been no more than a simple ownership transfer of dated
hard technology without SAIC's additional efforts to absorb ex-Rover R&D manpower. SAIC
was aware that the ownership of two vehicle models and their relevant intellectual properties in
and of itself would not be sufficient to fully assimilate the technology and know-how that
underlie such outcomes. What SAIC sought outside desperately was not only tangible assets that
existed in the form of drawings, specifications, or platforms, but also the tacit knowledge that
was necessary to create the concrete outcomes. From SAIC's perspective, the most feasible way
to secure access to such tacit knowledge behind the acquired Rover assets was through Rover's
key researchers and engineers. This idea-hiring ex-Rover's key R&D manpower-was
implemented successfully by employing a separate international JV arrangement. When SAIC
was close to reaching a deal with Rover in early 2005, it was already discussing the establishment
of an R&D JV with an England-based independent automotive technology provider, Ricardo,
PLC, which had worked with most of the world's leading automakers and tier one parts suppliers.
In May 2005, shortly after the Rover deal was completed, SAIC and Ricardo PLC
founded an automotive R&D JV called the Ricardo 2010 Consultants, Ltd. that would be wholly
responsible for SAIC's new vehicle development projects based on the ex-Rover technology.
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Ricardo 2010's 150 engineers, the majority of whom were recruited from Rover's core R&D
division, played a leading role in the launch of the first two of SAIC's own models-Roewe 750
and 550: Ricardo 2010 was the commanding center for the whole process of the two vehicle
models' adaptation, upgrade, and redesign process. In January 2007, SAIC took over Ricardo
PLC's stake in Richard 2010, after the successful completion of the JV's initial mission; since
then, Ricardo 2010 has been SAIC's wholly owned subsidiary. Ricardo 2010 is now functioning
as the European branch of SAIC's pivotal in-house engineering arm, the Shanghai Automotive
Engineering Academy, specializing in advanced R&D and adaptation for up market.
SAIC's Rover project was completed with its merger of NAG in 2008. NAG was an
attractive target for a merger, primarily due to a potential synergy between SAIC-acquired Rover
technologies and NAG's MG division.2 2 NAG-owned MG platforms, designs, labor power, and
brand name, all could complement SAIC's acquired assets. In addition, the deal allowed SAIC to
enjoy a sizable passenger car manufacturing base and a new local market near Shanghai, which
the SAIC management saw as critical to the group's future growth.
4.2. Takeover of Ssangyong Motor's Majority Stake
In January 2005, SAIC announced officially that it was the majority shareholder of Korea's SYM.
This deal was a new milestone for China's automobile industry, as it produced the first China-
based multinational automaker. Leading global automakers viewed this event with some
suspicion, as SAIC's global management capability was in question, and even marriages between
leading global automakers (e.g., the Daimler-Chrysler merger) often ended up in failure.
SYM is one of Korea's oldest automakers. The HaDongHwan Motor Company, the
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matrix of SYM, was founded in 1954. The firm, renamed Donga Motors in 1977, focused on the
assembly of foreign-licensed bus and jeep lineups, which was crucial in building its identity as a
sports utility vehicle (SUV) maker afterwards. In 1986, Donga Motors merged with Ssangyong
Group, one of Korea's major diversified business groups. In 1998, SYM's ownership was
transferred again to the Daewoo Group, Korea's then-third largest chaebol, having the then-
second largest domestic automotive output capacity, primarily due to the government-led post-
crisis restructuring drive of the late 1990s. Although Daewoo Motors (sedan) and SYM (SUV)
were expected to create substantial synergy, Daewoo Group's financial insolvency in 2000
dissolved the alliance even before the realization of this synergy. SYM's ownership was
transferred to the firm's major creditors. In 2005, SAIC acquired a 48.92% stake of SYM from
the creditor group, after a series of bidding wars with another Chinese auto producer, the Lanxing
Group.23
At the time of this deal, SYM was not an attractive target for merger and acquisition
(M&A), from an objective stand point. Despite its long history of auto assembly and production,
the firm had never achieved a leader position in Korea, in terms either of market share or
technological performance. As of 2004, SYM's share in Korea's passenger car market was barely
over 10%, and its annual output level of 130,783 units was still far from the sector's minimum
efficient scale of one-quarter million units a year (Figure 2-5). Rising oil prices and the firm's
SUV-dominant portfolio (over 88% in 2004) made SYM's future even more uncertain. Another
issue was whether or not SYM had in-house technological capability worthy of acquisition.
When SAIC acquired SYM, all of Ssangyong's SUV line-ups were still built on the
technologically backward frame body structure instead of on the industry's standard, the
23 Interview #19; SAIC's official website (http://www.saicgroup.com).
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monocoque body technology, which ensures a higher level of vehicle safety and fuel-efficiency.24
The firm was not equipped with competitive in-house R&D capability for core parts components,
exemplified by the fact that the firm's major passenger car line-ups installed Mercedes engines
under an official license agreement. SYM's Diesel-based technologies, if valuable for some
reasons, could not apply directly to SAIC's gasoline-based vehicle line-ups, either.
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Figure 2-5: Ssangyong's Annual Sales Volume and Market Share, 1991-2007
Note: I defined passenger cars as sedans and recreation vehicles (RVs).
Source: Data from HKM (2008).
All in all, the SYM deal involved in a high risk and a low return, from a third party's
viewpoint. Then, why did SAIC want SYM so desperately? SYM probably had something
valuable to SAIC that others might not perceive readily. In the following two sections, I will
explain this claim in detail.
24 Interview #15. SYM failed to develop monocoque-structured vehicle models even as of 2009.
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4.3. Revisited: What is Missing in the Sino-foreign JV Arrangement
The JV is an institutional arrangement through which multiple parties can form a strategic
alliance. This arrangement is appropriate if the alliance partners can create greater value from the
combination of their competitive and exclusive internal resources. Complementarity,
interdependency, and reciprocity among JV partner firms are primary sources that can determine
the durability of the JV (Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Park and Ungson, 2001). A strategic alliance
is sturdy, and JVs can last long when alliance partners need each other to create synergy and
when they have a similar level of leverage power on their collective assets thanks to each party's
competitive and complementary core competency (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Mutual learning
among JV partner firms is encouraged highly in such an environment (Crossan and Inkpen, 1995;
Hamel, 1991; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Mowery et al., 1996).
However, high degrees of interdependency and reciprocity have been absent from Sino-
foreign JVs. Most Sino-foreign JVs split roles between Chinese and foreign equity holders. The
Chinese side is mainly in charge of dealing with the government and managing human resources
and local distribution/sales networks, while foreign shareholders take the lead in most kinds of
technical issues, including technology license and parts purchase. Although the official
institutional arrangement ensures that each party has the same level of influence as its equity
share on every decision-making process within the JV, this has not been the case for technical
issues mainly due to a huge technological gap between the partner firms: MNCs have the gap-
induced relative leverage power. In a certain sense, what Chinese partners contributed to the JV
was things that could be learned by others relatively easily within a relatively short period of time,
while what foreign partners brought to the JV was just the opposite. Also, before the 2000s,
China's passenger-car market was not big enough to give Chinese automakers substantial
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bargaining power vis-a-vis their foreign partners. Rather, a heated bidding war among Chinese
local governments, which wanted to develop the auto sector as a basic local industry, for a
potential JV opportunity raised MNCs' leverage in JV-related negotiations. The success of
China's "exchange-market-for-technology strategy" was uncertain under such conditions.
MNCs have not been active in sharing their knowledge with their JV partners. Perhaps
weak intellectual property rights protection in China is part of the reason. Chery's best-selling
model QQ, a reverse-engineered version of GM's Spark, is an example that may in part justify
MNCs' strict control over their intellectual properties.2 s Some MNCs even worried that their
technologies might be leaked to their rival MNCs through the mediation of their Sino-foreign JVs,
because one Chinese firm often has multiple JVs with different MNCs. 26
A more fundamental reason, however, seems to be that MNCs did not see a strong need
to introduce their advanced technologies to China. From MNCs' perspective, it was too costly to
clone their core in-house R&D capability in China or even to transfer part of it, given China's
weak local R&D bases. Instead, they wanted to take advantage of China's huge pool of low-cost
unskilled labor force. The JV arrangement did not mean more than a government-imposed
obstacle that had to be cleared in order to enter China's market (Gallagher, 2006). Even at present,
most Sino-foreign JVs are specialized for the assembly of foreign-developed passenger vehicles,
and peripheral R&D activities, such as modification of interior designs or body frames to suit
local tastes.
25 An interviewee told me that even some parts for QQ and Spark were compatible.
26 Interview #2.
27 Interviews #1, 3, 8, and 12.
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When it comes to building in-house capabilities for new vehicle development, it seems
obvious that current Sino-foreign JVs cannot help Chinese local automakers much. A new vehicle
development project needs around five years to complete (Figure 2-6). Roughly seven stages,
each of which requires half a year to one year, constitute the whole project, although different
automakers may have somewhat different development and design processes. The project begins
with advance engineering. This stage focuses on the development of the power-train module for a
new vehicle. The design, prototype production, and testing of key power-train components, such
as the engine and transmission, should be completed even before a detailed product development
plan is under way. The second stage is design concept development and approval, led by the
marketing or planning department. The third stage is the detailed design stage, of which the R&D
department is in primary charge. Exterior and interior design is completed, and detailed drawings
come out by a group of modules, such as the chassis, electrical appliances, and body. The fourth
stage is to develop prototypes for the new vehicle in conformity with the drawings. As part of this
Project begins. Project ends.
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Figure 2-6: A Typical Flow Chart of a New Vehicle Development Project
Source: Created by author on the basis of Interviews # 13, 15, and 20.
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task, engineers examine existing problems in parts and vehicle production, and check the quality
of design and the potential market value of the product. The fifth stage is pilot production and
testing. The sixth stage is preparing production: the assembly line is designed and actually
installed. The final stage is production and market launching.
Of the seven stages, Sino-foreign JVs are involved in only stages 6 and 7 and part of
stages 4 and 5, while core competencies of leading global automakers are based on their ability to
carry out the first three stages. In particular, the power-train module and platform development of
stage 1 is the essence of a new vehicle development project and greatly affects the project's
success. 28 The ultimate goal of the Sino-foreign JV arrangement-that Chinese local automakers
can develop their own capabilities for new vehicle development in alliance with leading global
automakers-was too ambitious to be attained, primarily because Sino-foreign JVs were not set
up to carry out locally the entire process of new vehicle development. Simply licensing the
outcomes of the first three stages could not provide Chinese local firms with any critical learning
opportunities for such essential tasks. Of course, Sino-foreign JV experiences were not very
helpful in developing the organizational capacity for managing and coordinating the whole
process of new vehicle development, either. Even in the presence of Sino-foreign JVs, most local
firms still were not sure where to start or what to do in order to develop their in-house R&D and
manufacturing capabilities in a competitive way. The learning-by-doing dynamics, which are
crucial in technological catch-up (Amsden, 1989), are missing from such practices.
MNCs have also minimized the possibility of spillovers of production and manufacturing
knowledge. MNCs take the initiative in determining which models to introduce in China, and
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28 Interview #15.
how manufacturing plants for these models are to be designed.29 MNCs design manufacturing
plants and determine the equipment to be installed in them: the production line needs to reflect
MNC-owned production technologies. There is little room for the Chinese side's voice in the
decision-making process for such matters. In the production stage, Chinese JV shareholders still
have limited access to key information, including a whole set of specifications of vehicle models
and core parts components. Most vital information is kept at MNCs' home base, and foreign
equity holders strictly control their intellectual properties within the JV, even when such
information resides in China.30 In addition, Chinese local firms cannot own or use foreign-
licensed technologies permanently. Licenses on model-specific technologies are withdrawn with
model changes. The three to four years of an average model change cycle in China is not enough
for Chinese firms to absorb foreign technologies, even when perfect access to such technologies
is assumed.
It is also very hard to expect substantial information leakage through intra-industry trade.
In the auto manufacturing sector, the simultaneous engineering approach is prevalent because it
reduces time and financial costs in the new vehicle design and production process (Jurgens, 2001;
Shenas and Derakhshan, 1994). From the early stages, major car assemblers operate inter-
divisional and inter-disciplinary teams for new vehicle projects in close collaboration with their
primary parts suppliers. VW-Bosch, Toyota-Denso, GM-Delphi, and Hyundai-Mobis alliances are
examples of such partnerships. Such alliances are often formed among firms sharing the same
home bases, through long-term transactional relationships. Key members of these alliances and
subordinate supply networks are a kind of firmly established knowledge- and profit-sharing
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29 Interviews #19, 20, and 25.
30 Interviews #2, 8, 12, 20, and 25.
community. There has been an increasing tendency for foreign auto assemblers to enter China's
market together with their primary parts suppliers; that is, core parts components for vehicles
produced in China are supplied mainly by Chinese subsidiaries of foreign automotive parts
manufacturers. In this situation, their key knowledge remains within MNCs' global alliance
network. In addition, the modularization trend increases the secrecy of knowledge (Baughn et al.,
1997). Although Chinese JV partners often make an effort to give more opportunity to Chinese
local parts suppliers, such attempts are not successful because MNCs have veto power over any
suppliers that fail to meet MNC-set quality standards.3 ' As a result, MNC-initiated localized
supply networks provide limited space for Chinese local parts suppliers, even when they are
subsidiaries or primary collaborators of Chinese JV partners.
4.4. Outward FDI as a Mode of Active Learning
Given the weaknesses of the Sino-foreign JV as an institutional device for learning, it seems
reasonable to link SAIC's desire to fulfill missing dimensions in its JV-based learning and a
32
series of SAIC's foreign asset acquisitions.
The acquisition of SYM allowed SAIC to access resources that its JVs strictly controlled.
The first action that SAIC took after the deal was to build an information-sharing channel
between SAIC and SYM.33 As Ssangyong's primary shareholder, able to control broad aspects of
the firm's management, SAIC made an intra-group inter-divisional license agreement, based on
which SAIC's China-based divisions could access Ssangyong's core intellectual properties such
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as an entire set of drawings and technical notes for SYM's flagship passenger vehicles3 4 and
major parts components (Spec Watch Korea, 2009). In 2007, SYMs' intranet was fully integrated
into SAIC Group's communication network, which even enabled remote access to such assets
and information sharing (ibid.).
SYM is far from the sector's technological leader, but from SAIC's perspective, its
technological assets may be more valuable than we believe. A GM-China engineer commented:
Automakers here do not necessarily have to have the world's up-to-date technology. Even
without it, you can still compete in China. For example, Chery's QQ35 sells three times more
than our Spark, despite its seemingly lower quality. The secret is price-QQ is cheaper than
Spark by more than half Mediocre-quality cars can appeal to Chinese consumers as long as
they are operational and affordable. In my view, SYM's base technology is advanced enough
in Chinese standards.36
In fact, when acquired by SAIC, SYM had an independent technology base, developed through
its strategic alliance with Mercedes-Benz, and the firm's technological assets were enough to give
it a significant edge in the Korean market (Salmon, 2004). It is likely that the entire set of
information on vehicles and parts components, which was virtually inaccessible through IJVs,
substantially reduced the time cost needed for trial-and-error-based learning. 37
However, SAIC may have placed more value on human-embedded knowledge, which is
the source of such technological assets, than on the technological assets themselves. The SAIC
Group initiated a joint project between the group's independent division, SAIC Motor, and SYM
under the leadership of the former. Annually, an average of 40 key SYM researchers and
engineers were sent to Shanghai for this project.38 Ssangyong engineers helped their Chinese
3 Kyron (SUV) and Chairman W (full-size sedan).
3 Chery's QQ is a reverse-engineered imitation of SGM's Spark.
36 Interview #2.
37 Interview #15.
38 Interviews #15 and 19.
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coworkers interpret specifications accurately and provided other technical assistance whenever
Chinese engineers met unexpected problems. More importantly, Ssangyong engineers helped
SAIC Motor conceptualize how its R&D department should be organized and how a new vehicle
development project should be planned, managed, and implemented. As a SAIC Motor engineer
commented during our interview, what was most in need for his company was not particular
technologies, to which SAIC already had fairly good access through market transactions, but a
system that would enable SAIC to create such technologies.39 In this sense, it is not meaningful
to discuss whether or not SYM had cutting-edge technologies. What we need to pay attention to
is the fact that SYM had much better organizational capabilities and experience than SAIC in
planning, managing, and executing new vehicle development projects.
A close look at SAIC's independent vehicle development projects demonstrates how
crucial outward FDI was for these projects. In 2006, the SAIC Group announced an ambitious
post-IS upgrading plan in which it would develop five platforms based on its own in-house
technologies, and introduce 30 of its own brand passenger-car models by 2010. At the time of
announcement, the plan evoked skepticism from the mass media and the industry as a whole
because SAIC then had no experience in new vehicle development, and even the world's leading
automakers needed at least four years to develop a new model. As of 2009, however, SAIC's new
vehicle projects seemed to be on the right track. Six platforms on which SAIC's independent
passenger-vehicle line-ups are based have been completed, and at least 11 SAIC-branded models
have already been introduced in the market or will be in the near future (Table 2-4).
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Table 2-4: Details of SAIC's Own Brand Model Development Projects
Platform Type Brand Models Market Debut Base Technology
No. 1 Four-wheel drive (4WD) layout Roewe C200 Sep 2009 Ssangyong
for SUVs
Nos. 2 & 3 Front-wheel drive (FF) layout Roewe 350 Dec 2009 Rover
for mid-sized sedans 450 Dec 2008
550 Jul2008
750 Oct 2006
BP21 Jun 2010
750H Sep 2010
Nos. 4 & 5 Front-wheel drive (FF) layout MG 5Z Jun 2009 Nanjing-MG
for compact-sized sedans 7Z Sep 2009
No. 6 Front-wheel drive (FF) layout MG 3Z Sep 2008 Nanjing-MG
for compact-sized coupes TF Jun 2009
Source: Interview #19 and Zhang (2009).
Given that leading global automakers spend, on average, three to five years in developing
new vehicles, SAIC's new vehicle development project has made comparably fast progress. It
seems hard to deny that SAIC's outward FDI strategy contributed to the outcome. The
improvement of pre-existing reference technologies was an easier task than the creation of
something new from scratch." Solid progress in the upgrading plan also suggests that SAIC has
developed organizational capabilities to lead and manage multiple new vehicle development
projects to a considerable degree.
4.5.Further Thoughts on the Ssangyong Deal
It seems controversial to consider the Ssangyong deal a positive factor in SAIC's upgrading
strategy, in contrast to the Rover deal, as SAIC's acquisition of SYM ended up with a net loss of
at least half a billion dollars. Even after SAIC took over SYM, the latter failed to reverse the
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situations it confronted, such as a shrinking market share and an expanding economic loss. Rising
oil costs and the recent economic downturn, ignited by the US sub-prime mortgage crisis, drove
SYM, with its SUV-centered product lineup, further into the corner. In late 2008, SYM's
accumulated deficit increased to a level where it could not manage without external cash
injections. As a result, SAIC had to determine whether or not it would invest further in its Korean
subsidiary. In January 2009, the SAIC headquarters (HQ), which was pessimistic about the future
of SYM, decided not to do so. Decisions as to the future of SYM were handed over from SAIC to
the Korean government. In February, the Korean government decided to inject public funds to
prevent Ssangyong's bankruptcy, and it froze SAIC's legal rights as the firm's majority
shareholder.
Although SAIC's acquisition of SYM was a disaster from a financial perspective, it may
not be so from a different angle. In the first place, it is questionable that SAIC had an interest in
strengthening SYM's market position as an independent business entity: There is little evidence
that SAIC made active efforts to this end. A US$1 billion investment package, which SAIC
promised in public in return for its acquisition of SYM's majority stake, was not implemented
until SYM went into court receivership in 2009 (Spec Watch Korea, 2006). SYM's labor union
further claimed that SAIC did not initiate any Ssangyong-branded new vehicle development
projects, which would have been a primary source of SYM's future market performance (Spec
Watch Korea, 2006). This claim, though somewhat exaggerated, seems to have some basis, given
the three-to-five-year new vehicle development project cycle and the time of the first market
appearance of SYM's product line-ups concentrated between late 2005 and late 2006 (Table 2-5).
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Table 2-5: SYM's Product Line-up, as of 2008
Models Segment First Appearance in Market
Rexton* SUV Apr 2006
Kyron* SUV Nov 2006
Actyon** SUV Oct 2005
Actyon Sports* SUV May 2006
Rodius* MPV Sep 2005
Chairman* Luxury sedan Oct 1997
Chairman W** Luxury sedan Mar 2008
Note: SUV = sports utility vehicle; MPV = multi-purpose vehicle.
Source: * Zhang (2009); ** HKM (2008).
SAIC's series of attempts to share SYM-owned intellectual properties with its China-
based divisions made the internal conflict even worse. With the L-project contract, the internal
conflict became widely known to the Korean public. The L-project was a joint project between
the SAIC Group and SYM, whose legal contract negotiation was completed in June 2006. The
most controversial aspect of the project was that it legally allowed SAIC's China-based divisions
to share the complete set of intellectual properties (drawings, specifications, and other relevant
technologies) related to SYM's then-new SUV model, Kyron, under the US$20 million license
arrangement (Spec Watch Korea, 2006).
The course of the project contract was not at all smooth. In its early stages, SAIC faced
intense oppositions from SYM's top management (and labor). From SYM's perspective, the L-
project was a threat rather than an opportunity: SYM could not expect any potential benefits from
the project, beyond the license income, while SAIC's China-based divisions using Ssangyong's
up-to-date technologies were a potential threat to SYM's market position, especially if SAIC's
made-in-China products, built on SYM's technologies, were exported to Korea. SYM's
management and labor felt that, for its technological upgrading purposes, SAIC was forcing SYM
to make unfair sacrifices. From SAIC's standpoint, however, access to SYM's strategic assets
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was almost all about its outward FDI. Both parties failed to reach an agreement on the project for
several months.
The SAIC HQ chose shock therapy to break the impasse. In November 2005, the SAIC
Group finally exercised its legal right as SYM's majority shareholder and replaced SYM's
hardliner chief executive officer, Soh Jin-Kwan, with the then-director of the SYM R&D
department, Choi Hyung-Tak, and appointed then-SAIC vice president Zhang Ziwei as SYM's
new executive manager (Chang, 2007). In addition, some more seats of the SYM board of
management were reserved for SAIC delegates. The L-project discussion between SAIC and
SYM parties went well after the personnel changes and resulted in a legal contract in seven
months.
Forming a pro-SAIC management was not the solution to mitigating opposition from the
SYM labor, however. Since the pro-SAIC SYM management came onstage, the SYM labor union
tried to form a much broader alliance in order to push SAIC away from its one-sided and coercive
managerial practices. The SYM labor union used the mass media to attract public attention, allied
with external actors such as the Korean Metal Workers' Union-the Korean equivalent of the
United Auto Workers-and the Spec Watch Korea-a non-profit organization whose primary
mission is to raise public awareness of the speculative behaviors of foreign investors in Korea.
In particular, the SYM labor union raised the following issues. One concerns the nature
of the subject of the license contract. The intellectual properties for SYM's Kyron model, to
which SAIC's China-based divisions were granted full access, consisted of SYM's most up-to-
date technologies and know-how. In the automotive industry, it has been a very rare practice to
license a firm's up-to-date technology to other external parties because such a practice may open
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the firm's core competences to its rivals.4 1 In light of the industry's convention, it seems that the
SYM labor union had some grounds for suspecting a link between the L-project and the abuse of
SAIC's managerial power against SYM's benefit. The second issue raised by the SYM labor
union was whether or not SAIC paid the right price for the licensed intellectual properties.
According to SYM's labor union, the US$20 million license royalty that SAIC paid for the SYM
technologies according to the contract, was no more than 10% of the technologies' market value
(Spec Watch Korea, 2006; Chang, 2007).
The conflict of interest between the stakeholders and the lack of managerial leadership to
tune the conflict, exemplified in the L-project case, were serious obstacles to maximizing SYM's
market potentials. Evidence shows that there were other practices similar to those of the L-
project 43, and such practices further weakened the internal solidarity. The deep-rooted mutual
distrust between management and labor raised SAIC HQ's skepticism as to its new investment in
SYM, and the absence of timely investments gradually crowded SYM's dated models out of the
market. With court receivership in 2009, SAIC's US$ half a billion seed capital, which was used
to acquire the majority stake of SYM, became a sunk cost.
Such an economic loss, however, may be seen as a kind of investment, in that SAIC's
primary motivation for the deal was not financial profit maximization (as evidenced by its moves
after the deal) but the absorption of the SYM's vehicle design and production know-how. In this
41 Interviews #15 and 17.
42 In 2006, Korea's Seoul District Court, however, dismissed SYM labor union's accusation against SAIC by ruling
that the L-Project and its related technology transfer contracts between SAIC and SYM did not violate any laws or
regulations (Kim and Moon, 2009).
4 In early 2009, for example, SYM's labor union filed another lawsuit against SAIC's and SYM's management,
accusing SAIC of attempting to abuse SYM-possessed Diesel hybrid technologies, which were partially funded by
the Korean government. In November 2009, the Suwon District Court found in favor of SYM's labor union, ruling
that part of SYM-possessed hybrid technologies were leaked to SAIC without the SYM Board of Directors'
appropriate approval process, let alone the issue of whether or not the technologies were valuable from an objective
standpoint (Choi, 2009).
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sense, SAIC seems to have obtained what it primarily aimed to get from the deal: C200, the first
SAIC-branded four-wheel drive SUV model, is based on SYM's technology, and the contribution
of SYM engineers to the completion of the project was crucial. Also, it may be a plus for its
future multinational business that SAIC learned managerial lessons from the Ssangyong deal. In
contrast to the Rover deal, which involved fixed capital assets only, the Ssangyong deal involved
the acquisition of stock shares for an existing independent business entity. In the case of the latter,
SAIC often met with huge resistance to its decisions from other internal stakeholders such as
SYM's management and labor, as there existed a conflict of interests between them.
Apart from challenges from outside, SAIC could not deal with the internal conflict
successfully, in part due to its lack of international management and cultural experience.
According to a SAIC interviewee, SYM's labor union and its resistance were among the most
challenging cultural shocks that SAIC experienced in Korea, as these thing did not exist in China.
Even at present, labor unions do not exist in China and labor's organizational resistance to
decisions made by the top management is a very rare occurrence.4 The SAIC interviewee
personally viewed such an experience as a precious asset for SAIC's managerial upgrade, and the
Ssanyong deal itself as a meaningful pilot project for SAIC's growing globalization efforts.
4.6.Feedback Effect: Outward FDI as Leverage to Maneuver Inward FDI
Recently, there have been several events that symbolically have shown that the preexisting SAIC-
GM strategic alliance is being reshaped in such a way as to expand SAIC's role in the alliance.
SAIC's improved technological capability through its bidirectional globalization strategy seems
to underlie this change.
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First, GM has shown a clear intention to expand its China-based R&D activities. In 2007,
GM announced that it would closely cooperate with SAIC to equip PATAC with full vehicle
development functionality (Li, 2009). PATAC then had only partial engineering capability, such
as minor vehicle interior/exterior modification and safety-testing, although it was the largest
automotive R&D IJV project ever made in China and GM had invested in China-based R&D
more than any other foreign automakers. The announcement might have met with surprise from
the industry circle, given that even GM was reluctant, before its announcement, to use its Chinese
operation for vehicle development. A senior engineer from GM-China commented on the change
of GM's R&D strategy.
Roewe 550/750 demonstrates that SAIC has already developed substantial vehicle
development capability, though its in-house capability may not yet be as competitive as ours.
Regardless of our China strategy, SAIC ultimately will find a way to get what it demands
from us now, either from other foreign companies or from its own assets. In this situation, it
would be wise to expand and upgrade the existing SAIC-GM alliance as SAIC wants; and the
stronger alliance with SAIC would in fact not be against GM's benefit, either. We need help
from SAIC for our global business as much as SAIC needs from us. 45
This event reflects a significant change in the attitude of foreign automakers toward their Chinese
operations: at least, GM has begun to consider China as a place to develop, not just assemble,
cars. VW, SAIC's other IJ partner, has also expanded its China-based vehicle development
activities (Zhou, 2009). Such a move may not be as ambitious as GM's, but is substantially ahead
of most other foreign automakers operating IJVs in China, in terms of local R&D expenditure
(CATARC, 2008).
Second, GM ensured SAIC more room in SGM's operational control. On December 4,
2009, SAIC took over from GM a 1% stake in SGM, and thus became the majority shareholder,
controlling 51% of SGM's total equity (Ho and Shirouzu, 2009). This is the first case in China's
4s Interview #2.
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automotive sector in which the initial IJV equity-control structure was revised afterwards.
Although the basic management frame remained the same-three board members from each
firm-and GM had the privilege to buy back the 1% stake, SAIC would exercise stronger
influence on the management of SGM and PATAC 46 with its veto rights and a deciding vote on
the SGM executive board (Muller, 2010). A cash income of US$85 million provided GM with a
primary incentive for this deal (Bradsher, 2009). Given the importance of Chinese operations in
its global business47, however, GM might not have reached the decision to give up its control
premium over SGM unless it had substantial trust in SAIC's managerial and technological
capability.
Finally, the SAIC-GM alliance seeks markets beyond China. In late 2009, SAIC and GM
finalized their plan to establish a new 50-50 JV operation in India (Newton, 2009). Both firms
plan to expand their JV operations to other emerging markets than India in the mid run (Bradsher,
2009). This JV project is considered a win-win partnership; GM can benefit from SAIC's
financial contribution 48 and low-cost manufacturing capability 49, and SAIC views this as a good
opportunity to expand its business beyond China and to become a global player. This event
symbolically shows that GM treats SAIC as an equal business partner, and SAIC's improved
46 SGM controls half the equity in PATAC; SAIC and GM directly control the other half.
47 The GM Group lost a total of US$4.8 billion in 2009, but its emerging-market operations (excluding sales in the
North American and European markets) earned US$1.2 billion; roughly two-thirds of the profit from its emerging-
market operations (US$764 million) came from GM's Chinese operations (Muller, 2010).
48 Just as GM has trouble diverting tax money loaned by the U.S. government for its global business expansion
projects, SAIC is likely to play a primary role in financing their India project, which is estimated to require US$400
million (Bradsher, 2009).
49 As SAIC cooperates with GM for advanced technologies, GM also tries to learn from SAIC how to make profits
through producing cheap, compact vehicles (low-cost vehicle production know-how), which is SAIC's core
competency and would be essential to the success of GM's global business targeting emerging markets (Muller,
2010).
'0 For example, Yale Zhang, a CSM Worldwide (a Michigan-based auto-industry consultancy) analyst familiar with
SAIC and GM's India project, commented: "For SAIC, the India move will allow the company to expand beyond its
home market, a key step as it strives to become a global player." Source: quoted in Ho and Shirouzu (2009).
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technological capability in part has contributed to GM's changed view of its IJ partner. Until
now, no comparable practices have been found in other Sino-foreign auto assembly JVs.
In sum, all of the aforementioned events suggest that SGM, which initially functioned as
GM's China-based assembly operation, has evolved into a self-contained business entity with a
substantial in-house technology development capacity. This evolution path is in fact what the
Chinese central government expected when it initially formulated the IJV-based "exchange-
market-for-technology" strategy for its auto sector development (Chu, 2008). However, the
SAIC-GM alliance case suggests that such a goal may be hardly achievable only through inward
globalization, given that (i) only SGM, whose Chinese equity holder, SAIC, has established other
alternative sources of knowledge and know-how apart from its IJVs, followed this evolution path
and (ii) GM redefined its Chinese operations in such a way as to emphasize their self-contained
technological capability only after SAIC had already developed significant in-house vehicle
development capability through foreign asset acquisitions. In other words, it is possible that
outward FDI not only contributes to the technological capability-building process itself by
allowing a learner to establish access to complementary external resources but also creates
synergy with inward FDI in that the improved technological capability partly through outward
FDI can increase maneuvering space for the learner within the FDI-based strategic alliance.
5. Conclusions: Passive Learner to Active Learner
Latecomers to the market have primarily depended on inward FDI to access external resources.
Wholly owned foreign subsidiaries and international JVs are at the center of such an inward
internationalization strategy. MNCs necessarily bring their knowledge and know-how, in addition
to capital, to host economies in the course of managing their subsidiaries or JVs, and local firms
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have an opportunity to build access to the intangible resources. This learning strategy, however, is
passive, as key aspects of the learning process (e.g., type of resources, timing, mode of access,
etc.) are controlled by foreign investors. If they depend solely on inward FDI for external
resources, latecomers may confront certain constraints in their technological catch-up process.
In this essay, I argue that a portion of outward FDI from the developing world has been
initiated to ease the above-mentioned constraints, with the case example of SAIC. Among
Chinese automakers, SAIC is arguably the one that has made the best use of the international JV
arrangement for its market position and in-house technological capability building. SAIC,
however, acquired foreign assets and managed foreign operations even earlier than its local rivals.
This is perhaps because SAIC, one of the oldest Sino-foreign JV operators, saw the limitations of
inward FDI-based learning before the others did. Under the JV arrangement, SAIC could not
accumulate enough knowledge and experience to initiate and manage the whole new vehicle
development project for itself because the core R&D activities for the project were implemented
outside the JVs; the final outcomes of the R&D activities were imported into China under the
legal license agreement.
With the lack of base knowledge and experience, SAIC could not spur its learning-by-
doing practices, either. SAIC could clear such bottlenecks of learning with its outward FDI
project. Evidence shows that SAIC's new vehicle development projects are based on acquired
technologies and are supported by experienced engineers from SAIC's outward FDI target firms,
and the experience that SAIC accumulated from the projects propels its learning-by-doing
practices. Also, outward FDI helped SAIC effectively incorporate manufacturing and assembly
process know-how from its JV projects into its independent new vehicle development projects.
Table 2-6 summarizes this concept.
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Table 2-6: Synergy between Learning Modes: The SAIC Case
Inward FDI Outward FDI Learning-by-Doing
Source of Knowledge External External Internal
Nature of Learning Mode Passive Active Active
Synergy with Inward FDI n/a Substantial Low
Synergy with Outward FDI Substantial n/a Substantial
Although this study is based on the SAIC case only, some key implications seem to be
generalizable. First, technological catch-up based on inward FDI may work only up to a certain
point, as the process is substantially controlled by the investor. This fact, however, does not mean
that inward globalization is a bad practice, as the accumulation of capital and experience from
inward globalization seems essential in employing the active learning mode in a more effective
way. Second, making overseas FDI investment can provide access to certain valuable external
resources that may not be accessible by hosting FDI, such as tacit knowledge. Inward and
outward globalization, however, are complementary rather than substitute for each other. Inward
FDL may help latecomers recognize what they have to do with outward FDI to further upgrade,
and the latter may help latecomers take greater advantage of the former. Third, outward FDI may
function as a turning point between passive and active learning modes. The outward FDI practice
itself can be viewed in part as a latecomers' active effort to seek alternative sources of learning,
and such attempts can accelerate learning-by-doing practices, which are another major source of
organizational learning. Finally, the acquisition of external technologies can create sustainable
sources of industrial upgrading (beyond one-time technological adoption), when it is
accompanied by an effort to absorb the tacit knowledge underlying the resources. Perhaps SAIC
could have gotten far less from the Rover deal, for example, if it had failed to absorb a sizable
pool of ex-Rover engineers through Ricardo 2010. Moreover, SAIC's access to 1500 SYM
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engineers was crucial to the completion of the first SAIC-branded SUV development project.
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Chapter III
Intra-organizational Proximity as an Asset for Technological Catch-up:
A Comparative Study of China's Big Three Automotive Groups
"[I]f a country has large companies or groups, it will be assured of maintaining a certain
market share and a position in the international economic order ... [I]n the next century our
nation's position in the international economic order will be to a large extent determined by
the position of our nation's large enterprises and groups."
- Wu Bangguo, former vice Premier of Chinal
1. Introduction
How does intra-organizational distance affect the technological capability-building outcome of
the firms seeking base technologies externally? Here, the term intra-organizational distance
refers to the degree of inter-divisional interactions, collaboration, and resource-sharing within a
multidivisional (M-form) business group, which can be assessed indirectly in terms of each
division's contribution to a key group-wide project. I conjecture a causal link between intra-
organizational distance and technological learning because (i) seeking external knowledge may
result in substantial growth in capital or organization 2, especially when it involves the merger and
acquisition (M&A) or direct investment arrangement; (ii) a unitary form corporation often
becomes an M-form organization in the process of governing its increased assets or enlarged
organization-the two forms of organization assign tasks differently, so the communication tasks
they confront differ; and (iii) in that case, intra-group (or inter-divisional) governance may be
critical in the subsequent internalization process of the acquired knowledge, and can affect the
Quoted in Nolan (2001), p. 17.
2 For example, it is a common practice in China's automotive sector that domestic firms establish new JVs with
global/domestic partners or attempt cross-border/domestic M&As in order to access valuable external knowledge.
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firm's overall technological performance. My main hypothesis is that intra-organizational
proximity is a positive contributor to a firm-level learning outcome as it is crucial in integrating
acquired knowledge from multiple sources and inducing subsequent learning practices through
inter-divisional interactions.
I test this hypothesis with a comparative case study of China's three largest automotive
groups: the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), the First Automotive Works
(FAW), and the Dongfeng Motor Group (DFM). The following similarities and dissimilarities
among them provide the rationale for my comparative approach. First, all of the three firms have
grown from single-plant firms to multi-divisional business groups as a result of their organic
growth, which refers to output-led growth, opposed to M&A-driven growth, and technological
capability-building strategies based on international joint ventures (IJVs) and cross-
border/domestic M&As. Second, in their growth paths, SAIC has kept closer intra-organizational
proximity than FAW and DFM, when a set of indicators3 for the intensity and frequency of inter-
divisional interactions and collaborations are used as a proxy for intra-organizational distance.
Finally, SAIC has at the same time developed more competitive in-house technological capability
than FAW and DFM have, when that capability is measured as in-house R&D and engineering
contribution to each firm's self-branded passenger vehicles.
Over the last two decades, China's passenger-vehicle sector has been dominated by IJV
assembly operations whose equity is jointly controlled by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
and foreign automakers. Accordingly, scholars have focused on government variables 4 and IJV
3 Examples of such indicators include primary growth mechanics (organic growth, M&As, hosting FDI, etc.), the
number of self-branded independent vehicle development division, the number of key strategic alliances, the number
of passenger vehicle manufacturing divisions, and spatial distance among divisions.
4 These variables include, for example, the central government's industrial policy, which clearly specifies "pecking
146
partnership factors5 as key determinants of inter-firm performance variations within the sector.
These variables well explain each firm's import substitution (IS) stage performance, measured as
market share and local-content ratio, because appropriate public support and timely access to
foreign technology are necessary to ensure initial capital formation and its efficient operation.
Such variables, however, may leave unexplained a substantial portion of the inter-firm variation
in post-IS catch-up outcomes, where in-house technological capability is critical. Substantial
inter-firm variations in in-house technology development may still exist, depending on their
organizational learning capacity for example, even when the government or IJ partnership
variables are controlled.
A firm lacking its own technological assets utilizes its production capability, built on
acquired knowledge, in order to develop other segments of technological capability, such as
project-execution skills and innovation capability (Lall, 1992). A firm-level organizational
learning capacity is a key determinant of the technological capability-building outcome (Kim,
1995). To a firm depending on external sources for technology, learning is mostly a process of
internalizing external resources through various assimilation practices. As valuable knowledge is
often tacit, a more complete internalization of external knowledge can be attained with intensive
learning-by-doing practices (Arrow, 1962). Also, a firm's learning outcomes in part depend on its
ability to share, integrate, and coordinate certain generic knowledge and skills throughout its
internal business divisions, as evidenced by some successful diversified business groups 6 from
orders" among industrial sectors and among firms within each sector (e.g., Huang, 2003) and local governments'
industrial policies, which targets firms within specific provincial or municipal administrative boundaries (e.g., Thun,
2006).
5 For example, the degree of mutual trust and synergy between IJV equity holders, and the performance of local
government as dual agents of the central government and foreign IN equity holders (e.g., Harwit, 1995; Zhang and
Taylor, 2001; Zhao et al., 2005; Gallagher, 2006).
6 For example, Japanese keiretsu in the post-war period and Korean chaebol in the last quarter of the 2 0 th century.
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the developing world (Amsden, 1989). Therefore, any analysis of a latecomer's post-IS
technological upgrading needs to embrace such organizational learning perspectives.
In this study, I demonstrate that the firm growth strategy of keeping short intra-
organizational distance has contributed substantially to SAIC's technological capability-building
process. Then, I further discuss what key lessons we can learn from the case.
2. Method: A Comparative Case Study
I compare the cases of the Chinese Big Three automakers to test my main hypothesis. The
primary rationale for my adoption of a comparative method is that substantial degrees of
variation exist in their intra-group governance and in-house technology development, while those
three firms share some common features, such as initial car manufacturing experience, firm sizes,
government support, and basic organizational structure. Accordingly, my comparative analysis of
the three firms allows us to capture a substantial portion of the proximity-learning causality with
other potential key variables controlled.
2.1. Details on Case Selections
In detail, SAIC, FAW, and DFM are similar in the following four respects. First, all have a
comparably long-over three to four decades-car manufacturing history (Table 3-1). FAW and
DFM are China's two oldest commercial vehicle manufacturers, and both FAW and SAIC began
passenger vehicle production on a public order basis as early as the late 1950s. If our discussion
focuses on the volume production of modern passenger vehicles, SAIC, in alliance with
Volkswagen (VW), entered the market in 1985, five to seven years earlier than FAW and DFM.
All the three firms, however, were among the first movers in China's passenger vehicle market.
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Second, all three firms have achieved comparably high economies of scale. As of 2009, their
aggregate passenger vehicle market share reached 54%, and each of the three firms already built
an annual passenger vehicle output capacity of over one million units. Third, the Chinese central
government has put the Big Three firms at the center of its automotive industry development plan
(Chu, 2008). These Chinese Big Three firms have enjoyed their preferential status in various
forms of government support, such as financial resource allocation and industrial rationalization
policy. Finally, all three firms have used the Sino-foreign JV arrangement as a main access point
to advanced technology for passenger-car manufacturing.
Table 3-1: Brief Information on China's Big Three Passenger Car Makers, 2009
SAIC FA W DFM
Ownership Shanghai Municipal Chinese Central Chinese Central
Government Government Government
Annual passenger vehicle
production (units) 2.5 million 1.6 million 1.4 million
Passenger vehicle market share 24% 16% 14%
Year of establishment 1958 1953 1964
First year of mass production of
passenger vehicles 1985 1990 1992
Own passenger vehicle brands Roewe, MG FAW, Xiali, Haima Fengshen
Source: Data from Fourin (2010) and each firm's official website.
Despite their similarities, SAIC and the other two automakers have adopted different
growth strategies. On the one hand, SAIC has operated its key internal organizations for
passenger-vehicle manufacturing near the group's headquarters (HQ) in Shanghai, and its output
growth has been achieved primarily by extending the existing IJV partnership with General
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Motors (GM). On the other hand, FAW has expanded its output capacity primarily through the
acquisition of other domestic vehicle manufacturers, and DFM has employed new IJV
partnerships with different global automakers as a major growth vehicle. As a result, FAW and
DFM's growth strategies have involved higher degrees of spatial dispersion and embraced more
diverse constituents within their organizations, compared with SAIC's. In other words, SAIC has
maintained seemingly shorter intra-organizational distance, in both physical and non-physical7
terms, than FAW and DFM have.
In addition, in-house technological capability varies among the three automotive groups.
When assessed in terms of their internal technology development projects, SAIC is ahead of the
other two. FAW and DFM-affiliated divisions produce their self-branded vehicles under the
quasi-original equipment manufacturing (OEM) arrangement. They license vehicle platforms8
and other core technologies from multiple foreign sources, and assemble imported or OEM-
produced modules according to the licensed integrated-vehicle design specifications. For example,
FAW produces Hongqi on a dated Audi platform fitted with a Chrysler engine and a Volkswagen
(VW) transmission. Similarly, DFM's Fengshen S30 is built on a dated Citro4n platform fitted
with a Peugeot engine. In contrast, SAIC-branded vehicle models more intensively exploit the
group's in-house vehicle development capability. Although the first two of SAIC's own brand
models (Roewe 550/750) were built on the minor-upgraded versions of the acquired Rover
vehicle models, later line-ups are based on new platforms and powertrain technologies,
developed internally with reference to the acquired ones.
' For example, the degree of commonness in institutional and cultural characteristics across subsidiaries.
8 The vehicle platform refers to a set of core vehicle technologies, which can be shared by several vehicle models.
Conventionally, a platform consists of key underbody components (e.g., engine and other powertrain subassemblies)
and suspensions.
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Table 3-2: Variables of Interest: China's Big Three Automakers, as of 2008
SAIC FAW DFM
- Variables of interest (A set of firm-specific characteristics
[1] Non-physical dimension
- Primary firm growth mechanics existing IJV
of the recent decade partnership
Number of key strategic
alliances
- Passenger-vehicle output
concentration ratio in product
lineups*
- Number of passenger-vehicle
manufacturing divisions
- Number of self-branded
passenger-vehicle divisions**
- Intra-group organizational ties***
[2] Spatial dimension
- Divisional HQs located in the
group's home base**
- Number of passenger-vehicle
manufacturing bases
- Output concentration within 120
km radius from group HQ*
- Output-weighted average
distance between group HQ and
passenger-vehicle manufacturing
plants*
Dependent variable
- In-house research and
engineering contributions to self-
branded vehicles
2
(VW, GM)
76%
4 f
single
(seemingly) strong
3 outof3
5
90%
149 km
substantial
that may affect "intra-organizational distance")
domestic M&A
3
(VW, Toyota, Mazda)
53%
multiple
(seemingly) weak
2 out of 7
6
50%
712 km
low
new IJV establishment
4
(Peugeot-Citroan,
Nissan, Honda, Kia)
39%
single
(seemingly) weak
3 out of 7
6
41%
461 km
low
Note: * Local-branded minibuses, which are often considered as commercial vehicles, are excluded from the
computation.
** Only passenger-vehicle manufacturing divisions are considered.
Conjectured from each group's primary growth mechanics.
I SGM, SGM-Dongyue, and SGM-Norsom are counted as one division.
I Tianjin FAW-Toyota and Sichuan FW-Toyota are counted as one division.
Source: Adopted and computed from CATARC (2009) and Fourin (2010), for firm-level output-related measures;
other qualitative data from firm interviews and official corporate websites.
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A comparative analysis of SAIC and the other Chinese Big Three, adopted as the main
methodology for this study, is performed to deduce a causal link between a business group's
intra-organizational distance and its group-wide technological learning performance (assessed in
terms of in-house research and engineering contributions to each firm's self-branded passenger
vehicle models), with some other organizational characteristics controlled. The independent
variables of interest and the dependent variable are listed in Table 3-2.
2.2. Data Collection
For data, I use both primary and secondary sources. Like the previous two chapters, this study
also excerpts core primary data from the 25 in-depth interviews and two manufacturing plant
visits (SGM and DF-Honda) conducted in winter 2007 and summer 2008. In addition, I
extensively refer to published data and documents on the selected firms, including those from the
China Automotive Industry Yearbook, the Fourin China Automotive Intelligence, official
corporate websites, and annual firm reports. Whenever relevant, I also incorporate partial
information from academic journals, books, newspapers, and automotive magazines to
crosscheck and complement the information from other sources.
3. Literature Review
In this section, I review two sets of existing literature, offering crucial implications for this study.
One set is drawn from management and development studies about the interplay between the
structure of large enterprises and socio-economic settings; the other set is drawn from regional
studies and organizational research to examine the potential causal link between
physical/organizational proximity and learning outcomes.
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3.1. Large Enterprises in Diverse Economic Settings
Large enterprises may not guarantee successful industrialization, but the latter has rarely been
achieved without the former. Large enterprises have remained a central institution in the world's
economic development, taking a leading part in productivity growth and technological progress
(Chandler and Hikino, 1997). The in-house capability of exploiting the economies of scale and
scope, in particular, determines the long-term competency of large enterprises (Chandler, 1990).
A minimum efficient scale for a single product, though important, may not ensure an optimal
economic outcome in the long run because increasing returns to the invested production factors
can be further realized when those factors are exploited for the production of other
technologically related products as well. In this sense, the economies of scope are as critical as
those of scale in a firm's growth. Accordingly, leading large enterprises from the developed world
have grown in such a way as to incorporate various but technologically related business segments
into their business portfolio (Chandler, 1990).
Large enterprises are also key institutions for late industrialization; however, leading
firms from the developing world deviate from the Chandlerian growth pattern (Amsden and
Hikino, 1994). Many leading market performers from late-industrializing economies are more
diversified than their competitors from industrialized countries, and their business scope often
covers a wide range of industrial sub-sectors having weak technological ties (Leff, 1978; Amsden,
2001). The degree of diversification is primarily a function of a firm's existing proprietary
technology and in-house technological capability. From the perspective of latecomers lacking
knowledge and skills, diversification has served as the most feasible strategy for moving up to
more profitable and technologically challenging industrial segments. Diversification has helped
latecomers manage market entry to such industrial segments through the intra-group financial
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subsidization between their new and well-established business segments and through the group-
wide sharing of the generic segments of knowledge and skills (Amsden and Hikino, 1994).
In transition economies, large enterprises, the majority of which are SOEs, also account
for a large fraction of the national economy (Roland, 2000). The SOEs in transition economies
have well-focused business domains, inherited from the planned economic system. In general, a
planned economy materialized the social division of labor principle by putting each SOE under
the control either of a certain functional ministry of the central government or of a comparable
regional organization (Nove, 1980; Granick, 1990). Chinese SOEs also have well-defined
primary businesses, but China has a larger number of SOEs whose primary business function is
the same than does the former Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. This is because the social division
of labor principle was implemented at a provincial level in China, while it was coordinated at the
central level in the former Soviet economic bloc (Qian and Xu, 1993). Accordingly, the post-
reform corporatization drive in China has emphasized the reduction of inter-regional and inter-
firm functional redundancy (Child, 2001).
At present, leading Chinese SOEs take the multi-divisional organizational form, in which
a firm consists of multiple sub-operational units with quasi-self-contained organizational
functionalities. After a series of domestic M&As, for example, the Chinese Big Three automotive
groups are currently affiliated with multiple vehicle and parts manufacturing divisions, each of
which has its own brand, products, and substantial managerial autonomy. Like their Western
counterparts, each firm's sub-operational units in general are devoted to technologically related
business activities. This outcome is, by and large, guided by the central government, which has
encouraged intra-industry M&As to promote the sector's economies of scale and reshape the ex-
regionally fragmented market in a more integrated fashion.
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Lacking in-house technological capabilities and managerial skills, however, Chinese
SOEs may confront some new challenges with their M-form organizational structure in
generating group-wide synergy. Certain M-form organizations, where internal divisions with
substantial managerial autonomy compete with one another, may work for firms with strong
proprietary knowledge assets (Chandler, 1977); however, the centrally coordinated firm structure,
which enables the internal sharing of group-wide generic project execution skills, may be a more
feasible growth strategy for firms lacking such internal technological assets (Amsden, 1989). Yet,
many Chinese SOEs, lacking competitive proprietary technologies, operate their M-form
hierarchies without effective central monitoring (and thus coordination) mechanisms (Steinfeld,
1998). Of course, they do not need to adopt the diversification strategy to emulate the Japanese
keiretsu or Korean chaebol models, which are neither necessary nor sufficient for their optimal
corporate governance, particularly given the soft budget constraints that Chinese SOEs face.
However, they need to transplant in-house technological capability-building dynamics,
comparable to those in the successful diversified business groups, into their M-form
organizational structure, analogous to that of typical Western corporations.
3.2. Proximity and Organizational Learning
Proximity involves multiple dimensions; it can be defined from geographical, cognitive, institu-
tional, social, and organizational perspectives (Boschma, 2005). I limit the scope of discussion in
this section to the concept of geographical and organizational proximity, as this study focuses on
physical and managerial distance among sub-operational units within a business group.
It was economist Alfred Marshall (1890) who first recognized that a geographical
clustering of firms in the same industry could generate increasing returns to the invested capital.
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He called these scale economies at the industry level the external economies of scale in order to
distinguish them from the conventional (internal) economies of scale at the firm level. The
primary drivers of the external economies of scale, to which Marshall devoted attention, include
labor market pooling, production factor/intermediate input sharing, and knowledge spillover.
Some contemporary scholars focus on the intra-industry division of labor aspect of the
Marshallian industrial district model. Piore and Sabel (1984), for example, argue that the primary
strength of inter-firm proximity is derived from social institutions and values embedded in it,
which initiate and sustain a flexible specialization production system. They also claim that well-
coordinated inter-firm division of labor, which combines a mass production system (lower cost)
and a craft production system (flexibility and diversity) in an organic fashion, should be seen as
an alternative capitalist paradigm to Fordism. Given increasing vertical disintegration, Scott
(1988) sees the reduction of transaction and coordination costs as a primary advantage of
geographical proximity. Krugman (1991 a) emphasizes the transport cost savings from clustering,
besides the external economies of scale, which Marshall originally highlighted.
Other analysts attend to social interactions and information flows within the
territorialized production network. Jacobs (1969), for example, argues that the city as a home for
new ideas has led to socio-economic and technological progress, but refutes the view that the city
is simply an outcome of such progress. In line with her view of the role of space in the exchange,
learning, and spread of knowledge, the access to information and tacit knowledge through
localized social networks has been considered as a key incentive for geographical proximity
(Utterback, 1974; Feldman, 1994; Lucas, 1998). As critical inputs for innovation and
entrepreneurship, various geography-attached intangible assets-such as relational capital,
institutions, cultural norms, and local conventions-affect corporate performance (Glasmeier,
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1988; Saxenian, 1994; Storper, 1997; Polenske, 2001). These assets are important because a
firm's competitive advantage does not depend solely on its internal resources; it instead is built
on and reinforced through the resources' interplay with such external environments as
factor/demand conditions, local contexts for firm strategy and rivalry, and related supporting
industries (Porter, 1990). Such intra-cluster dynamics for mutual and collective learning, though
occurring by and large as outcomes of unintended historical incidents and subsequent cumulative
causation (Krugman, 199 1b; Rauch, 1993), may be encouraged under certain sets of public
policies and institutional arrangements (Cooke, 1992; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Asheim, 1996;
Morgan, 1997).
Without certain organizational ties, however, geographical proximity alone may not lead
to successful access to localized knowledge. One aspect often overlooked in cluster studies is the
exclusiveness of a localized production network. Relational capital, knowledge, and other
intangible assets, if substantially territorialized, are often available to the insiders of the
production network only, and organizational membership in the network is necessary to access
them (Florida, 2002). Accordingly, networks need to be viewed as social constructs rather than
physical ones (Piore and Sabel, 1984). Empirical studies suggest that knowledge spillover is not
necessarily bounded by physical proximity (Bunnell and Coe, 2001) and that tacit knowledge can
convey a substantially long distance with effective centralized coordination mechanisms among
sub-organizational units (Rallet and Torre, 1999).
While geographical proximity often focuses on inter-firm organizational arrangements
(Polenske, 2004), organizational distance can be defined in terms either of inter-firm relations or
of intra-firm organizational structure. Independent or sub-organizational units are considered
close when they belong to the same relational space (e.g., a firm or an inter-firm production
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network) or when they share a common reference space or knowledge base (Torre and Gilly,
2000). In addition, organizational proximity is often measured as degrees of inter-dependency
within or between organizations from financial or managerial aspects (Kirat and Lung, 1999).
However, divergent views on the causal link between organizational distance, defined
from a relational space perspective, and organizational learning outcomes do exist. On the one
hand, strong ties-close and frequent interactions within or between organizations-are often
considered effective vehicles for organizational learning because they lead to timely inter-
organizational knowledge sharing and integration (Krackhardt, 1992; Leonard-Barton and Sinha,
1993; Szulanski, 1996). On the other hand, weak ties-remote and infrequent relationships-may
lead to more efficient learning outcomes as organizations can access a more novel and diverse set
of knowledge (i.e., less redundant information) through weak rather than strong ties (Granovetter,
1973; Rogers, 1995; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). An eclectic view is that strong ties work better
when a project involves an inter-unit transfer of complex knowledge, while weak ties are more
efficient, otherwise (Hansen, 1999).
In contrast, a positive relationship is somewhat clear between organizational proximity,
measured in the degree of shared reference space, and organizational performance. Organizations
tend to attain higher learning outcomes when they share a greater common reference space or
knowledge base (Hamel, 1991; Crossan and Inkpen, 1995; Mowery et al., 1996; Baughn et al.,
1997; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). In some cases, however, too much overlapped reference space
may reduce incentives for inter-organizational collaboration or intra-organizational knowledge
sharing. Cantwell and Santangelo (2002), for example, find that European electronics
multinational corporations (MNCs) tend to locate their main R&D operations at a distance from
those of their rival firms in the same industry to minimize unintended knowledge spillovers,
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while an R&D clustering is apparent among firms from different industries. Even within the same
organization, sub-organizational units may have disincentives for inter-divisional knowledge-
sharing if they have a substantially overlapped knowledge base and primary business fields.
Under such conditions, sub-units may see one another as competitors rather than as members of
the same economic community (Szulanski, 1996).
3.3. Implications for This Study
As reviewed in Section 3.1., large corporations have taken a leading role in industrial develop-
ment, but their growth patterns are far from uniform. In China, leading large firms are often SOEs
with well-focused primary business fields. China's leading SOEs have been directed to grow
from single-plant firms into M-form business groups by government-led foreign direct
investment (FDI) projects and domestic asset-reconsolidation practices. This centrally guided
growth pattern may have brought Chinese large enterprises new challenges, such as how to
govern their enlarged organizations throughout extensive administrative and spatial boundaries
(i.e., increased intra-organizational distance) in order to maximize group-wide synergy.
From the literature discussed in Section 3.2., I draw the following implications for the
potential link between intra-organizational distance and technological learning. First, physical
proximity may be helpful in encouraging organizational learning, but the former is neither
necessary nor sufficient for the latter. Second, substantial degrees of organizational proximity are
necessary to promote organizational learning, though neither too excessive nor too scarce
organizational proximity is likely to result in an optimal learning outcome.9 Finally, if I limit the
9 For example, over-reliance on the market (i.e., too little hierarchy) may be too inefficient to carry out core
corporate activities due to high transaction costs (Williamson, 1983), while excessive hierarchy (or too rigid
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discussion to the governance of large business groups lacking in-house technological capability,
intra-organizational proximity may be an asset for organizational learning rather than a liability,
as evidenced by the experience of Korean chaebols.
4. A Comparative Analysis: the Chinese Big Three Automotive Groups
As previously argued, organizational learning at the firm level may be substantially affected by
the level of firm-wide coordination and inter-unit interactions, particularly when the
internalization process involves complex knowledge, various knowledge sources, and a large
organization consisting of multiple sub-operational units. In this section, I clarify this point with a
comparative study of China's Big Three automotive groups.
4.1. Overview: From a Single Plant Firm to a Large Business Group
SAIC, FAW, and DFM are all huge state-owned business groups consisting of over 30 wholly
owned or partially controlled subsidiaries. Most of their subsidiaries are primarily engaged in the
automotive vehicle/parts manufacturing or supportive service sectors. While the sectorally
focused organizational structure has been developed through over three decades of these three
firms' vehicle manufacturing histories, their organic growth is particularly notable in China's
post-reform period.
Since China's central government designated the automotive sector as a national pillar
industry" in 1986, the Big Three automotive groups have been at the center of the automotive
bureaucracy) may also be so, as evidenced by the market hegemony shift from Route 128 to Silicon Valley in the
United States' electronics sector (Saxenian, 1994).
10 China's 10th Five Year Plan (2001-2005) designates a total of 13 pillar industries, which include the machinery,
automotive, electronics/information technology, metallic, non-metallic, petro-chemical, chemical, pharmaceutical,
coal mining, construction materials, light industry, textile, and power generation sectors.
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industry policy. In the post-reform period, China's automotive industrial policy initially outlined
the sectoral arrangement of three big, three medium, and two small passenger car makers" (Xia
et al., 2002). SAIC, FAW, and DFM, which I chose as the three large players, have been the
primary targets of public preferential policies such as easy access to foreign exchange reserves
and subsidized credits and priority in establishing IJV partnerships. The recent Auto Industry
Readjustment and Revitalization Plan' 2, announced by the China State Council in March 2009,
revised the sectoral profile to the four major/four minor13 formation, with SAIC, FAW, and DFM
remaining major policy target firms.
More specifically, government-driven policies targeting these three firms were prompted
by a suboptimal production scale at the firm level. In 1991, when China's automotive sector was
still in an early development stage, over 110 automakers were producing integrated vehicles in
China, but their average annual production capacity was no higher than 7,000 units per firm
(Figure 3-1). This production scale was far from the industry's conventional minimum efficient
scale-an annual output of a quarter million units (Baranson, 1969). A decade later, the
government's rationalization drive for the automotive sector became apparent, when the
government initiated intra-industry M&As ' and controlling domestic firms' market entrance1s
At present, local firms on average are operated at larger scales, partly due to the public
" The three big makers are FAW, SAIC, and DFM, the three medium-sized makers are the Beijing Automotive
Works (renamed as the Beijing Motor Group), the Tianjin Automotive Industry Corporation (merged with FAW in
2002) and the Guangzhou Automotive Group (renamed as the Guangzhou Automotive Industry Group), and the two
small makers are the Chang'an Automotive Group and the Guizhou Aviation Group.
" For details, refer to the press release of the plan at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-03/20/content 1264324.htm.
13 The four majors are FAW, SAIC, DFM, and the Chang'an Automotive Group, and the four minors are the Beijing
Motor Group, the Guangzhou Automotive Industry Group, the Chery Group, and the China National Heavy Duty
Truck Group.
14 For example, China's 2004 Automotive Industry Development Policy encourages M&As between automakers,
each of which has a market share of under 10%.
15 Since 2004, China's central government has required a minimum total investment of RMB2 billion and an initial
R&D investment of RMB half a billion, as a precondition to enter the domestic passenger vehicle market.
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intervention: the local automaker's average annual output level increased from 17,527 units in
2000 to 75,918 units in 2007, and the collective annual passenger vehicle output of the Big Three
automotive groups grew over six-fold, from half a million units in 2000 to 3.2 million units in
2007 (Figure 3-2).
- C 3 33 0 330 .000
MeanAnnual
Output per
Firm
-O-Total Number
of
Automakers
Figure 3-1: Mean Production Scale of Chinese Automakers, 1991-2007
Note: Statistics in the graph include commercial vehicles and commercial-vehicle producers.
Source: Data from CATARC (1992-2008).
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Figure 3-2: Share of the Chinese Big Three in Domestic Passenger Vehicle Market, 1998-2008
Source: Data from CATARC (1999-2009).
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Despite some visible achievement, the central automotive policy tended to incentivize
local automakers to pursue extensive growth before intensive growth.16 It was not rare for local
firms to take on output expansion itself, without considering improvement in efficiency, as their
short-term managerial goal in order to enjoy public policies preferential to large firms. The
Chinese government chose target firms primarily on the basis of size (in terms of market share)
while neglecting efficiency aspects. For example, the Chinese Big Three automakers were
initially chosen as primary policy targets simply because they were big; they remain so, mainly
thanks to their large operational scales. With such public incentive-and under soft budget
constraints (due to the state ownership)-their growth strategies have often, though not always,
aimed at output growth with little consideration of other strategic goals, whether they are based
on IJV partnerships, M&As, or further investment in existing operations.
In addition to a low production scale, a low spatial agglomeration characterizes China's
automotive sector. As previously mentioned, China's former planned economic system (which
applied the social division of labor principle to provinces and comparable municipalities as self-
contained economic units) inherited substantial inter-provincial redundancy in industrial
investment-in other words, a low degree of spatial clustering of a particular sector at the
national level. Regarding the automotive sector, the inter-regional investment coordination failure
became even more obvious in the post-reform period (Huang, 2002). This is mainly because local
governments exercised their increased political influence (arising from the politico-economic
decentralization drive) to expand or newly create the local automotive production base for
16 Extensive growth refers to the type of growth achieved with a larger amount of factor inputs and other resources
but without a significant improvement in the pre-existing efficiency level; Intensive growth refers to the type of
growth driven by improved efficiency (or higher productivity) of given factor inputs.
17 For example, the 2004 automotive industry policy permitted only the automakers with a market share of 15% or
higher to formulate their own development plans, independent of the central government guidelines.
163
revenue-generating purposes. A series of intra-industry asset reconsolidation practices, carried out
for sectoral rationalization, led to the scale-up of each automaker on average but not to a better
spatial organization of production system. As illustrated in Figures 3-3 and 3-4, the degree of
spatial dispersion in the vehicle manufacturing sector actually increased over the last two decades:
spatial GINI coefficients 8 declined from 0.73 in 1990 to 0.65 in 2007.
GIN1200 7 = 0.65
GIN11 990 = 0.73
----- Line of Equality
Lorentz Curve in 1990
-+-Lorentz Curve in 2007
100%
Cumulative Number of Regions in %
Figure 3-3: Spatial GINI Coefficients for China's Vehicle Manufacturing Sector, 1990 vs. 2007
Note: Data for these graphs include value-added from manufacturing both passenger and commercial
vehicles while excluding that from producing automotive parts and components.
For consistency with regional boundaries in 1990, the data for the Chongqing municipality is
consolidated with that for Sichuan Province in 2007.
Data for Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan are excluded from this graph.
Source: Created by author; Raw data from CATARC (1991, 2008).
18 The spatial GINI coefficient is a spatial application of the original GINI coefficient concept, which sorts sub-
national regions by income in order to produce the Lorentz curve. The spatial GINI coefficient is computed as
follows, and its range is between 0 (perfect equality) and 1 (extreme inequality):
f( "., y,- yjGINI =
2n 2P
where y, is income (sectoral value-added) for region i, p is mean regional income (sectoral value-added), and n is
total number of regions.
164
100%
Industrial Value-added
in millions of RMB
45 or less
46- 107
IM 108-269
I 270 - 561
562 or more
Excluded from analysis
(a) 1990
Industrial Value-added
in millions of RMB
1,335 or less
*W 1,336 - 3,080
11113,081-7,172
=7,173- 12,728
12,729 or more
Excluded from analysis
(b) 2007
Figure 3-4: Regional Distribution of Industrial Value-added in China's Vehicle Manufacturing Sector, 1990 vs. 2007
Note: Data in this map include value-added from manufacturing both passenger and commercial vehicles while excluding that from producing
automotive parts and components.
Source: Data from CATARC (1991, 2008).
The increased spatial dispersion suggests that the Big Three automotive groups now need
to manage not only larger organizations but also greater geographical space. As displayed in
Table 3-2, in 2009 SAIC, FAW, and DFM's production concentration ratios to home base were
76%, 53%, and 39%, respectively. The comparable numbers in 2000, however, were 100%, 80%,
and 100%.19 During the same period, the number of each firm's passenger vehicle manufacturing
20 2 223 24 25divisions increased from two, three, and one in 2000 to three , seven 2, and seven in
2009, respectively. In addition to new IJV partnerships, the government-led sectoral
rationalization drive itself, where the Big Three firms were major asset acquirers, is behind this
increased spatial dispersion. Larger firm scales may mean more internal resources available to
exploit, but these internal resources are likely to be diffused throughout more sub-operational
units and greater geographical space. Accordingly, managerial capability necessary for effective
spatial and organizational coordination became more important to create group-wide synergy
from acquired external resources. 26 The following case studies and their comparative analysis
will make this point clear by demonstrating that intra-organizational proximity has substantially
contributed to SAIC's technological capability-building.
19 Like the numbers from Table 3-2, these numbers are computed from Fourin (2010) and consider passenger
vehicles only.
20 SVW and SGM.
21 FAW-VW, FAW Car, and FAW-Haima.
22 In 2000, DF-PSA (then, DF-Citrodn) was the only passenger vehicle manufacturing division in the DFM Group.
DF-Yueda-Kia, though established in 1998, did not produce passenger vehicles until 2002.
21 SVW, SGM, and SAIC Motor (SGM-Wuling is considered as part of SGM).
24 FAW-VW, FAW Car, FAW-Haima, FAW-Xiali, FAW-Toyota, FAW-Hongta-Yunnan, and FAW-Jilin.
25 DF-PSA, DF-Yueda-Kia, DF-Nissan, DF-Honda, DF Passenger Vehicle Company, DF-Liuzhou, and DF-Yuan.
26 The challenge from spatial and organizational expansions is likely to keep increasing even in the future; the 2009
Auto Industry Readjustment and Revitalization Plan makes it clear that the Big Three groups will continue to be at
the center of upcoming major intra-industry M&As.
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4.2. Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) Group
As the first of the three case studies, this sub-section examines the SAIC Group, with primary
focus on the firm's history, growth patterns, and internal hierarchies.
4.2.1. Brief History
SAIC is an SOE under the direct control of the Shanghai Municipal Government. Its history dates
back to 1958, when its precursor Shanghai Automotive Assembly Plant (later restructured as the
Shanghai Tractor and Automobile Corporation, or STAC) was founded. In 1959, STAC produced
its first passenger vehicle model Phoenix (Fenghuang) SH760, which later was re-branded into
Shanghai SH760 in 1964. SH760 was essentially a reverse-engineered imitation of the 1956
Mercedes 220S model, produced to meet local passenger vehicle demand for elite public officials
(Posth, 2006). SAIC continued to produce this model until 1991, without significant
technological upgrades. Between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s, the average annual
production volume of the SH760 model was between 3,000 and 5,000 units. SAIC produced
more passenger vehicles than any other local firm even before operating its first assembly IJV.27
In the overall firm scale, however, SAIC was much smaller than FAW and DFM due to its small
production capacity for commercial vehicles, which were then the leading market segment of
China's automotive industry.28
SAIC's current status as a Chinese Big Three automaker was firmly established after its
successful JV partnership with VW. When SVW was established in 1985,29 SAIC's own
27 For example, SAIC produced over 5,000 units of passenger vehicles in 1980, when China's total passenger vehicle
output was only 5,418 units (CATARC, 1988/2007).
28 As of 1985, the passenger vehicle segment accounted for less than 2% of China's total vehicle production volume
(CATARC, 1994).
29 SVW was the second IV project in China's automotive sector, beginning its actual vehicle production in 1985.
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technological capability was extremely weak. As evidenced by the continued production of the
dated SH760 model, SAIC lacked in-house capabilities (and motivations) for new vehicle
development. Its decrepit assembly plants and old-fashioned equipment reflected highly labor-
intensive procedures, a far cry from modern vehicle production technologies. Also, few
Shanghai-based parts producers met VW-required technical standards prepared for the firm's
global operations to ensure certain minimum product quality.
A solid coalition between VW and the Shanghai municipal government formed in the late
1980s contributed to a substantial improvement in such preexisting conditions, unsuited for the
local volume production of VW-branded vehicles.30 On the one hand, the Shanghai municipal
government showed a consistent and powerful leadership in initiating and managing its regional
level localization drive (Harwit, 1995; Thun, 2006). The localization drive package-consisting
of localization tax, subsidized credit, and tight monitoring system- released SVW's growth from
the foreign exchange reserve constraint, and mended the coordination failure problem between
SVW and its primary suppliers. On the other hand, VW responded to the public localization drive
through active technology transfer. VW not only introduced modern production technologies and
equipment to the Shanghai manufacturing plants but also provided SVW employees and primary
parts suppliers with extensive on-the-job training and technical assistance.
SAIC's leadership in the domestic passenger vehicle market, which began with its SVW
operation, has been more firmly established with its IJV alliance with GM. In 1997 SAIC and
GM founded an OEM vehicle assembly JV SGM and an engineering JV the Pan Asia Technical
The first Sino-foreign automotive assembly JV project was Beijing-Jeep, which was founded in 1983 (two years
earlier than SVW was) through the equity-sharing alliance between the Beijing Automotive Works (now the Beijing
Automotive Group) and the American Motors Corporation (the then-owner of the Jeep brand).
30 For further details on the synergy between SAIC and VW, see Chapter 1.
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Automotive Center (PA TA C) in Shanghai. GM as a second mover did not need to go through the
same hardships as VW did a decade ago, because Shanghai had already developed a sound local
sourcing foundation and a solid semi-skilled labor pool by the time GM entered the Chinese
market. In return for the second mover advantage 31, which GM could take through its IJV
partnership with SAIC, GM promised its greater commitment to SAIC's in-house technology
development. PATAC-the largest single FDI project dedicated to China-based automotive
R&D-was a showcase of GM's such move. The SAIC-GM partnership has extended to operate
multiple assembly bases under separate JV arrangements, such as SGM-Wuling, SGM-Dongyue,
and SGM-Norsom.
In 2006, the SAIC Group restructured its internal organization to form SAIC Motor, in
primary charge of SAIC's self-branded vehicle development and manufacturing. After ceasing
production of the dated SH760 model in 1991, SAIC put aside its independent vehicle
development plan for over a decade. In the 2000s, SAIC began to consider the revival of the plan.
A critical part of SAIC's strategy was foreign asset/equity acquisition: SAIC acquired Rover-
owned manufacturing and intellectual assets, and a 51% equity stake in Korea-based Ssangyong
Motor by 2005.32 In 2006, SAIC Motor finally launched Roewe 750, the first of its own brand
models based on the acquired Rover technologies. In 2007, the SAIC Group became the new
owner of the Nanjing Automotive Group (NAG), which acquired the MG brand from the
bankrupt MG Rover Group. Until recently, SAIC Motor has initiated its independent vehicle
development projects with Roewe and MG brands.
31 From VW's perspective, SGM simply took a free ride on the local vehicle manufacturing infrastructure built on
SVW-initiated localization efforts. For example, SGM shared many of SVW's primary local sourcing partners and
hired a substantial number of ex-SVW employees. All these were possible with SAIC's mediation.
32 For more details about these mergers, refer to Chapter 2.
169
4.2.2. Macro Analysis: Spatial and Organizational Expansion
At present, the SAIC Group operates four major passenger vehicle manufacturing divisions in
five locations within Mainland China (Figure 3-5). Those four divisions include SVW, SGM,
SAIC Motor, and SGM-Wuling. Among them, SGM controls Yantai-based SGM-Dongyue and
Shenyang-based SGM-Norsom manufacturing plants as its secondary production bases, and
SAIC Motor governs Nanjing-MG with a 100% stake in it. SGM-Wuling is a triad IJV
partnership among SAIC, GM, and Liuzhou Wuling Motor, dedicated primarily to the production
SAIC's Major Passenger Car
Production Bases in China
Sino-foreign Joint Venture Division without foreign equity control
Established in 2003
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Figure 3-5: SAIC's Major Passenger Car Production Bases in Mainland
Source: Created by author; Data from Fourin (2010) and SAIC's official website.
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SAIC-GM-Wuling
of commercial minibuses but with some production capacity of GM-branded compact sedans.
SAIC's four major divisions are operated in five cities: Shanghai, Nanjing, Liuzhou, Yantai, and
Shenyang. The SAIC operations located outside Shanghai were established through merger
(Nanjing-MG) or the reorganization of preexisting assets (SGM-Wuling, SGM-Dongyue, and
SGM-Norsom). Among the five locations, Shanghai is SAIC's single dominant production base,
accounting for over three-quarters of the group's annual passenger vehicle volume.
Shanghai remains SAIC's dominant command center, even though the automotive group
operates multiple vehicle manufacturing divisions in multiple locations. One point noteworthy is
the fact that SAIC's spatial expansion did not much increase the group's intra-organizational
distance as it was attained primarily by the pre-existing organizational ties. It is the SAIC-GM
partnership developed through SGM that initiated subsequent SGM-Wuling, SGM-Dongyue, and
SGM-Norsom projects, all of which are SAIC's out-of-Shanghai manufacturing operations (Table
3-3). SAIC and GM strategically settled those three operations out of Shanghai in order to
minimize the construction time necessary for SGM's production capacity expansion by utilizing
pre-existing manufacturing facilities there. Subsequently, the three divisions have been operated
in accordance with SGM's China strategy. In NAG's case, the merger was motivated by SAIC's
desire to create synergy between its ex-Rover assets and NAG-owned MG division, which shared
a common technology base.33 Besides close economic and cultural proximity between Shanghai
and Jiangsu Province 34 , the technological complementarity between the two firms played a
crucial role in enhancing their inter-organizational bond after the merger. Also, substantial
asymmetry between SAIC and NAG-in terms of production capacity and asset size,
3 Both MG and Rover were the core divisions of the MG-Rover Group.
3 Both Shanghai and Jiangsu economies have developed close economic bonds at the regional level as part of the
Yangtze River Delta, one of China's five integrated mega economic regions (Ohmae, 2002).
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technological and management capability, and pecking order in central government support-
reduced NAG's resistance to its asset and organizational restructuring as part of the SAIC
Group. 35 In sum, SAIC has still kept its initial backbone organizational structure-SAIC-VW
and SAIC-GM partnerships and SAIC Motor-even after a series of spatial and organizational
expansions, and Shanghai is home to the group's key governing bodies (the SAIC Group HQ and
divisional HQs for SVW, SGM, SAIC Motor, and PATAC).
Table 3-3: Major Passenger Vehicle Divisions of the SAIC Group, 2009
Equity Ownership Structure
SAIC Divisions SAIC Foreign Others
SVW 50% VW: 50%
SGM (HQ & Jinqiao plant)* 51% GM: 49%
SGM-Dongyue 25% GM: 25% SGM: 50%
SGM-Norsom 25% GM: 25% SGM: 50%
SGM-Wuling 51% GM: 34% Liuzhou Wuling: 15%
SAIC Motor 100%
Nanjing-MG 100%
Note: * On December 4, 2009, SAIC and GM agreed on the transfer of SGM's 1% equity from GM to SAIC,
which would make SAIC the majority shareholder of the former 50-50 IJV.
Source: CATARC (2009).
The municipal ownership in particular has substantially incentivized SAIC to manage its
organic growth in close proximity to Shanghai. On the one hand, the Shanghai municipal
government coordinated the automotive sector development and localization drive within
Shanghai, so that a large fraction of the sector's socio-economic impact could reside within its
administrative boundary (Huang, 2003). Accordingly, SAIC's core organizations, production
facilities, and primary sourcing partners are located near the group's HQ. On the other hand,
SAIC as a locally controlled SOE had some disadvantages in acquiring domestic assets outside
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* Interviews #19 and 25.
its home region, compared with centrally controlled SOEs such as FAW and DFM.36 In general,
inter-regional asset reconsolidation in China's automotive sector was accompanied by substantial
resistance from the primary stakeholders of the consolidation target assets: most local
municipalities had strong desire to keep local automotive production bases under their control in
order to secure sizable public revenue sources. Such a challenge was often hard to be dealt with
at the municipal level, in the absence of the support from the central government.
4.2.3. Micro Analysis: Internal Hierarchies
SAIC has managed its organic growth and spatial expansion with very clear strategic concerns.
As explained before, SAIC and GM chose to build SGM's secondary manufacturing bases in
Yantai and Shenyang, where sizable manufacturing facilities already existed, in order to meet
soaring domestic market demands for passenger vehicles promptly by restructuring pre-existing
manufacturing assets there. Shanghai's limited land reserve for their plant expansion was another
concern. The spatial expansion of the SAIC-GM partnership to Liuzhou was primarily motivated
by SAIC's wish to strengthen its commercial vehicle lineup. 37 SAIC's Nanjing operation was to
create technological synergy between SAIC's ex-Rover assets and NAG's MG division. In sum,
the SAIC Group's intensive growth motivation, as well as the SGM division's extensive growth
purpose, underlies SAIC's organic and spatial expansion outcomes.
One key advantage from SAIC's firm growth strategy-Shanghai-centered growth under
the solid (internal and external) organizational ties-is its ability to generate intensive horizontal
knowledge flows. First, SAIC has relaxed the constraint in IJV-based learning, although the legal
36 Interview #4.
37 The SGM-Wuling project reflects more of SAIC's motivation than GM's, as evidenced by the fact that SAIC has
the management right for SGM-Wuling with a 51% stake in the JV, while GM is primarily a profit-sharing
shareholder in the operation (see Table 3-2).
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IJV arrangement strictly prohibits the sharing of IJV-owned resources (whether physical or
intellectual assets) with Chinese IJV stakeholder firms, more effectively than other Chinese
automakers on the basis of its strong relational assets with GM. Over the last decade, SAIC and
GM have developed strong mutual trust and organizational ties through a series of joint business
projects. The degree and scope of their IJV cooperation has been continuously deepened and
extended from OEM vehicle production to joint R&D activities for new vehicle development.38
Also, as evidenced by the increasing joint projects between SAIC Motor (SAIC's wholly owned
subsidiary) and PATAC (IJV between SAIC and GM) 39, the SAIC-GM partnership is not limited
to their IJV operation. Second, SAIC's spatially controlled growth pattern has generated a greater
possibility for horizontal knowledge spillovers from IJVs to other SAIC divisions through
regional labor pooling. A substantial number of SAIC Motor engineers and production workers
have working experiences at SVW, SGM, or PATAC, and their skills, knowledge, and know-how
are critical assets for SAIC's in-house technological capability development.4 0
SAIC's close intra-firm ties have been at least as crucial as its organizational ties with
outsiders like GM, for in-house technology development. Although the SAIC Group seemingly
resembles in organizational structure a conventional western M-form business group, whose
business divisions often compete with one another, this in general is not the case.4 ' Little internal
competition within SAIC is partly due to little inter-divisional redundancy in primary business
activities, except its IJVs. Within the SAIC Group, for example, there is only one SAIC-branded
38 For example, SGM plans to release a new vehicle model, for whose development PATAC has taken a lead, in the
latter half of 2010 (Interview #20).
39 When PATAC was newly established, it was fully devoted to engineering support for SGM. But now around 10%
of PATAC's business is related to SAIC Motor's new vehicle development projects (Interviews #18 and 20).
40 Interview #20.
41 This is to emphasize the perspective of SAIC employees: even Chinese managers in SAIC-affiliated IJVs tend to
have strong identities as SAIC families rather than as IN managers. Foreign IN managers, in contrast, see SVW and
SGM as rivals.
174
vehicle development division SAIC Motor, and each of SAIC's parts manufacturing subsidiaries
is dedicated to particular products without substantial overlapping with one another. Under these
conditions, there is little disincentive for inter-divisional information and resource sharing.
Also, SAIC's intra-group rotation policy seems important in controlling motivations for
internal competition. Under the rotation system, each division's top management develops a
stronger sense of belonging to the SAIC Group, rather than to the division. Even in SVW and
SGM, Chinese managers behave much more like the agents of the SAIC HQ rather than dedicate
themselves fully to the IJVs they are in charge of.4 It is not even rare that SAIC managers have
overlapped memberships in multiple SAIC divisions (Thun, 2006). In general, managers in each
SAIC subsidiary report detailed financial and operational information to the group's HQ on a
day-to-day basis. This practice, together with dispatching HQ delegates to each division annually
(or semi-annually) for inspection and evaluation purposes, forms bases with which the SAIC HQ
can effectively monitor sub-group units' performance and coordinate their internal resources. The
SAIC Group has also initiated group-wide workshops and training programs for its employees on
a regular basis in order to encourage inter-divisional interactions at all employment levels.
All in all, the SAIC Group has developed an internal hierarchy, where the strict top-down
management system and the inter-divisional horizontal resource and information sharing channels
coexist. Such a group governance system has been a critical asset in carrying out a series of its
self-branded new vehicle development projects. Under the leadership of the SAIC Motor division,
the SAIC Group has successfully integrated its various technological assets from multiple
channels-such as ex-Rover technology (SAIC Motor), ex-MG technology (Nanjing-MG), and
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42 Interview #2.
43 Interview #19.
Ssangyong Motor-to develop 11 SAIC-branded passenger vehicle models based on six
platforms by September 2010 (Table 3-4). For those projects, the SAIC Group has mobilized key
engineers from multiple divisions to form group-wide project teams. For example, on annual
average around 40 Ssangyong Motor engineers were transferred to SAIC Motor's Shanghai R&D
center to work on the Roewe C200 project, a four-wheel drive sports utility vehicle model
launched on the market in September 2009.44 Since 2007, the SAIC Group has operated an
intranet-based common knowledge base system covering the whole group including Korea-based
Ssangyong Motor in order to encourage group-wide sharing of knowledge such as drawings,
technical notes, and so on.45 Also, the R&D resource integration (both physical and human
resources) is under way between SAIC Motor and Nanjing-MG.46
Table 3-4: Details of SAIC's Own Brand Model Development Projects
Platform Type Brand Models Market Debut Base Technology
No. 1 Four-wheel drive (4WD) layout Roewe C200 Sep 2009 Ssangyong
for SUVs
Nos. 2 & 3 Front-wheel drive (FF) layout Roewe 350 Dec 2009 Rover
for mid-sized sedans 450 Dec 2008
550 Jul2008
750 Oct2006
BP21 Jun 2010
750H Sep 2010
Nos. 4 & 5 Front-wheel drive (FF) layout MG 5Z Jun 2009 Nanjing-MG
for compact-sized sedans 7Z Sep 2009
No. 6 Front-wheel drive (FF) layout MG 3Z Sep 2008 Nanjing-MG
for compact-sized coupes TF Jun 2009
Note: This table is the same as Table 2-4 of Chapter 2.
Source: Interview #19 and Zhang (2009).
44 Interviews #15 and 19.
45 Interview #19; Spec Watch Korea (2009).
46 Interviews #19 and 25.
176
4.3. First Automotive Works (FAW) Group
The second case study firm is FAW, which has the longest vehicle manufacturing history in China.
4.3.1. Brief History
FAW is the oldest Chinese automaker, established in 1953. The firm is a centrally controlled SOE
headquartered in Changchun, the capital city of Jilin Province. The Chinese central government
initially chose the remote northern city as the home for the nation's first vehicle manufacturing
plant for two reasons. One was Changchun's substantial industrial assets inherited from the
Japanese-controlled Manchurian State.47 The other reason was its geographical proximity to the
Soviet Union, the major technological source of the then-infant Chinese automotive industry.
FAW began production of its first vehicle Jiefang (Liberation) CA10 in 1953. This light
truck with a loading capacity of four tons was basically a clone of the Soviet ZIS 150 model. For
this project, FAW owed the Soviets core vehicle technologies and substantial engineering
supports. Over the following three decades, Jiefang CA10 was the only vehicle model that FAW
mass-produced, and its cumulative output total reached 1.3 million units, the then-world's record
for that vehicle segment (Lee et al., 2006). In 1987, FAW launched its second generation Jiefang
model (CAl 41) with a loading capacity of five tons after a six-year development and production
preparation period. This new Jiefang model was developed in-house by the Changchun
Automotive Research Institute (CARI), which is currently part of the FAW Group.
FAW also has a longer manufacturing history for passenger vehicles than any other local
automakers. It was as early as 1958 when FAW produced its first sedan Hongqi (Red Flag). This
4 Changchun was the capital city of the Manchurian State (Manchukuo), which the Japanese empire indirectly
governed through its puppets in northern China between 1931 and 1945.
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vehicle project, begun in 1957 on the order of the central government, was initiated to serve top
central government officials. Like SAIC's SH760, the initial Hongqi sedan (CA72) was a reverse-
engineered imitation of Chrysler's C69 model, launched in the United States in 1955. Until FAW
discontinued their production in 1984, it produced a cumulative total of only 1,549 units of the
old Hongqi model and its variations (Lee et al., 2006). The Hongqi lineup was revived in 1993
based on Audi technologies, but its production volume remains minimal.
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Since 1990, FAW has expanded its passenger vehicle manufacturing divisions through
IJV partnerships and domestic mergers (Figure 3-6). FAW-VW, the vehicle assembly IJV between
FAW and VW established in 1990, is FAW's largest passenger vehicle manufacturing division
with an annual production capacity of two-thirds of a million units of Audi- and VW-branded
vehicles. Tianjin-FAW-Toyota, an IJV between FAW and Toyota founded in 2002, is FAW's
second largest passenger vehicle division; in 2008, it sold over one-third million units of Toyota-
branded vehicles. Besides this Tianjin-based division, FAW and Toyota operate Sichuan-FAW-
Toyota under a separate IJV arrangement. This operation has two manufacturing plants in
Chengdu and Changchun.
In addition the IJVs, the FAW Group has three sizable non-IJV operations. Two of them,
FAW-Xiali and FAW-Haima, were affiliated with FAW through mergers with the Tianjin
Automotive Group (TAG) in 2002 and with the Hainan Automotive Group (HAG) in 1998,
respectively. FAW-Xiali produces licensed Daihatsu and Toyota compact sedans with the Xiali
brand, and FAW-Haima manufactures Haima-branded vehicles based on Mazda technologies.
FAW Car is also the group's key non-IJV division. In 2009, FAW Car produced a total of 89,088
units of self-branded models based on imported technologies; among them, 88,775 units were the
Besturn lineup built on the Mazda 6 platform and the rest 313 units were the new Hongqi model
built on an Audi platform and a Chrysler engine.
4.3.2. Macro Analysis: Spatial and Organizational Expansion
For a long period, FAW led the domestic automotive sector as China's oldest and biggest local
automaker. FAW's leadership in the sector, however, was seriously challenged since 1986 when
DFM excelled in its commercial vehicle production volume and SAIC began to solidify its
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leading position in the market's fast-growing passenger vehicle segment in the late 1980s. In fact,
FAW's growth slowed from the early 1970s, though it was still the largest local automaker.
FAW's initial production capacity (30,000 units per year) was expanded twice by 1971, but after
then remained approximately the same for the following decade (Chen et al., 2008). During the
same period, FAW's technology development was also stalled. Until it introduced the second
generation Jiefang model in the market in 1987, FAW still continued to produce the dated Jiefang
trucks and Hongqi sedans, developed in the 1950s. FAW needed to initiate new growth strategies
to retrieve its market leadership.
Clinging to its glorious past, FAW's management until recently gave its consideration to
group-wide production volume expansion before any other concerns. The main mechanics of
FAW's output growth was the JV partnership and domestic merger. FAW-VW and FAW-Toyota,
the two IJVs accounting for over two-thirds of FAW's total passenger vehicle volume, are located
distant from each other partly due to their different origins. In contrast to the FAW-VW alliance,
arranged by the Changchun-based FAW HQ, the FAW-Toyota partnership was originally initiated
by TAG, which was affiliated with the FAW Group in 2002. TAG and Toyota jointly operated
automotive parts manufacturing plants since 1995, and their partnership extended to vehicle
assembly in 2000 by establishing a vehicle assembly JV Tianjin-Toyota-FAW-Toyota's
predecessor. After the merger between FAW and TAG, part of TAG's equity share in Tianjin-
Toyota was transferred to FAW and the assembly IJV was reborn as FAW-Toyota. Accordingly,
the FAW-Toyota alliance has been developed centering on Tianjin, distant from the group's home
base.
FAW's two sizable non-IJV operations are also located outside FAW's home for similar
reasons. First, FAW-Xiali, which produces self-branded compact sedans based on licensed
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Daihatsu and Toyota technologies, was part of TAG until 2002. The Xiali division has Tianjin-
based self-contained organizational capability, little in need of support from the group's HQ.
Second, FAW-Haima, located on the Hainan Island of China's south end, was affiliated with the
FAW Group in 1998. The predecessor of Haima is Hainan-Mazda, an IJV established in 1992
between HAG and Mazda, but Mazda fully liquidated its equity in the operation by late 2006. At
present, HAG and the Hainan provincial government, jointly holding a 51% equity stake,
exercise the final management right for FAW-Haima (Table 3-5).
Table 3-5: Major Passenger
SAIC Divisions
FAW-VW
FAW-Toyota (Tianjin)
FAW-Toyota (Sichuan)
FAW-Xiali*
FAW-Haima
FAW Car*"
FAW-Jilin
FAW-Hongta
Vehicle Divisions of the FAW Group, 2009
Equity Ownership Structure
FAW Foreign Others
60% VW: 30%; -
Audi: 10%
20% Toyota: 50% FAW-)X
50% Toyota: 50% -
48%
49%
53%
100%
51%
iali: 30%
TAG: 32%; Public: 20%
HAG: 49%;
Hainan Local Gov't: 2%
Public: 47%
Yunnan Hongta Group: 30%;
Yunnan Light Vehicle: 19%
Note: * FAW-Xiali was listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1999.
**FAW Car was listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1997.
Source: CATARC (2009); firm websites.
One thing noteworthy in FAW's growth pattern is that it has involved substantial
organizational and spatial expansion at the same time. Now the FAW Group manages a large
number of functionally overlapped divisional units throughout the nation. The inter-divisional
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organizational ties within FAW, however, are rather loose. Even after the mergers, each passenger
vehicle operation tends to remain as its own rather than as part of the FAW Group, as evidenced
by the fact that FAW-Xiali and FAW-Haima still exist as quasi-independent operational units
under the significant managerial influences of their ex-equity holders such as TAG (and the
Tianjin Municipality) and HAG (and the Hainan provincial government). The FAW HQ has not
been active in reforming the group's governing structure as the mergers were primarily motivated
by group-wide output capacity expansion rather than other strategic concerns.
4.3.3. Micro Analysis: Internal Hierarchies
Self-branded vehicle development projects may reveal FAW's M-form structure with weak inter-
divisional organizational ties. As of 2009, three FAW-affiliated divisions produced seven
passenger vehicle models without using foreign brand names (Table 3-6). First, FAW Car
produced the Hongqi sedan, upgraded from its original 1953 version, under the FAW brand. The
Changchun Automotive Research Institute, now part of the FAW Group, adopted the Audi 100
platform, to which the Chrysler-licensed CA488 engine was fitted, as base technology for the
redesigned Hongqi model (Lee et al., 2006). Second, FAW-Xiali introduced three Xiali-branded
compact sedan models, based on dated Toyota technologies. The Xiali division carried out only
minor local adaptation tasks for the licensed Daihatsu and Toyota models; in fact, discretionary
modifications of the licensed technologies beyond certain extents were prohibited under the
licensing arrangement. Finally, FAW-Haima built three sedan models with the Haima brand. At
least two of the three models were based on previous generation Mazda platforms.
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Self-branded Vehicles Produced by the FAW Group, 2009
Vehicle Model Vehicle Class Base Technology
Hongqi (New) Full size/Luxury Audi platform; Chrysler engine
Xiali Compact Daihatsu Charade (licensed
production)
Vizi (Vitz) Compact Toyota (licensed production)
Vela Compact Toyota (licensed production)
Haima M2 Compact Mazda 2 platform
Familia Standard Mazda 323 platform
Haima 3 Standard Adopted in-house-developed
HA-VIS 1.8 engine
Units sold in 2009Units sold in 2009
313
150,762
530
4,890
5,154
71,967
9,551
Source: CATARC (2009); Interview #23.
FAW's self-branded lineups symbolize the group's divisional technology development
approach. Each of FAW's three independent brand divisions has its own research and engineering
department: FAW Car depends on the group's main engineering arm CARI, FAW-Xiali has its
own technical center in Tianjin, and FAW-Haima operates independent R&D facilities in Haikou,
Shanghai, and Zhengzhou. There is little evidence, however, of active inter-divisional
collaborations within the FAW Group. FAW Car, though the group's central operational unit in
self-branded vehicle development, has not shown a critical leadership in mobilizing the group-
wide resources. Even after FAW's rebirth as a large automotive business group through a series of
mergers, FAW Car, FAW-Xiali and FAW-Haima still depend on their ex-IJV partners or foreign
technology licensers (VW, Toyota, and Mazda, respectively) for base product and manufacturing
technologies, while neglecting technological cooperation among themselves.
There are several reasons for the substantial organizational distance among FAW
divisions. First, TAG and HAG had strong identities of their own as sizable local SOEs. They
existed as part of Tianjin and Hainan local municipal governments, respectively. These local
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Table 3-6:
Brand
FAW
Xiali
Haima
municipalities still have substantial influence on the management of FAW-Xiali and FAW-Haima
divisions as principal stakeholders. Except partial equity transfer, nothing else changed much.
Second, the regionally fragmented group governance system, however, was left largely
unchanged given the lack of FAW HQ's strategic concerns (e.g., group-wide synergy for new
vehicle development) about the merger, except inflating the group's gross output level. After the
merger, the group's HQ replaced part of the management of the group's new division by its own
people, while keeping much of the preexisting governing system. Third, each division's managers,
though transferred from the group's HQ, were not very active in initiating horizontal resource
sharing efforts with other divisions. Divisional managers tended to see other divisions as
competitors rather than as members of the same FAW family as many of them regarded their
careers at FAW as stepping stones to climb up the hierarchical ladder within the central
government or the communist party.4 8 Their political promotion is by and large indexed with
their management records in FAW divisions. Finally, when intra-group operational units had
weak organizational ties, spatial dispersion was a clear disadvantage as it further weakened the
group HQ's monitoring and coordination capability.
4.4. Dongfeng Motor (DFM) Group
In this section, I examine the last case firm, DFM Group, focusing on how DFM's IJV-based
growth strategy has shaped its intra-group governance pattern and how the governance pattern
has affected the firm's in-house technology development performance.
48 For example, Jiang Zemin (ex-President of China), Li Lanqing (ex-First Vice Premier), Zou Jiahua (ex-Vice
Premier), He Guangyuan (ex-Minister of Machine-Building and Electronics Industry), Lu Fuyuan (ex-Minister of
Commerce), Rao Bin, and Chen Zutao (Both Rao and Chen are ex-Chairmen of the China National Automotive
Industrial Corporation) all served for FAW in the middle of their political careers (Chen et al., 2008).
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4.4.1. Brief History
In 1964 the Chinese central government established the Second Automotive Works (SAW), the
matrix organization of the current DFM Group, in Shiyan, a small town in Hubei Province. In an
objective sense, Shiyan was not well suited as an industrial location, as it was located in an inland
mountainous area where road and railway access was limited. Chinese political leaders, however,
strategically chose Shiyan as the home for SAW due to the city's locational disadvantage. Given
the increased international political tensions in the 1960s (e.g., the outbreak of the Vietnam War
and the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations), they clearly saw the need to build an alternative
automotive production base safe from potential external military attacks, in order to make
provisions for the case when the FAW production base could not function. A group of FAW
engineers were transferred to Shiyan for the national SAW project.
In 1978, SAW began to produce a light truck model, Dongfeng EQ 140, after over a
decade of preparation, construction, and testing production. 49 Dongfeng EQ140, developed by
CARI, was initially planned to replace FAW's dated Jiefang CA10 model, but the central
government transferred the model to SAW for actual production (Chen et al., 2008). Compared
with FAW, SAW met consumers' needs more closely to broaden its market share by providing
more product options (multiple variations of the original truck design) and better post-sales
services (in particular, maintenance and repair) (Byrd, 1992). Such a market penetration strategy,
combined with its more technologically advanced product, helped SAW take over the market-
leading position from FAW in 1986.
The initial form of the DFM Group appeared in 1978 as an SAW-centered but rather
49 Such a long period was required to build manufacturing plants partly due to Shiyan's unfavorable geographical
conditions (Byrd, 1992).
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loose alliance of nine local auto producers located in four provinces-Hubei, Sichuan, Guangxi,
and Guangdong (Byrd, 1992). Their cooperation was carried out such that member firms
assembled SAW-provided knocked-down kits under the Dongfeng brand. In 1981, the Chinese
central government formalized the alliance as an independent business group. As DFM's key
labor power and functional organizations were inherited from SAW, the group was initially
headquartered in Shiyan. However, disadvantages of the location-such as the low transport
accessibility, limited land reserves, and weak human resource pool-became a huge burden when
DFM pursued its organic growth in the post-reform period. Accordingly, DFM's group HQ, after
being relocated twice, is now settled in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei Province.
Since the early 1990s, the DFM Group has expanded its passenger-vehicle segment
business mainly through IJV partnerships. At present, all of DFM's four major passenger vehicle
divisions are IJVs (Figure 3-7). DFM's oldest assembly IJV is DF-Peugeot Citrodn (PSA),
established in 1992. As of 2009, DF-PSA produced over a quarter million units of Peugeot- and
Citro6n-branded vehicles. In 2002, DFM established two IJVs. One is DFM's biggest IJV DF-
Nissan; the other is DF-Yueda-Kia, where DFM, Jiangsu Yueda Group, and Kia Motor have
equity stakes. DF-Nissan, which operates two manufacturing bases in Xiangfan and Guangzhou,
sold over half a million units of Nissan-branded vehicles in 2009, and DF-Yueda-Kia sold nearly
a quarter million units of Kia-branded vehicles in the same year. In 2004, DFM established its
youngest IJV DF-Honda in partnership with Honda. By 2009, DF-Honda developed an annual
production capacity of over 200 thousand units of Honda-branded vehicles.
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'O The nine automakers included SAW.
DFM's Major Passenger Car
Production Bases in China
Sino-foreign Joint venture Division without foreign equity control
- Established in 1998
- Passenger Car Production in
2009: 244,o68 units
- Established in 2008
- PassengerCar Production in
2009: 18,69o units
- Established in 1992
- Passenger Car Production in
2009: 262,889 units
- Established in 2003
- Passenger Car Production in
2009: 208,131 units
- Established in 1986
- Passenger Car Production in
2009: 144,682 units
DF-iu 6o
- Joined DFM in 1981 Established in 2002
- Passenger Car Production in Passenger Car Production in
2009: 24,228 units 2009: 522,965 units
Figure 3-7: DFM's Major Passenger Car Production Bases in Mainland China, 2009
Note: Some local-branded minibuses are included in the passenger-vehicle production volume statistics, shown
above.
Source: Created by author; annual output data from Fourin (2009); other information from DFM's official website.
It was not until 2008 that DFM raised the status of its self-branded passenger vehicle
development unit to a division level: the DF Passenger Vehicle Company launched its first
vehicle model Fengshen S30 in May 2009. The other two divisions shown in Figure 3-7, DF-
Yuan and DF-Liuzhou, are dedicated primarily to commercial vehicle production.
4.4.2. Macro Analysis: Spatial and Organizational Expansion
The primary firm growth mechanics for DFM is the IJV partnerships. All of the four sizable DFM
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passenger-vehicle divisions are OEM assembly IJVs operated in four different cities (Table 3-7;
see also Figure 3-7). As discussed in detail in the first chapter, Sino-foreign IJVs by nature exist
as independent business entities, rather than as part of local JV partner firms. Considering that
DFM, originated from a loose alliance of nine state-owned automotive manufacturing plants,
already had a decentralized group governing structure, the IJV-based, spatially disintegrated
organic growth further raised intra-organizational distance.
Table 3-7: Major Passenger Vehicle Divisions of the DFM Group, 2009
Equity Ownership Structure
SAIC Divisions DFM Foreign Others
DF-PSA 50% PSA: 50% -
DF-Nissan 50% Nissan: 50% -
DF-Honda 50% Honda: 50% -
DF-Yueda-Kia 25% Kia: 50% Jiangsu Yueda Group: 25%
DF Passenger Vehicle 100%
DF-Yuan 50% Chongqing Yuan Group: 50%
DF-Liuzhou - DF-Nissan: 75%
Source: CATARC (2009).
The Dongfeng Passenger Vehicle Company (DFPVC)-comparable to SAIC Motor and
FAW Car divisions in primary charge of SAIC's and FAW's group-wide independent vehicle
development projects, respectively-was founded in 2008. The predecessor of DFPVC existed as
a functional department within the DF Group HQ before then. Understandably, it was not until
May 2009 that DFM introduced its first self-branded passenger-vehicle model (Fengshen S30),
the development of which was led by DFPVC. The lack of efforts to create group-wide synergy
for in-house technological capability seems to suggest that such a strategic concern did not
5 DFM's four sizable passenger-vehicle divisions here refer to DF-PSA, DF-Nissan, DF-Honda, and DF-Yueda-Kia.
52 Here, I use the term loose alliance to emphasize that SAW initially functioned as the DFM Group's HQ but the
other eight sub-operational units were endowed with substantial managerial autonomy.
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function as the primary motivation for DFM's organic growth. The establishment of DFPVC and
the launch of Fengshen S30 were, in fact, the outcomes more of the central government's push
for independent vehicle development, clearly specified in its 2004 automotive policy, than of
DFM's self motivation. 53 The motivation for rapid extensive growth based on the addition of new
IJV partnerships has primarily determined DFM's spatially fragmented organic expansion. As a
DFM manager admitted during the interview, a relatively small operation scale in the passenger
vehicle segment (Figure 3-8), compared with those of SAIC and FAW, raised DFM's concern that
it might be excluded from the central government's primary preferential policy targets, and such
pressure by and large shaped DFM's current M-form structure lacking central coordination
functions.54
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Figure 3-8: Annual Passenger-Vehicle Output by Firm, 1998-2009
Source: Date from Fourin (2009).
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* Interviews #21 and 23.
54 Interview #21.
4.4.3. Micro Analysis: New Vehicle Development
Like most other Sino-foreign assembly JVs, DFM-affiliated IJVs also lack in-house technology
development capabilities. Each of DFM's four assembly IJVs operates an internal engineering
department, but its functionality is limited to secondary engineering support for local OEM
production such as minor local adaptation of foreign technologies or vehicle safety testing.55
This circumstance has seriously constrained DFM's IJV-based technological catch-up. Perhaps
foreign automakers, lacking motivations for localizing R&D, are partly responsible for DFM's
retarded in-house technology development. DFM, however, should also take part of the blame for
the outcome, given the lack of the strategic motivations underlying its IJV partnerships (other
than increasing group-wide output) and efforts to raise foreign alliance partners' commitment to
local R&D. As evidenced by the SAIC case, the IJV partnership can be a precious asset in
building in-house technological capability, particularly when it is accompanied by intra-
organizational proximity, managed toward a clear group-wide goal. However, DFM has failed to
control intra-organizational distance in its organic growth path.
In 2009, DFM completed its first self-branded passenger-vehicle development project
(Fengshen S30). According to several DFM interviewees, the group's IJV experience was of little
help for this project.56 In fact, this project followed one of China's typical vehicle-development
formulae-fitting multi-sourced component technologies into a dated vehicle platform under the
license arrangement (Table 3-8)."7 The base technology for Fengshen S30 is the PSA-licensed
platform for Citrodn ZX, whose production in Europe had already ceased in 1998. To compensate
* Multiple firm interviews with DFM managers and engineers confirmed that DF-PSA R&D Center (established in
2002; located in Wuhan), DF-Nissan R&D Center (established in 2003; located in Guangzhou), and DF-Honda
Development Center (established in 2006; located in Wuhan) were all engaged in minor localization activities.
56 Interviews #6, 21, and 22.
" FAW's Hongqi model was also engineered in a similar way.
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for the dated powertrain technology, DFM separately acquired a production license for the engine
developed for the Peugeot 307 model58, and sourced newer transmissions from Aisin and PSA.
These separately outsourced powertrain components (and some other key parts) were then fitted
onto the platform. 59 The overall and detailed vehicle designs were outsourced to an Italy-based
vehicle design and engineering firm Italdesign. The primary tasks, done by the DFM HQ and
DFPVC in the S30 project, were production engineering and manufacturing, respectively,
substantial in-house capability for which DFM already developed through its three-decade-long
commercial-vehicle manufacturing experience. This fact symbolically shows that the IJV
experience did not add much to DFM's in-house technological capability.
Table 3-8: Details on Fengshen S30, 2009
Vehicle Base Technology* En,
Class
Compact - Platform: Citrodn ZX 0 P
(sedan) - Engine: 1.6L N6A gasoline * F
(Peugeot 307)
- Transmission: Aisin 4-speed AT
(automatic) or PSA 5-speed MT 0 I
(manual)
I
Source: * Firm Interviews; ** Wang (2009); **Fourin (2010).
gineering Sources, etc.
roduction: DFPVC
&D: DF Automobile Engineering
esearch Institute & Technical
enter (DFM HQ)
Design outsourced to the
taldesign-Giugiaro S.p.A. (Turin,
taly)
Besides substantial organizational distance (due to a loose group governance structure
and the IJV division's independent internal hierarchy), managerial rigidity, combined with spatial
dispersion, has also hindered DFM in its attempts to incorporate IJV experience into the group's
58 Peugeot 307, whose replacement Peugeot 308 was released in the market in 2007, was produced in Europe
between 2001 and 2008.
59 Some key parts were outsourced from other leading global parts makers including Bosch, Lear, and Delphi (Wang,
2009).
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Units sold in
2009
20,889
new vehicle development project. Due to its central ownership, the local government (whether for
Hubei Province or for Wuhan City) has had only limited degrees of direct influence on DFM's
management, and accordingly, the group's organizational growth and localization strategy are not
confined to a specific locality. A low degree of spatial clustering, however, is a clear disadvantage
in DFM's IJV-based catch-up practice, as proximity-based labor pooling (sharing of IJV-trained
human resources) is a main horizontal spillover channel.
In this situation, a brain drain in the local automotive sector, caused by DFM's
managerial rigidity, has made the situation even worse. A strong socialist legacy, for example,
survives in DFM's standardized seniority-based wage system, where wage margins are narrow
among employees engaged in similar tasks. Recently, DFM has been losing its skilled labor and
talented engineers to other firms located outside its home base (SAIC is a notable example),
partly due to its limited ability to offer them attractive incentive packages. 60 The DFM
management recognizes this problem, but little change has been made to their system due to the
expected resistance from existing DFM employees, who would not bear too high wage
differentials among them.
4.5. Comparative Analysis of the Chinese Big Three Automotive Groups
Over the last two decades, all of China's three largest automakers have experienced rapid growth
in terms of both output and organization. Each originated from a single automotive assembly
plant but later grew into its current multi-divisional business group having operations in multiple
locations. Each group confronts challenges to deal with greater internal organizations and larger
60 As an example case, a Chinese automotive magazine journalist told me about a DFM engineer with 20 years of
experience, who moved to the SAIC Group with a compensation package four times higher than the one he received
at DFM (Interview #23).
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geographical space, in order to create group-wide synergy.
Those three business groups, however, have developed different degrees of intra-
organizational distance, due to their distinctive growth mechanics. First, SAIC has pursued
Shanghai-centered firm growth under the leadership of the group's HQ and the existing SAIC-
GM partnership. Accordingly, even after the firm expansion, the SAIC HQ could maintain their
tight monitoring and coordination function, and each vehicle manufacturing division could
develop a strong identity as part of the SAIC Group. This is also the case for the NAG-SAIC
merger, as evidenced by Nanjing-MG integrated to the SAIC Group as part of the SAIC Motor
division, rather than as an autonomous operational unit.
Second, FAW's primary growth mechanics has been domestic mergers, accompanied by
substantial spatial expansion. FAW's major passenger-vehicle divisions have functioned as quasi-
independent operational units with strong self-identities (as the division itself, not as part of the
FAW Group); for not only have FAW's mergers targeted sizable local SOEs with long operational
histories (thus strong self-identity) but their ex-owners (local governments) also continue to
remain major stakeholders even after the mergers.
Finally, DFM employed the IJV-driven growth strategy. DFM's passenger vehicle
divisional group has been a bundle of independent firms rather than one organic body as each IJV,
by arrangement, functions independent of the group's internal hierarchies. DFM's organizations
are not very well spatially integrated, either, due to low intra-organizational interdependency and
few valuable location-specific factors in DFM's home location.
SAIC has taken substantial advantage of its intra-organizational proximity in carrying out
a series of independent vehicle-development projects (thus, in building in-house technological
capability). First, close inter-organizational ties, developed in particular between SAIC and GM
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through a series of their IN projects61, have paved the way for upgrading OEM assembly-
centered Sino-foreign strategic alliances into more comprehensive ones, including joint R&D.
Such relational assets have functioned as effective boundary spanners, which promote knowledge
transfer between GM and its Chinese operations. In contrast, DFM's IJV operation strategy has
been the exact opposite. DFM has simply widened its global alliances without deepening them.
Accordingly, relational assets that DFM has developed through its IJV projects are not as solid as
those SAIC has, though DFM has substantially increased its passenger vehicle output volume
through its widened IJV partnerships.
Second, the spatial clustering of SAIC's key operations encouraged horizontal
knowledge spillovers, driven by regional labor pooling and inter-firm labor mobility. Although
foreign automakers have minimized the possibility of unwanted horizontal knowledge spillovers
mediated by their IJV operations, SAIC has incorporated its IJV-based learning by employing ex-
IJV human resources for its fully owned subsidiaries. Inter-divisional labor mobility (particularly,
from SAIC-affiliated IJVs to SAIC's fully controlled divisions) is higher for SAIC than for FAW
and DFM, partly because the SAIC case (inter-firm labor transfer within Shanghai) does not
involve any significant changes in living environment from a laborer's perspective, and SAIC's
management shows more flexible and active attitudes to attract local talents.
Finally, active knowledge-sharing among SAIC divisions, initiated under the group HQ's
coordination, has promoted the group-wide absorptive capacity. SAIC's acquisition of external
assets was driven by the strong motivation of internalizing others' strategic resources, and it was
followed by group-wide systematic efforts for inter-divisional knowledge sharing. SAIC has
61 The original SAIC-GM alliance for SGM and PATAC has been expanded to SGM-Dongyue, SGM-Norsom, and
SGM-Wuling. Also, SAIC has participated in the management of GM's Korean operation (GM-Daewoo), since 2002,
with a 10% stake in it.
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successfully integrated its own technological capability, developed through IJV partnerships and
acquired ex-Rover operations, with the core competencies residing within Nanjing-MG (MG
brand and ex-MG manufacturing assets and product designs) and Ssangyong Motor (independent
vehicle development and engineering capabilities) operations under a series of inter-divisional
joint vehicle development projects.62 Joint project teams, whose members are recruited from
multiple divisions, are prevalent practices within SAIC, and such inter-divisional interactions
have generated key dynamics for mutual learning and knowledge sharing across divisions.
SAIC's group-wide intranet system, where the group's sub-operational units can access group-
wide intellectual assets such as vehicle drawings and technical documents according to
authorization level, has further assisted inter-divisional interactions. 63
In contrast, FAW and DFM have failed to incorporate division-specific assets at the
group level, as evidenced by their independent vehicle development projects. FAW and DFM
have had weak motivations for restructuring their preexisting group governance for closer inter-
divisional collaboration, on the one hand (as their organic and spatial expansion has been
dominated by extensive growth motivations without deep strategic concerns about potential
group-wide synergy), ex-local SOEs and IJVs affiliated with FAW or DFM have preferred to
remain alone, not as part of the group governance, due to their strong self-identities, on the other
hand. As a result, FAW Car and DFPVC, FAW and DFM's central sub-organizational units for
self-branded vehicle development, respectively, have maintained their conventional vehicle
development architecture, which employs a dated foreign vehicle platform fitted with multi-
sourced components as base technology. This fact demonstrates that FAW and DFM have failed
62 For example, around 40 Ssangyong engineers have been working in Shanghai, under (on average) three-year
contracts, for SAIC-branded vehicle development projects (Interviews #19 and 20).
63 Interviews #15 and 20.
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to utilize their organic growth for in-house technological capability-building, in the absence of
intra-organizational proximity.
5. Conclusions
Through a comparative analysis of China's three largest automotive business groups, this chapter
argues that intra-organizational proximity is crucial when latecomers attempt to create in-house
technological edges from external resources. As I pointed out in two earlier pieces, inward (e.g.,
IJV-based strategic alliance) and outward globalization (e.g., outward FDI) strategies can lead to
a better technological catch-up outcome when they are combined: their effective combination
helps latecomers establish access to more comprehensive external knowledge resources. Another
crucial contributor to the catch-up performance, which I would like to suggest through this study,
is latecomers' internal effort to convert acquired external resources into more valuable assets for
themselves. The gist of this study is that acquired external resources can be better internalized
when a latecomer's organizational growth, led by its asset-seeking inward and outward FDI
strategies, is followed by its active internal efforts to maintain or enhance intra-organizational
proximity.
The SAIC management, as I highlighted throughout, has sought the group's
organizational growth while sustaining intra-organizational proximity. In the case of SAIC,
spatial expansion has not created serious barriers to creating group-wide synergy as such physical
expansion has been well managed by the compact relational space shared across SAIC's key sub-
operational units (e.g., multiple geographical operations governed by the SAIC-GM IJV
partnership; the Nanjing-MG division consolidated with SAIC Motor's internal hierarchy).
Deepened, instead of widened, IJV partnerships have functioned as effective boundary spanners
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between SAIC and its IJV partners (i.e., foreign JV partners' higher commitment to local
technology development), and inter-firm labor mobility, promoted by spatial clustering and
managerial flexibility (e.g., SAIC's ability to offer local talents attractive incentive packages), has
substantially loosened constraints against IJV-mediated knowledge spillovers toward SAIC. Also,
SAIC's acquired domestic and foreign operations have added substantial technological assets to
SAIC's own; clear asset-seeking motivations have underlain SAIC's major acquisition, and SAIC
has, in fact, encouraged inter-divisional knowledge sharing and integration with various inter-
divisional joint projects and knowledge-sharing channels (e.g., human exchanges, group-wide
intranet).
In the cases of FAW and DFM, however, there is little evidence that their firm growth has
been followed by internal efforts to sustain an optimal degree of intra-organizational distance.
With recent organic growth, both firms have developed M-form organizational structures, where
each division is spatially and managerially separated from other intra-group parallel divisions.
Accordingly, strategic assets residing within sub-operational units have not been effectively
mobilized at the group level, as evidenced by both groups' division-isolated own brand vehicle
development practices.
As a result, in part, of differing intra-organizational distance management, the
technological catch-up performance gap now seems clear between SAIC and the other two
groups. On the one hand, SAIC has launched 11 of its self-branded passenger vehicle models
built on six in-house-engineered platforms over the last four years. Although four platforms
acquired from ex-MG-Rover Group provided the initial starting points of SAIC's technology
development for the six platforms, SAIC has added a significant amount of its own in-house
technological capability (also mobilized from Nanjing-MG and Ssangyong Motor divisions) so
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that the dated platforms may be reborn into those matching the contemporary standard
technologies. As a GM engineer commented, SAIC Motor's Roewe lineup has now reached
SGM's Buick quality.64 On the other hand, FAW and DFM's self-branded lineups have not made
any significant progress from technology development perspectives. FAW's Hongqi and Haima
lineups and DFM's recent Fengshen S30 model are all built on foreign-licensed dated vehicle
platforms fitted with multi-sourced core component technologies, and FAW's Xiali lineup is
simply a re-branded launch of dated Daihatsu and Toyota compact sedans onto the Chinese
market under the license production arrangement.
In sum, this comparative case study of China's Big Three automotive groups provides us
with three key implications for latecomers, in general. First, spatial proximity, combined with
certain managerial practices to raise inter-firm labor mobility, may substantially promote
horizontal spillovers between local firms and their foreign-invested operations. Second, the
compact relational space, regardless of a firm's spatial expansion, may generate valuable
relational capital between local and foreign firms that can be crucial in increasing foreign firms'
commitment to local technology development. Finally, when a firm grows substantially, whether
in financial or organizational terms, as an outcome of external asset acquisition, its intra-
organizational proximity is critical for more effective internalization of the acquired assets. In
particular, intra-organizational proximity is critical for (inter-divisional) mutual learning and
knowledge integration at the group level.
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64 Interview #2.
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